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CONFERENCE ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF QUANTUM MECHANICS 
October 1-5, 1962 
Public Relations Policy 
In order that each participant may feel free to express himself 
spontaneously in the spirit of the limited attendance portion of this 
conference, the chairman has adopted the following policy regarding 
references.  It is understood that each person present, before 
referring in publication to remarks made by a participant during these 
sessions is expected to check such material with the participant or 
participants concerned. Reports of general conclusions are to be 
checked with the chairman.  This policy applies as well to the published 
report of the proceedings, which is to be edited by the chairman. 
Dr. Podolsky:  In the heat of an argument I can make a statement, and 
I probably will, which any freshman with a pencil and paper and five 
minutes can prove to be nonsense.  Perhaps a few minutes later I might 
regret having made the statement.  Now, we don't want such statements 
to get out.  The principle reason for this is to make sure the 
participants won't stop to worry about whether or not what they're 
saying is really so, or whether it is nonsense.  We want the 
participants to feel free to express themselves spontaneously, and 
afterwards, in more sober discussions, withdraw these statements 
without things getting out in the newspapers. 
MON-A.M. 
Conference - October 1-5, 1962 
Part of Monday Morning Session after introductions: 
Podolsky:  You probably have seen in the newspapers some reference to 
quantum-mechanical action at a distance. The idea of that occurred to me 
and probably has occurred to many other people.  I would like sometime 
to have a discussion on this subject.   Aharonov and Bohm suggested an 
experiment which was, as you know, performed by Mölllenstedt, and which 
can be interpreted in two ways.  One is that the vector potential has 
physical significance.  That was the way in which they presented it.  But 
if you consider the fact that the observed phase shift in the wave function 
actually turns out to be proportional to the flux, which is gauge invariant, 
one might interpret the result of the experiment in a different way, namely, 
that the reason we have the shift is quantum-mechanical action at a 
distance. The fact that flux through a loop formed by the two electron 
beams actually affects the wave function of these two electron beams and 
produces the observed phase shift at the place where the flux is not, will 
be an example of an action at a distance.  Now if this experiment was alone 
it would not convince me that there is such an action at a distance, because 
then it would be simplest to say that a vector potential has a direct effect.  
But there is this old question, sometimes referred to as the 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, where also we have a kind of action at 
a distance.  You are all probably familiar with that.  I have discussed 
this question of quantum-mechanical action at a distance with several 
people and one of them said "Well, of course, in all the quantum-mechanical 
effects there is action at a distance."  For example:  when you take the 
so-called reduction of a wave packet and the wave function suddenly 
changes from one thing to something quite different, there is again a kind 
of action at a distance,  I would like expressions of opinion about 
this question of action at a distance. 
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Aharonov:  It is clear that this action at a distance is never observable 
in the usual sense.  The usual statement about observation involves 
probabilistic statements, and it is clearly the case that in all the other 
examples that you mention about action at a distance there will be a change 
in a particular case, but not a probabilistic change in an ensemble of 
cases. 
Podolsky:  But what about the Aharonov-Bohm experiment? 
Aharonov:  Well, in that case there is a change in probabilities too, of 
course, because that is what we observe in the experiment.  But one can 
in that particular case discuss a local action which involves an 
interaction with potentials.  You wanted to strengthen the idea of action 
at a distance by discussing other examples, but I am not aware of any other 
example of action at a distance that will involve change in probabilities 
and not only in information.  In one particular case, namely, in the case 
of ensembles, there is no change in probabilities after so-called action 
at a distance. 
Podolsky:  What about the experiment of Wu and Shaknov? 
Aharonov:  Well, this case is exactly similar to any other example of the 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox.  That is to say:  in any individual case, 
when you make an experiment on one of the particles that are involved in 
the setup of the paradox, you learn something about the state of the other 
particle.  In that sense, you have made a change in the wave function of 
the total system, and also of the particle that is far away. So you can 
predict something about the probabilities of an experiment that will be 
made on the other particle.  But if you consider an ensemble of similar 
experiments, you ask whether your measurements of the first particle in 
each pair of particles that appear in his ensemble will cause changes in 
probability of the second particle in the ensemble.  This means 
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that the observer that makes experiments on the second particle (all the 
members that are called second particle in the ensemble of 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs) will never be able to discover that the 
experiment was done on the first particle.  On the other hand, this action 
at a distance cannot send any information, or any change of probabilities 
to the faraway members.  In other words, there is a transformation of 
knowledge but not of probabilities from one side to the other.  
Podolsky: That makes the wave function purely a subjective entity.  That 
this isn't a subjective thing is shown by the fact that in a measurement 
when there is a transformation of knowledge, the wave function changes 
completely, while no other change occurs. 
(A brief discussion here continues about the question whether the change 
is complete or if only a partial change occurs in the wave function). 
Wigner:  Well, it is true that under certain conditions the change in the 
wave function is complete.  Anyway, it does not matter whether it is a 
 
knowledge? 
Wigner:  No. 
Furry:  By introduction of means of measurement, one could introduce a 
statistical situation which, from the point of view of the coordinates 
of the particle to be measured, is a mixed state. This mixed state is just 
the same thing as the classical Gibbs ensemble.  I did not say it 
 
 
difficulty, as in the case of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen, that the ensemble 
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can be interpreted from many points of view.  When I said the Gibbs ensemble, 
it implies a realistic interpretation.  This realistic interpretation is 
valid only in the usual laboratory set-up, when one is interested in 
measuring something that has non-uniform distribution over the 
 
possible to interpret it in many different ways.  This is, in a sense, 
an artificial situation, but the theory has to deal also with artificial 
situations.  Well, it just seems to me that the problem is perhaps the 
wholeness of the quantum state, and the quantum state may have this 
character as a whole extending over a very large distance.  In a certain 
sense it is like the Wu experiment, and this may conflict with 
old-fashioned ideas.  But probably we just have to accept these new 
properties.  London suggested that this property of wholeness may extend 
over a very large distance in a many bodied system.  
Wigner:  I do not think though, if I may put my two-bits in, that I fully 
agree with what Professor Furry says:  that the consequences of quantum 
theory are such that there is no way out of what he has mentioned. There 
are suspicious elements, though, since under some conditions it is very, 
very difficult to confirm the consequences of quantum theory.  This point 
has been emphasized, the first time in my knowledge, in the book of Bohm.  
The fact that it is so difficult to verify it makes one suspicious that 
perhaps all that is quantum theory cannot be applied to these very 
difficult situations.  I would like to hear about what the people that 
probably have thought very deeply and greatly about it think. 
Aharonov:  I wonder if you are familiar with an article that was written 
on this subject by Professor Bohm and myself, in which we analyze an 
MON-A.M. 
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experiment that was done by Yu.  (He pronounced it like "you".) 
Wigner, wholly astonished asks:  By who? 
Aharonov: By Wu.  (referring to Wu and Shaknov)  The experiment involves 
a case that is similar to the paradox in which two photons emerge from 
annihilation of electron and positron, and there is correlation between 
the photons polarization of a type similar to the correlation discussed 
in the products of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen.  The correlation is 
complete in the sense that whenever you measure the polarization of 
one of the photons in an arbitrary direction, you find the polarization 
of the other photon in the same direction well defined.  This means 
that by different measurements on the first photon, one could put the 
second photon in eigen states corresponding to a non-commuting operator, 
namely, polarization in different directions.  The purpose of our 
article was to show that no semi-classical description for this 
situation would suffice. If one assumes that the photons in each 
particular case are in a well-defined state of polarization, and one 
just gets the correlations in different directions as an average over 
different cases (that is, in different cases the polarization is well 
defined in different directions) one finds that the correlation between 
the results of measurement on one side and those on the other side are 
not enough.  The only possibility to account for the experimental 
results would be to assume that really the complete correlations of 
a quantum type, described by the products of E.P.R., are necessary.  
But one should add that this experiment is not conclusive as far as 
the question of signal velocities is considered, because the experiment 
was not done quickly enough to insure that there was no possibility 
of a light signal going from one photon to another photon.  The only 
clear way to insure that no hidden "interaction" 
MON-A.M. 
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between the two photons can account far this kind of correlation would 
be to send the photons so far away from each other that two measurements 
could be made on each one of them outside the light cone connecting the 
measurements.  Then there would be no possibility of sending information, 
from one photon to the other, about the type of experiment that is done. 
In that case, we could insure that as long as the hidden "interaction" 
behaves according to relativistic laws there is no other possibility to 
account for this type of correlation except by taking the quantum theory 
fully into account. 
Wigner:  I agree to this kind of a discussion completely, though I did 
not have this experiment in mind.  But I do think there is a contradiction. 
I agree that in all the actual cases one discusses about quantum theory, 
namely, the case of two electrons that one might like to quote, or the 
cases of two light quanta that you have discussed, quantum theory is 
probably valid and one may also discuss experimental verification in a 
way that you have pointed out.  In this connection, when the information 
cannot possibly be transmitted, it is certainly a fact of life.  But if 
we go to systems which are complicated, where, for example, even a 
photographic plate helps in a case similar to the 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox;  there the question whether quantum 
mechanics applies is not certainly clear.  It is not clear because it 
is virtually impossible to verify it due to the experimental difficulties, 
and because of the complexity of the system.  It may still be proved where 
there is a basis for doubt. Evidently it should be discussed, if at all, 
after we all held very clear discussions of the program, because clear 
discussion will add to it.  It also creates a common ground for the 
discussion during which we could approach things better instead of going 
again and again over preliminaries.  Maybe it will be a good thing to 
discuss it.  It 
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certainly would be one thing about which I would like to hear the views 
of some of those present.  Would the program allow us to take this ques-
tion up even though it is somewhat speculative?  
Podolsky:  I think it will be possible to arrange it. 
Furry:  I think we should devote a considerable amount of time to this 
question.  
Podolsky:   Are there any other opinions related to this? 
 
my ideas. 
Aharonov:  I would like to add a remark that will help to see the fact 
that no observable information can be sent using this type of correlation 
in a more picturesque way.  In order to do this, let me first emphasize 
that there is no way to distinguish, in quantum theory, between a box 
full of particles all spread over a passible eigenstate of position and 
another box with particles all in eigenstates of momentum spread over 
all the possible eigenvalues.  Put more exactly, we take one box where 
all the particles are in eigenstates of position with equal probability 
for each eigenvalue;  then in the other box all the particles are in 
eigenstates of momentum.  The number of particles in each eigenvalue of 
momentum is equal to the number of particles in any other eigenvalue of 
momentum.  There will certainly be a difference in the mathematical way 
that one should describe the two boxes, since the description of 
particles in one box will involve delta functions of position and pure 
plane waves in momentum, while in the other case one will have plane waves 
in position and delta functions in momentum space. It is an interesting 
observation that if there was any observable way to distinguish between 
these two boxes corresponding to the difference in the mathematical way 
that one describes them, then quantum theory and 
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special relativity would not be able to be brought together in a 
consistent way.  To see this better, come back to the example of the 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen case in which we have a pair of particles 
having their relative position and their total momentum both well 
defined. This means that by measuring the position of one of these 
particles we can put the other particle in an eigenstate of position, 
or instead, by measuring the momentum of the first particle we could 
put the other particle in a n eigenstate of momentum.  Now let's suppose 
that instead of having just one pair we have an ensemble of such pairs, 
all of them in the same state of relative position and total momentum 
but the two members of each pair are very far away from each other.  
Let's say all of the first members of each pair are on the earth and 
all of the second members of each pair are on the moon.  Now let's suppose 
that we make a measurement of position on each one of the first members, 
which are on the earth.  In this way we put all of the second members, 
uhich are on the moon, in eigenstates of position.  In other words, 
we have prepared all the particles on the moon in an ensemble of 
eigenstates of position spread over all the possibilities, because the 
position was not well defined to begin with.  But all of them are in 
eigenstates of position.  We could, on the other hand, have chosen to 
make a measurement of momentum on the first members on the earth, and 
in this way put all the particles on the moon in eigenstates of momentum.  
So in other words, we could prepare either a box of particles all in 
eigenstates of position, or a box of particles all in eigenstates of 
momentum, on the moon.  And this preparation would have gone on with 
arbitrary velocity, namely, instantaneously after the measurement was 
over on the earth all the particles on the moon would either be in 
eigenstates of momentum or in eigenstates of position, which, as I 
mentioned before, 
MON-A.M. 
-9- 
are distinguished by the mathematics.  If there was any way to 
distinguish between these two cases by observation, it would mean that 
we could instantaneously send information from the earth to the moon 
by deciding either to make a measurement of position or to make a 
measurement of momentum.  So in this way we see more clearly why we 
say that this type of correlation causes a kind of action at a distance, 
quantum mechanical action at a distance.  It affects only the 
mathematics and not the physically observed state, because there is 
no way to distinguish observationally between one kind of measurement 
and another kind of measurement.  Oh, Wigner just mentioned that 
old-fashioned people remember that in his first article on the problem 
of mixture he discussed a similar example.  I was not aware of the fact 
that I re-discovered this instead of invented it. 
Wigner:  Well anyhow it is an important point, but it's a little bit 
distinct from the problem we would like to discuss now.  Would anybody 
from the audience like to defend the idea that quantum theory really 
describes correctly the question of the wave-function collapse? One 
finds again and again articles in which it is stated that the problem 
of the reduction of the wave packet is unnecessary, and that this 
reduction is an old-fashioned idea.  If we could hear a little more 
on that it would be very useful.  But we should, of course, hear about 
it from somebody who is convinced about it. 
Furry:  Well, if there is somebody here who believes in this, he should 
know exactly what you mean.  I take it that what you mean is that there 
is no need to go outside the present organized formalism in order to 
understand the reduction of the wave function.  
Wigner:  Do you believe that?  
Furry: I don't believe in that.  Quantum theory certainly describes 
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changes that are different from the changes that are necessary in 
measurement theory.  Now if one could find a way to describe 
measurement theory consistently also, so that there will not be this 
difficulty in a description of the ordinary kinds of dependent states 
and measurement cases, it would be very interesting.  But I know that 
quantum theory is not that theory. 
Aharonov:  I would like to describe one kind of such an attempt which 
says that the universe is taken to be infinite and therefore includes 
infinite degrees of freedom.  All of them in some sense take part in 
every measurement process and therefore it is never possible to 
discuss all of them in a closed or complete theory which is finite.  
Therefore one always has to discuss an open system in which one has 
a mathematics that is different from the mathematics of the closed 
system, namely, that time dependent evolution is not given just by 
canonical formalism. One has to discuss a more general case of density 
matrices that have non-canonical equations of motion.  The reason for 
these non-canonical kinds of time displacing operators comes from the 
fact that you have to integrate over all of those degrees of freedom 
that you have to neglect, namely, the infinite number of them that you 
don't consider in your equations.  In that case you find that the 
equations of motion, for the rest of the degrees of freedom that you 
care to discuss, are non-canonical, and density matrices can introduce 
either a spread over its diagonal or the opposite case that corresponds 
to a collapse to one eigenstate of the measured quantity.  So in that 
sense people some-times say that one can get a consistent description 
of measurement theory, if one agrees on what it means to say that it 
is impossible to discuss any process by a closed system because there 
is always an infinite number of degrees of freedom involved, and 
therefore one has 
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always to discuss an open system.  I would like to add that this is 
not my own point of view.  I am just trying to give an argument that 
is quite common among people who try to say there is no difficulty 
in measurement, that it is only a question of mathematical 
difficulties in handling infinite systems.  Somehow I feel that one 
really avoids the main problem because it seems to me disturbing that 
one needs to fall back into the difficulties of infinities that one 
gets into in order to solve a problem that might also be formulated 
for finite number of degrees of freedom for non-relativistic systems 
that haven't necessarily infinite number of degrees of freedom. 
Wigner:  Well, I would like it very much if you could show that 
when one has an open system one could really avoid the problem of 
the reduction of the wave packet. 
Furry:  I would very much like Professor Aharonov to discuss 
this problem. 
Aharonov:  Well, I'm not prepared to do it now, since I have to try 
to organize my thoughts about this problem.  I would like just to 
mention again that when one discusses an open system, one says that 
one has to integrate over degrees of freedom that in principle cannot 
be measured.  Then one can get results that are different from the 
usual cases which are discussed, namely, cases of a closed system.  
These results might look arbitrary in a sense, but the mathematics 
permits them, and therefore they should be discussed carefully.  If 
I think about it a little bit more, I hope I will be able to present 
it in a more systematic way. 
Wigner:  I think if one looked more closely into the mathematics 
one may find that this leads to a contradiction, but I may be wrong. 
MON-A.M. 
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Aharonov:  Maybe we don't understand exactly the point of view of 
each other. 
Wigner:  That's very likely. I feel that it might be useful to continue 
these discussions after you have thought about it, because this will 
provide us with some common notation and starting point, and so on. 
Podolsky:  Dr. Aharonov, how soon do you think you could discuss this 
question more fully? 
Aharonov: Well, maybe next year. 
Wigner:  When everyone put down the notion of reduction of wave 
function 
one gets letters pointing out that it looks unnecessary.  For example, 
Margenau says it is an unnecessary assumption. 
(Aharonov mentions again that he would like to say that he is not, 
he 
believes, exactly of the opposite view, namely, that the reduction 
is a 
necessary assumption. 
Wigner points out:  therefore, he is not a good candidate to have 
votes from the other point of view). 
(A short discussion followed about the possibility of inviting Everett 
to discuss his point of view about the reduction of the wave packet. 
Podolsky asks Rosen if there is something he could say about Everett's 
 
one result it means that you are just on one of the branches. 
But since all of the other branches exist on the same footing, one 
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and from this branch one continues into further branching by 
making another measurement, and so on.  We all seem to feel that 
the measurement does something decisive.  For example. 
 
Podolsky:  Oh yes, I remember now what it is about - it's a 
picture about parallel times, parallel universes, and each 
time one gets a given result he chooses which one of the 
universes he belongs to, but the other universes continue to 
exist. 
Aharonov:  Perhaps Professor Rosen will be willing to introduce 
the idea a little bit more fully with perhaps a little bit more 
on the mathematical side. 
Rosen:  I just have some recollection of the paper.  It's not a 
question of mathematics, it seems to me, but rather a question 
of interpretation.  The mathematics involved is very simples 
you expand a wave function as a linear combination of 
eigenfunctions of the observed quantity.  In other words, if 
you have two systems interacting, one of them being the measured 
 
Professor Furry will talk more about in the afternoon, namely, 
correlation between the measurer and the measured system.  Then 
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multiplied by eigenfunctions of the measuring instrument.  The usual 
belief is that when the measurement is over, one of these 
 
Aharonov:  There seems to be a problem here.  It raises the questions  
Is time reversible? If you look on the process of branching you see 
that it has a definitely preferred direction of time.  You never 
experience any collection of past branching connected together with 
one observer in the present.  So the observer described by this method 
is always going in one direction of time, namely, more and more 
branching toward the future and not vice-versa.  In other words, it 
seems that the idea of the unique direction of time is basic for this 
theory, and one should therefore explain why a reversible equation for 
a closed system somehow irreversibly measures in this idea of 
branching. 
Professor Podolsky suggested we should at least very briefly in the 
conference discuss the general question of what basic problems in 
physics have not been solved yet.  
Professor Wigner remarks that he is not aware of any basic problem that 
has been solved yet, but then he corrects himself 
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and says "Well, perhaps one basic problem was solved and that is the 
question of the behavior of inanimate matter in the question of 
practical applications of physics, which at least in principle has been 
solved." 
Professor Podolsky answers that "the question what is practical or not 
seems to be entirely a matter of time.  For example, there was this case 
of a quite well known physicist in England who was not drafted during World 
War II.  Therefore they decided that they should let him work only on 
problems that have no practical significance at all, and put him to work 
on the question of atomic energy.  Now this goes to show, of course, that 
the question of what's practical or not is not necessarily settled at any 
given period."  Then he proceeds to discuss one of the questions that he 
feels is of basic importance and has not yet been solved in physics? the 
question of why all particles in the world have the same charge, plus or 
minus e or zero times e, while they might have different masses? 
Professor Wigner then explains that what he meant to say was "the problems 
of atomic scale and so on, are solved as far as their practical application 
is concerned, at least in principle.  But certainly they are not solved 
as far as understanding why these laws apply and not other laws.  This 
is something not clear, and as is probably always the case, we 
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understand how to apply the laws but we never understand the reason 
for this kind of law." 
Professor Podolsky:  It is well known that we work with manifestly 
inconsistent theories in which we seem to get perfectly good 
experimental results, but which involve procedures like 
subtracting infinities from infinities.  The question is: Are we 
going to be satisfied with such a theory?  
Wigner answers:  "No!"  (There is laughter from everybody) 
Podolsky:  Well, therefore there are important questions.  
Wigner: Oh yes, excuse me.  I did not want to say there are not 
any important questions left. 
Dirac: Well, I think that the value of e squared over hc is an 
important question. 
Podolsky:  Yes, that is something I feel is of very great importance. 
We have quantum mechanics and we have relativity theory.  Relativity 
theory is based on the concept of an event. Events cannot be 
experimentally determined. We can't measure position with arbitrary 
accuracy.  It is not only that we are limited in quantum theory, but 
also when we start using light of very short wave length, instead 
of having a position measurement we get a shower of particles, and 
the old concept of position is lost.  So our concept of event in 
quantum theory does not correspond to relativity theory. 
MON-A.M. 
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(Somebody from the audience asks whether Professor Podolsky is aware 
of an article by Wigner in which he points out limitations in 
measurements of position and time so that all concept of space and 
time in quantum theory may have quantum limitations and uncertainties.  
He answers, "Yes, that's right.")  
Podolsky continues:  We have a fine structure constant which connects 
e, h, and c; h represents quantum theory, c represents relativity, 
and from those two concepts we expect to derive e. We then will have 
a theoretical explanation for the fine structure constant. 
(Somebody from the audience asks whether it will be possible to 
discuss quantization of an event in space-time, in such a way that 
he will get quantization of minimum lengths and minimum time.) 
Podolsky:  Yes, Heisenberg was trying to do something similar to 
that.  He got quite interesting results but he gave it up later.  
Is there anything more somebody would like to say before I close 
this session? 
Aharonov:  May I just mention one more point which is related to the 
question of unifying special relativity and quantum theory? It is 
quite clear that quantum theory has states in which the momentum is 
well defined at a given instant of time. Not only that, the general 
operators of coherence, wave 
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functions that are in different regions of space, also are defined 
at a given instant of time.  Now it is interesting to point out that 
all these operator-observables cannot be checked out, or measured, 
in arbitrarily short periods of time.  This is because if one wants 
to get an interference of two of non-overlapping contributions to 
the wave function, one must wait at least a time period that is equal 
to the distance between these two wave packets divided by the 
velocity of light.  All velocities are restricted to being smaller 
or equal to the velocity of light.  One can see also the reflection 
of this limitation in the fact that if one wants to measure the 
momentum up to an uncertainty  rp, one must introduce an uncertainty 
of position which is equal to h/rp, and let's call it rx.  Therefore 
the time that it will take to introduce such an uncertainty will 
be at least rx/c.  Otherwise we would send information faster than 
the velocity of light.  Now it seems to me that such a limitation 
has no direct counterpart in the mathematical formalism, since we 
can write down any arbitrary states which include all the 
interference properties in regions that have time extension smaller 
than their spatial extension divided by c. Since there is no 
indication of such a limitation, it seems to me that one could 
perhaps formulate a more satisfactory 
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theory in which these limitations will appear directly in the 
formalism and not just indirectly in measurement discussions.  I 
wonder whether anybody has some remarks about this problem. 
Wigner: Well, I might talk about something related to it, although 
I am not sure it will have any substantial relevance. However, the 
point you make is a very important one.  The Doctor to the left 
of Dr. Podolsky (referring to Dirac) once tried to make a theory 
in which the initial conditions are given not in a space-like 
surface, well, on the light cone surface, converging to a point, 
and I never heard actually what happened to that. 
Aharonov:  Well, it probably ran away with light.  
Dirac:  Well, as far as I  know, it is equivalent to the usual 
theory. 
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THE QUANTUM MECHANICAL DESCRIPTION OF STATES AND MEASUREMENTS 
W. H. Furry 
Professor Aharonov apologized because most of his talk has 
been published.  I think practically all of mine has too, and any 
of you who have recently read von Neumann's book on the Foundations 
of Quantum Mechanics can just go to sleep. 
My talk will be concerned essentially with what I suppose no one 
will object to my calling orthodox quantum theory.  Some people object 
to that, but I simply mean standard quantum mechanics.  I shall 
describe the regular formalism of the theory of measurement in 
quantum mechanics — thus, I hope, providing a background for various 
further discussions. 
This will bring out, of course, several points along the way 
— among which is the quantum mechanical view of microscopic systems 
as having a certain quality of wholeness of their basic states.  In 
fact, this quality comes out in a particularly pronounced way in the 
sort of example that was given by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. 
Now in setting up this formal theory, I shall use four main 
assumptions: First (a) there's the assumption of the discrete 
spectrum, and we all know what this is for.  This is just to make 
things easy, and has no real bearing on the main 
MON:PM -2- 
problems.  One could get greater elegance of a certain sort, and some 
prestige, by generalizing the theory so as not to have this assumption.  
But by using this assumption we get more of the sort of elegance that 
makes it possible to give a lecture in 30 or 40 minutes, or 50, or 
60, or 70. 
Having given that relatively innocuous assumption, I'll hit you 
with the bad one. Assume that (b) every Hermitian operator is, in 
principle, observable.  These two little letters, h.m., just show 
off that I recently reread von Neumann, and they stand for 
"hypermaximal".  Occasionally there is a trick sort of operator, 
which, although Hermitian, cannot be regarded as observable, even 
in the mathematical theory. But this is the sort of thing which 
physicists would never, or rarely at least, think of using anyway.  
It's not hard to avoid. So essentially every Hermitian operator one 
is likely to think of using is here assumed to be observable.  Now 
this is a mean assumption and it is possible to take strong objection 
to it, as Pauli did.  Pauli objected very strongly to the idea of 
quantum mechanics based on this.  But on the other hand, if you're 
going to make a formal mathematical theory and include the whole sweep 
of the subject, you need a strong assumption. Of course, if you just 
let me assume the theory, I won't need this assumption.  But if one 
is to derive the theory, then one needs a strong assumption.  This 
assumption has been used in 
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many treatments, in Dirac's as well as von Neumann's, and in many 
others. 
The third assumption is a very famous early one of quantum theory: 
the possible values that may occur in measurements of an operator are 
its eigenvalues. 
Now here's the a ssumption for which one has to ring a bit of a bell, 
because it's really something to accept and it's fundamental to the 
theory.  If, say, A and B are such observables, then (d) any real multiple 
of A (so as to keep it Hermitian) is 
 
A and B at once, and clearly, the sum of the values is the value of 
the sum.  It is a natural thing to take as the value of the sum. 
But this is true even if A and B cannot be both measured at once.  
This is a basic assumption and is used all the time in quantum 
mechanics.  For example, the kinetic energy, a function of the 
momentum, and the potential energy, in a simple Schrödinger case a 
function of the coordinate, are not simultaneously measurable.  But 
we assume that the sum of the two, that is, the Hamiltonian function, 
is measurable.  There is an addendum to this:  (dd) the expectation 
value that we get for these observables, the expectation value of 
the multiple of 
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and the expectation value — this is the strong point — the 
That is, the expectation value is a linear function of the 
observables you're using. 
This, of course, is familiar from the recipe that is 
 
There is a lot of talk about the most general statistical situation 
we can have in quantum mechanics, and that situation is not a 
situation described by a wave function.  This is the thing that I 
want to remind most of you of, and perhaps inform a few people of, 
so it gets clearly in our minds early in this series of discussions. 
So let's begin on the mathematics.  I found, interestingly 
enough, that von Neumann doesn't begin back at quite so 
 
it, so I will.  We note that if we have any observable, such as 
A, we can tell what observable it is, we can characterize 
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over whatever coordinates there are. 
 
So let's start using this way of characterizing what an 
observable is. 
This, of course, is a rather artificial looking way, 
 
But that soon drops out of the argument.  Now from this assumption 
(dd), that the expectation value has meaning for sums, and is, in 
fact, a linear function of the observable, we see that the expectation 
value must be a linear function of the matrix elements, since it can 
be characterized by these matrix elements which themselves are linear 
functions of the observable. 
 
This is the most general form an expectation value can have.  
It's the most general sort of statistical situation that these 
assumptions will allow.  And, of course, it works out to be what 
von Neumann developed as the theory of a 
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statistical situation given by a density matrix or statistical matrix.  
We know at once that this expectation value must be a linear function 
of these A's.  That is, it must just be a linear combination or sum over 
m and n, and there must be some coefficients, R.  These coefficients will 
depend on what the state of the system is, on the way it was prepared, 
on our information about it, and they will also depend on m and n so I 
have put those on, let's say subscripts, on this coefficient. 
I put them on in this order, n m, and then here (Rnm) is a two  
index quantity that we can think of as a matrix.  We multiply these 
matrices together when we sum over m.  Then when we sum over n we take 
the trace of the product.  So this is the trace of the product RA and, 
as a trace, it has ceased to have any 
 
we have now rid ourselves, for the moment at least, of any 
dependence on a particular representation, on a particular 
 
Now one can quickly prove the rest algebraically, but I shall 
not go through the algebra.  You can easily find by a 
little algebra the fact that R is Hermitian itself, that is, 
that Rnm*  is equal to Rnm.  Then you use both assumptions 
(b) and (c) and you use the fact that the possible values are 
eigenvalues.  Then you pick yourself some special operators that have 
only a few non-vanishing eigenvalues, say only one apiece and that 
one positive.   Then you can easily convince 
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yourself that all the diagonal elements of R have to be positive.  
Because if they weren't, you could get a negative expectation value 
for something that could have only positive measured values, which 
is silly, because the expectation value is the average of the 
measured values.  The average of positive quantities couldn't be 
negative.  So one concludes from this that the diagonal elements of 
R, in any representation in fact, must be either positive or zero, 
and this just says that R is positive semi-definite. 
Now take the particular representation where R is diagonal. 
 
which are eigenfunctions of R.  R has to have the form then in that 
representations 
 
 
positive coefficients, wn or wm , that is, with wn greater than          
or equal to zero.  Then we consider the expectation value of one — 
one is a very simple observable, whenever you measure you get the 
value one.  If you turn me loose in a laboratory this would be the 
only observable I would know how to measure. This expectation value 
is one, it must be one. 
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That means that if you take the trace of this — just the sum of these 
diagonal elements — that the sum of the wn's must be equal to 1. 
 
The right member of that equation is 1.  This particularly brings us 
right back to the discrete spectrum case.  Well, I've used (a) all the 
time, really;  the fact that this is a discrete spectrum case.  I wrote 
all these sums.  And you could not make a trace equal to one if you 
did not have that situation. 
Now let's continue to use this special representation a moment 
longer, and consider again the expectation value of a particular: 
other observable A.  That will be the trace of RA. And if we write 
it out, then we will have the expectation value of A.  That will 
mean that we must take the sum over m and n, and we will have mnnw d .  
Now we multiply the R here by the A, and then, of course, we want 
to take the trace, so we will sum over n and sum over m also, so 
this is the trace. But, of course, this sum is very easy to do with 
a delta function.  Let's do the sum over m.  That means we replace 
m by n, and so we have nw  times mnA . 
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And now you see in this formula, the diagonal element A , is 
just the formula for the expectation value of A when we know 
that the wave function is nf . So we see that this 
expectation value is the sum over n of wn times the expectation 
value of A for the state with a wave function nf  . 
 
 
So here we have the most general statistical situation that 
quantum mechanics offers, and we see that it has what I'll call 
a realistic interpretation.  In fact, this is the 
 
density matrix.  Perhaps I should write one or two more lines of my 
formalism before I explain the ideas of realistic interpretation. 
I'll mention how this occurs in Dirac's book on quantum mechanics.  
They're called not precisely this, but I think recognizably the same 
thing.  You probably didn't use the letter W for probability (speaking 
to Dirac), which you know is a Teutonism picked up from von Neumann.  
If I wrote p, it might be momentum.  I forget what Dirac wrote.  The 
thing looks like this, if you look at the proper section in the book. 
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It is called Gibbs ensemble in Dirac's book, which is a very good 
name for it. 
The realistic interpretation is simply that maybe the system 
is in one of these states, and maybe it is in another, and so on.  
It is not in a state given by a particular one of these wave functions.  
It may be in a state given by another one of these wave functions, 
and so on.  We do know which wave function we should give to the system, 
but we do know probabilities with which we might assign one or the 
other of these wave functions.  So we take the average of the 
expectation values that the various wave functions would give it, 
weighted with the probabilities for the system to have such a wave 
function. And of course, this operator — well, I shall not go into 
the technical details of how this wonderful formula does exactly that 
same thing.  But it's called Gibbs ensemble.  You see, Gibbs ensemble 
does not necessarily mean anything with e to the minus something over 
kt.  That is a Gibbs canonical ensemble. 
The Gibbs ensemble basically is the idea that we could think 
of many systems, some prepared one way, some prepared another way, 
and the experiment consists of measuring on a system drawn from this  
ensemble.  Then, you see, the fraction 
 
gets this result. 
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So one has this realistic interpretation.  One can think of 
a lot of boxes, each box containing a system.  If wn is equal to 
15%, well then 15% of the boxes were prepared with 
a function nF .  Another 7% if another lw  is 7%.  Well, 
that means that 7% of them were prepared with a wave function lF  
and so on. 
Now you see that there are two possible situations here. We may 
have what is called a mixed state.  That's with several of the wn's (more 
than one, at least, of them) greater than zero, and the rest, of course, 
zero.  Or you may have what's called a pure state.  In a pure state 
only one w n is different from zero.  And of course, that one is 1, since 
the sum of them is 1. 
This means that wn is 1 if n is a particular value, say nO 
  
and is zero otherwise.  For the pure state wn is 
0
nnd . 
Now it must be emphasized that this mixed state does not mean — very 
definitely does not mean — a state which has a wave function which is 
a linear combination of some other wave functions.  You find the 
expression used this ways a mixture of s and d wave functions in some 
nuclear level, or something. That is not what is meant here, because 
there one takes a linear combination of the two wave functions and makes 
a definite wave function for the system.  This is not that. A mixed 
state here does not have any wave function at all.  It has instead, 
a list of probabilities for different wave functions. 
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It is not a list of coefficients where you can multiply them 
and add them up to get a wave function, but just a list of 
probabilities.  So that to solve a problem, say find an 
expectation value, you just first solve it with one of the wave 
functions and then solve it with another, and so on, and finally 
average your answers after you're through. 
Now this is exactly what you do classically when you don't know 
what sort of thing you have.  If some of your boxes contain one thing 
and some of them contain another and you don't know which box 
contains which, you do know that a certain percentage of them 
contain each thing.  And you can calculate an average like that by 
taking the averages for what the different possible contents would 
give and multiplying by the probabilities for the box to contain 
a particular thing.  So in this realistic interpretation of the 
situation, we simply say that this gives us a way also to ascribe 
this density matrix with w's in it to any such situation.  We simply 
make it with the wave functions which the sort of preparation this 
had might allow it to have, and then assign probabilities in 
accordance with what you know about the situation.  If you know, 
for instance, that the beam of particles came out of the furnace 
— just came out, there was no particular field on where the furnace 
was, and no particular deflecting arrangement, it's just coming out 
through some collimating slits — then you will 
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assign a mixed state to it, in which you give equal probabilities to 
all possible values of the spin component, because there is no reason 
to give anything but equal probabilities to them. Here one appeals 
to the principle of insufficient reason in precisely the same way that 
one does in classical probability theory.  And, in fact, all the 
reasoning about these w n's is precisely the reasoning of the classical 
probability theory. 
But here we have two different things coming ins  something which 
is just classical theory, just the classical theory of the Gibbs 
ensemble; and something else which is not at all classical theory.  
We have two sources of dispersion, two sources of what the 
statisticians call variance, but what the physicists call dispersion. 
The dispersion in the values — that is, the spread in the values 
of a variable — can come from the mixing of the state, from this Gibbs 
ensemble situation.  It comes from the fact that the various wn's give 
various contributions, that we have not prepared all the systems alike, 
or that we don't know exactly how to say in just what way the system 
was prepared. This has a classical analog.  In fact, it's precisely 
like the classical case in every respect.  All the calculations are 
just the classical ones.  The analogy is extremely close. 
In fact, it's identical in the way you calculate. 
Then it has another source of dispersion.  It comes from 
the dispersion in the individual state or in the pure state, the 
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various pure states.  Each of those certainly gives dispersion to 
certain quantities.  If for instance, I measure the momentum pretty 
carefully in each of these pure states nF ' then I'll have a sizable 
dispersion for the coordinate. 
Thus there is another source of dispersion in quantum mechanics 
and it has no classical analog.  In the early days of quantum mechanics 
some people, who were struggling to understand what in the world this 
statistical theory could be about, comforted themselves by saying, 
"Well, it's just a sort of Gibbs ensemble".  It isn't!  It's something 
entirely different. When you work in the usual way that elementary 
quantum mechanics does work with a wave function, you are working with 
something that has nothing whatever to do with the Gibbs ensemble.  
But it is true, that if you work in the most general possible way, 
you can build the Gibbs ensemble on top of the quantum mechanical 
situation.  And for some purposes, in discussing some situations, 
it's quite important to do that. 
Let's note one more thing.  It's a famous result and somebody 
might, in the next few days even, find it useful to use in an argument.  
It takes only a moment to mention.  If I have a pure state of this 
situation — a pure state, where only one of the w's is different from 
zero — then you see R (always working in the representation where 
R is diagonal), then Rmn is  mnd   because R is diagonal, and then it 
has to be 
multiplied by wn, and wn is 
0nnd  . 
 
This is a neat little product of delta functions, you see, and 
you can put in another one, mnd   
 
It doesn't cost you anything, but all three letters have got 
to be the same.  If they are the same, it's 1, and now you can 
readily believe that when one works out the algebra for R2mn 
it will turn out in a line or two of writing that this is the 
same as Rmn .  In other words, they just have to be equal, and 
if they are equal it's 1.  Of course, when you square the 
matrix you have to use a summation.  The summation drops down 
to one term because of all these delta functions.  So R2mn   is 
the same as Rmn. 
 
 
2 
This is now an algebraic relation between R2 and R.  And it 
holds in this representation, so it holds in every representation. 
Algebraic relations between matrices have that property.  The 
condition for a pure state is the so-called idempotent 
condition, R2 is equal to R. 
I shall not go through any argument in which this comes up.  I'll 
just mention a famous argument in which this criterion 
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for a pure state is used.  That is, von Newmann's famous argument 
against hidden parameters, which has something to do with our thinking 
these days.  Namely, this argument in which this criterion is used 
proves that if the formalism of quantum mechanics holds exactly — 
that is, within this formalism of quantum mechanics — it is not 
possible to ascribe this second form of dispersion to unknown but 
varying values of some sort of parameters which have not yet been 
discovered (which are, so to speak, hidden in the system).  This is 
not a consistent way to describe the situation, provided one stays 
within the context of quantum mechanics.  This, of course, doesn't 
mean that people who like — you know, it's been proved mathematically 
that when you prove something mathematically you always start with 
assumptions.  For instance, I started with these assumptions (a), (b), 
etc., some of which are rather strong.  And, of course, this proof 
of von Neumann's is based on the assumption that quantum mechanics 
is the exact and complete description of the situation.  So if you 
don't choose to believe that, you can believe in hidden parameters.  
I don't say that I'm recommending this.  I have normally been pretty 
orthodox in my own views, but I think it's only proper to say what 
the limitations are on a mathematical proof.  In mathematics you 
prove something from assumptions.  You don't prove it in the 
absolute. 
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Now I want to mention how this idea of mixed state comes in.  This 
is the situation in the sort of thing which is really one of the key 
things with which we are confronted — the sort of problem that I 
conceive of us as undertaking to discuss this week — that's the problem 
of measuring some quantity.   Now when you make a measurement in quantum 
mechanics, you do something.  When you measure in quantum mechanics, 
the usual postulate is that when you measure a quantity you will get 
one of the eigenvalues as a result of the measurement. The probability 
that you will get a particular eigenvalue is the square of the absolute 
value of the inner product of the eigenfunction of that eigenvalue 
and the wave function. Of course, we now generalize it and say that 
the probability that you will get that eigenvalue is the square of 
the inner product multiplied by the wn and summed — that is a loaded 
average of such calculated results.  The important thing is the 
statement simply that when you measure, this is what you get. There 
is no statement made as to what happens in the actual measuring process.  
Two statements are made that you have these various probabilities of 
getting the various eigenvalues, and that after the measurement has 
been made — if it's what is called a predictive or preparative 
measurement —  the system will be in a state which can be calculated 
in a suitable way from its previous state and from, the result of the 
measurement. 
 If the quantity measured has only one eigenfunction for the 
eigenvalue in question, then the state after measurement is a pure 
state with that function as the wave function.  If it has many 
eigenfunctions, if the situation is degenerate, then you will also 
have to appeal to the previous state for evidence about the w's in 
your new mixed state.  At any rate, there is only a statement of these 
results.  There is no statement as to what happens in the measuring. 
This is what various people, Bohr, Aharonov, and Bohm, and 
other people called the "cut".  It is where something happens 
which the theory does not describe mathematically. 
Classical theory didn't have to describe how you measure things.  
That was self-evident to all.  Why, you just looked and there it is.  
The moon goes around its orbit, the planets do their stuff, and we 
observe them.  And we don't have to say what happens exactly when 
we observe them.  If we do try to say what happens, let's say in a 
theory of the telescope, or a theory of the physiology of the retina, 
why we're just having some fun with more science.  We are not really 
saying anything about what happens in the measuring process as such. 
In quantum mechanics, however, we agree that the measurement 
can affect the state of the thing measured — we agree that 
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In particular, suppose its previous state was a pure state: 
MON:PM -19- 
there is some sort of uncontrolled interaction between whatever we use 
to measure and the system measured.  That's necessary because the 
measurement performed with a system prepared in precisely the same way 
may sometimes give a different result; and the system afterwards will 
then be in an eigenstate for the one result, or an entirely different 
eigenstate for the other result.  So there was an interaction with the 
means used to make the measurement.  So that in quantum theory we have 
something not really worse than we had in classical theory. In both 
theories you don't say what you do when you make a measurement, what 
the process is.  But in quantum theory we have our attention focused 
on this situation.  And we do become uncomfortable about it, because 
we have to talk about the effects of the measurement on the systems. 
Now this discomfort can be allayed somewhat.  In fact, 
 
many people live long and fruitful lives without ever worrying about 
the problems that we are distressing ourselves with right now.  But 
it can be allayed by noting that we can describe what is happening 
quantum mechanically, in principle, up to any particular point we 
please. We can change the position of this cut, this place where we 
suddenly say "Well, at this point we made the measurement and we 
applied the rules for what happens when you make a measurement, and 
we're not talking about how the measurement itself occurs." 
MON:PM -20- 
I can do this, if I want to, if I have an object system which 
I'll call q , if we can distinguish that from zero. This object system 
q  has coordinates, q say, and it has a wave function originally )(qF .  
And if I want to, I can simply say, well, I measure the observable 
A on that, and I get the result, and let's take a case of a 
non-degenerate spectrum, so that the eigenvalue An has only one wave 
function, belonging to it.  Then, of course, the probability of getting 
An will be the square of the absolute value of the inner product of  
nF  with the original wave function 
 
After the measurement has been made, the wave function of the 
 
can say, "I will not perform this mysterious and undescribed operation 
on this object. I will instead, couple to the object q  another system, 
another quantum mechanical system which has coordinates x and which 
has a wave function before I start the game, of u(x), and to which 
I've given the letter I, so that I mean it's the instrument.  And I 
will couple this instrument to the object, let them interact a while, 
then I will de-couple them, and then anything mysterious and 
undescribed I do will be done to the instrument".  All that happens 
to the 
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object will be described by the laws of quantum mechanics. Except 
that, of course, if I obtain incontrovertible information about 
the object, in the course of my perhaps obscene dealings with the 
instrument, I will, of course, make use of it, in future 
predictions about the object.  This is all I have to do. 
Of course, in making the general theory, we assume that the 
experimentalists are intelligent people.  This is one of the 
assumptions for which we have excellent evidence.  And we simply 
assume that they are able to devise — let's first note one more 
step before I say what they're able to devise. We have now the wave 
function of object and instrument before we begin our operations.  
The wave function for them is a function of both q and x and it 
is, of course, just the product of )(qF  and u(x). 
 
One readily verifies that this gives all the predictions about the 
separate systems that could be gotten from these wave functions.  
Now we assume that the experimentalist is intelligent enough, and 
ingenious enough, to provide an interaction Hamiltonian, that is, 
to provide a piece of apparatus whose use corresponds in the 
mathematics to the presence of an interaction Hamiltonian Hint, 
which is a function of q and x, which will be different from zero 
during 
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a certain period of time, namely from zero to T, and after that 
will subside again, so that there no longer will be any coupling 
between object and instrument. 
 
Almost anybody could get them coupled somehow, you know, and 
manage to shut if off.  I might, if you gave me a few weeks to bone 
up in the laboratory.  But now he must also pick this thing so that 
it does just the right thing. You see, during the presence of that 
interaction, of course, this wave function Y  is at all times 
obeying this precise, and if you please, causal formula of quantum 
mechanics, wave mechanics. 
 
During this time interval, from zero to T, the Hamiltonian 
includes not only the Hamiltonians for the separate systems, 
whatever they are, depending on their nature, but it also will 
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include, during that time interval, this trick interaction 
potential which our intelligent experimentalist has devised for us.  
Of course, we could probably devise it in a given case. Mr. Aharonov 
could devise it readily, and he and Bohm have done so.  There are 
some very cute cases in their recent papers.  But we assume that 
the experimentalist could actually build the thing in the 
laboratory. 
During this time (18) the wave function changes according to 
this law (19) and, of course, because this involves both q and x, 
the q and x get all churned-up together.  At the end we have a wave 
function Y  which, of course, can be expanded in terms of any set 
of functions we please for the q's.  I can write the Y , which is 
a function of q and x still, I can write it as a superposition of 
the F n(q), and the coefficients will be some functions of x.  Now, 
I'm finally going to tell you how clever the experimentalist has 
been. He has chosen this interaction term so that the following is 
true. 
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The coefficients are just certain functions um(x), which are 
eigenfunctions of a variable P, the pointer reading on the 
instrument, which has the eigenvalues Pm and the eigenfunctions 
um(x).  And then, of course, constants times those functions,  
And furthermore, if this is to be precisely the kind of measurement 
I want, the values of the cn's must be suitable, because this is to 
give information about the potentialities present in the previous 
state. 
Mr. Bohm introduced the fact that these are really 
potentialities.  The system in this state did not really have these 
values of A.  It had the potentialities of showing them 
if the measurements were made. So for the cn's still more 
remarkable properties are demanded of the Hint.  It must have the 
properties that after it has served this way to determine the change 
of the wave function with time, according to the quantum mechanical 
formula, the cn is to be equal to the inner product of nF  and F. 
 
Now let's notice was the situation is. We have a wave function, 
a perfectly good wave function.  It has arisen by the operation of 
the immutable and ineluctable laws of quantum mechanics from the 
initial state. And, corresponding to this wave function, what is 
the statistical situation about the object system? Well, we can work 
it out. Let's 
MON:PM -24- 
say that B is an observable for the system q .  Let's find the 
expectation value of B. Well, we have to integrate then the product  
*Y  by the result of applying B onto Y .  That will have to be 
integrated over all the coordinates, that is, both x and q.  Of course, 
each of these stands for a whole list, if we want them to.  And so we 
write it out: 
I'll put B in here, working on the 
)(qmF  because, of course, B belongs to the object system.  It has 
nothing to do with these coordinates x and the instrument system. 
And then I simply have left the integral over x of un*um.  That, of 
course is 'nmd  , and that means that I can do the summation. And so 
I arrive at sum over m alone of  |cm|2 times the integral which is, 
of course, now the diagonal matrix element of B, because n and m are 
equal.  It is then in fact the expectation value of B in the state 
nF  .  And we get a 
 
the laws of quantum mechanics on the total wave function.  It is a pure 
state, of course, for the whole system of object and instrument we're 
considering.  It is a mixed state of statistical information for the 
object. Now, first let's see what happens if we make some measurements.  
If we make a 
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to do that eventually.  I'm not going to interfere with q  at all.  
Let's just consider what would happen, what would inevitably happen, 
according to the quantum mechanical 
 
both P and A then there would be a probability say  |c1|2  for 
me to get the value P1, and the value A1 .  There will be a 
probability  |c2|2   for me to get the values P2 and A2 , and 
so on.  There is no probability whatever, there is zero 
probability in other words, of my getting P1 and A2  or P2 and 
A1.  And knowing the whole history of the situation, I know there 
is no chance of getting the wrong value of A, when I measure the 
value of P.  I don't need to measure the value of A.  I measure 
P.  I look at the pointer and I know the value for A. 
Now what happens when I look at the pointer? What happens to 
the system q ?  The system q  considered by itself was in 
a mixed state.  A mixed state would be realistically described 
 by saying that there is a probability |cn|2    for it to be in 
the state with wave function nF   and another probability 
|cm|2  for it to be in the state with wave function 'mF  , and 
so on.   Then I can take, as my realistic picture of what happened 
in the measuring process, that somehow or other in the coupling of 
the instrument, the object actually went into one of these states 
with these various probabilities for the 
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different ones.  And then when I read the instrument I find out into 
which one it went.  And, of course, once I know which one it's in, 
then I assign to q  the wave function for that state.  A perfectly 
reasonable procedure.  If that were only all. 
I see it's time for questions, but of course all the questions 
come from the fact that this is not all.  This is an eminently 
satisfactory situation.  But Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen have 
rubbed our noses in the fact that this is not the whole story.  In 
fact, it's impossible to maintain this nice realistic description 
that I just gave.  They didn't say it this way — I said it this way.  
That's my merit in the case. 
What they pointed out was that it is possible to have situations 
in which all of these cn's in this expression (20) are equal in 
absolute value over some wide range of states. Of course, there's 
an infinite number of states and we chop out a finite range of them 
— say two, in a very important example by Bohm, or Aharonov, or by 
Bohm in his book, or a thousand if you want, some finite number — 
and get equal values for the squares of the absolute values of these 
things here in (23), equal probabilities for the states. 
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As soon as you do that, then there is not just one way to write this 
),,( TxqY  as the sum of the products of orthogonal functions, the 
so-called biorthogonal expansion, because it contains orthogonal 
functions in both places; there are an infinite number of ways to 
write it in that form.  In fact, you will readily see that you could 
also write this wave function Y  in this form, the sum over l of — 
let's see.  I want the sum of the squares of them to be equal to one, 
because the squares of them are probabilities.  So I'll say that there 
are N of the states, for which these coefficients 
cm are equal, and they have the form 
 
This can also be written in the form of one over the square 
root of N times lC  of q vl of x, 
 
where the lC  can be any new wave function I please, any new 
set of orthogonal wave functions connected with the mF   by 
some unitary matrix mld . 
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S is a finite unitary matrix.  Then (24) is equal to (20) 
provided I also choose for lv  the new set of orthogonal 
functions given by this formulas 
 
If you just substitute these two things in (25), you're back to 
(20).  So you can make all the biorthogonal expansions you please, 
provided that the weights are equal in one of them. 
This then is the trouble, because as Einstein, Podolsky, and 
Rosen said, I can set this (20) up for a position measurement.  Then 
by measuring something about the instrument, I can find the 
position of the object exactly, or with extreme accuracy.  But if 
this is the situation, then by just taking linear combinations for 
a transform for the position wave functions, I could just as well 
write the biorthogonal expansion the other way around, as in (25).  
I could make a momentum measurement, again without touching the 
object, again looking only at the instrument, and find out what 
the momentum of the object is.  In neither case have I interfered 
with the object at all. 
Now I cannot, in quantum mechanics, assert realistically that 
the particle made a transition to a state in which both its position 
and its momentum were accurately defined.  There 
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is no such state in the theory.  So my realistic interpretation has 
blown up in my face. 
The realistic interpretation is perfectly good for laboratory 
situations, because, of course, the experimentalist is not 
interested in a measurement in which he knows already that all the 
probabilities for all the different answers are equal.  He is 
interested in measuring to find out a particular probability 
distribution, of unequal probabilities for something, say to plot 
the momentum distribution for electrons and atoms.  He is interested 
in inequalities.  The experimentalist will always be free in the 
laboratory to interpret quantum mechanics as realistically as he 
wants to.  We have here a situation which theorists cannot ignore, 
which you could easily concoct in the theory, and where the realistic 
interpretation fails completely.  It's just not available. 
Now the best example, I think, of this sort of thing is the 
example which Bohm, so far as I know, first put forward. That is 
the singlet state, say of a pair of spin one half particles.  And 
this singlet state comes apart and particles fly off in opposite 
directions.  Because it is a singlet state, I know if I measured 
the z component of the spin of the particle, I am bound to have the 
opposite value for the other one, and hence, I don't need to measure 
the other one, of course. I know that it is down if this one is up, 
and vice-versa.  But of course, for this particle on this side of 
the 
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room, I can choose not to measure the z component but the y component, 
and again if I get "out", that one will be "in", or if I get "in" 
that one will be "out".  I can do either one. But, of course, it's 
not possible for this to have made a transition into a state with 
both a definite value of the z component and a definite value of the 
y component.  There is no such state. 
Now, this is the hard thing to say.  I'll make an attempt for 
one minute to say it and then be still, because I could only flounder 
if I tried longer.  What this means is that there is a form of relation, 
a statistical relation, between these two particles, no matter how 
far apart they get; so that measurements on one will reveal things 
about the other; and so that one could make such a variety of 
measurements on this here, that it is not possible to say that one 
is merely finding out what state they're really in. One, in fact, 
in some sense creates the state of that other particle over there, 
when one makes the measurement on the instrument particle here, in 
just about as real a sense as one creates the state of a particle 
when one makes the measurements straight out without any of this 
argument about object and instrument. 
So that it seems that the property of wholeness — the 
property of being something so that when you deal with it, you 
deal with it as a whole — the property of wholeness of 
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the quantum state can apply to systems in which the parts become 
widely separated, and in which one deals only with one part.  This 
then indicates something which, if we are to regard the orthodox 
quantum mechanics as a final theory, we have to accept as one of 
the things that oblige us to take, as part of the doctrine, that 
this wholeness is typical of quantum systems in the small, let us 
say of the atom. 
This property of wholeness is well known, that this wholeness 
extends into such cases as this, where two parts of of the system 
are very widely separated.  Now I also think this is analogous to 
the wholeness of the quantum state which London has emphasized in 
the theory of superconductivity and superfluids.  There, one again 
has over macroscopic systems, macroscopic distances — and in that 
case with a great many particles in them — one has this essential 
wholeness of the quantum state giving the properties to the 
macroscopic system. 
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Thank you very much, it is a great pleasure to be here. I will talk 
about a subject which is not published, and it couldn't be published, 
because I would like to continue the ideas which Dr. Furry has told 
about.  I shall try to continue what he did, and of course, I did not 
know very much ahead of time what he would say.  He explained, with 
almost unbelievable conciseness and clarity, the process of measure-
ment and what we know about it.  But I would like to make one addition 
to it, and then explain in what way and how we are somewhat unhappy 
with it. 
I do not mean to say that there is a logical flaw in the structure. 
Mow there is no logical flaw and - I don't know whether I should say 
this three times over again - but there is no logical flaw in the 
structure, there is no logical flaw in the structure, the structure 
is free of logical flaws  (audience laughter) - because it's very 
difficult to accept this if the man afterwards just the same says that 
he is not entirely happy with it.  It is clear enough, well I said it 
three times and I think that should suffice. 
Let me make now the single remark which I would like to add to Dr. 
Furry's talk. He explained to us how the quantum mechanical measurement 
can be described by considering it as an interaction - or nowadays 
people would say, as a collision - as a temporary interaction or 
collision between object and instrument, he called it.  Now the result 
of this collision, he said, is a state of the joint system: object plus 
instrument, or object plus apparatus;  in which neither of the two has 
a wave function, but only together do they have a wave function.  
Separately, they must be considered to be mixtures.  That is the 
technical expression.  They don't have separate wave functions. 
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But what the measurement accomplished was to give a statistical 
correlation between the properties of the instrument and the properties 
of the apparatus.  As he explained to you, the correlation is such that 
if you now observe the instrument, it isn't necessary after that to 
observe the object, because you already know what the observation of 
the object would give.  So this is the statistical correlation that 
has been established. 
However, it is clear that the measurement is not completed because 
he said "If you now observe the instrument."  He did not tell you how 
to observe the instrument.  And the observation of the instrument, in 
some cases, may be even a very difficult task.  But at any rate, it 
is again an observation.  So that, as far as the description of the 
measurement by quantum mechanics is possible, it isn't a description 
of the full measurement but it is only the shifting of one of the 
measurements on the object to a measurement on what was called an 
instrument. 
Now many people say, "Oh well, the instrument may be macroscopic. 
That's easy to observe".  Well it is not so.  Because the instrument, 
of course, may be macroscopic — but the instrument may be in a state 
which has no classical analog.  And therefore, the observation on an 
instrument is fundamentally just as difficult and conceptually just as 
undescribed a problem as observation was to begin with.  And I still 
quote exactly from the same source from which Professor Furry quoted, 
namely, the sixth chapter of von Neumann's book, where this is 
described. 
What we can describe with quantum mechanics is the transmission 
of information from one to the other.  But how we eventually get the 
information is not described and cannot be described clearly with 
quantum mechanics.  One reason that it cannot be described was also 
mentioned by Dr. Furry. Namely, that the result of it is unpredictable, 
whereas  
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as long as quantum mechanical equations are valid everything is causal 
and predictable.  So there is a final step in this:  the cognition — 
or whatever more technical words are used — which cannot be described, 
of course.  And we could not really expect quantum mechanics to describe 
it. 
However, the fact is (and this is a point which has been brought 
out very often) that quantum mechanics does not permit objective 
reality. The wave function is only something that I use, and I use it 
to calculate probability connections between subsequent observations 
and that is all that I can calculate. 
Now many people say that, "Oh well, that's not very spectacular. 
Classical mechanics can also be formulated as probability connections 
between subsequent observations." And that is true.  But that means 
only that every theory can be formulated that way.  Classical theory 
can also be formulated in terms of objective reality, but quantum 
mechanics cannot be formulated in terms of objective reality.  This 
is a major difference between the two.  And it is something with which 
we either have to come to equilibrium and accept, or we have to say,  
"Oh, we don't believe entirely what quantum mechanics tells us and we 
want to modify it."  I don't know which one is the right procedure, 
but I think it is good to be clear about it, that one of the two things 
has to be accepted.  Either we believe that quantum mechanics will have 
to be modified, and very fundamentally modified, by giving up the 
superposition principle, or else we have to acquiesce to the situation 
that the objective - well, what is usually called objective-reality, 
cannot be described and we have only probability connections between 
subsequent observations. 
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This is one of the two remarks which I wanted to make, still 
entirely within the spirit of Professor Furry's talk.  Namely, to 
discuss the conceptual framework of quantum mechanics without any 
particular reference to its content. Professor Furry did not tell 
us that it is relativistic or not relativistic, that it describes 
a collision or doesn't describe a collision. He described only its 
language and not its content.  Now this is one of the two points I 
would like to make which still refer only to the language. 
Then I would like to make some remarks about how modern theory 
is compatible with it.  And I will consider it from two points of 
view: from the point of view of relativistic invariance, which, as 
you know, plays a very fundamental role.  Modern quantum mechanics 
is an attempt to reconcile relativity theory with quantum mechanics.  
And the other point of view from which I would like to discuss it, 
is the question, how realistic is it to consider this? Professor Furry 
said the experimental man makes an apparatus or instrument, he called 
it, which does this.  Now, how does he do it? 
But let me speak now about the other language problem which 
bothers me a great deal, and has bothered me since I learned these 
things many more years ago than I am happy to admit. 
Professor Furry only mentioned an example of "What is the 
quantity which we measure?" He measured momentum, angular momentum, 
position, and so on.  But if we look at the conceptual framework of 
quantum mechanics, "Oh" he said, "every self-adjoint operator can be 
measured" Well, why is it that we measure - as a rule - almost 
exclusively -positions? 
If you ask a well-educated freshman how he measures the velocity, 
he wont tell you that he will measure it in the way Professor Furry 
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would want to measure it, namely with a grating to measure its momentum, 
and then divide by its mass.  But if he measured it, "Oh", he will say, 
"I will measure its position at two times, take the difference, and 
divide by the time difference." 
In other words, the position observable plays an entirely prominent 
role in all our measurements. Now why is that? If we think of it in an 
abstract way, me really can't explain this.  And if there is such a very 
fundamental point here — that almost all our measurements are position 
measurements, whereas from the beginning all types of measurements are 
almost on a par — I feel terribly uneasy about it. 
We come here to the question of measuring now the position, now 
the- state of the apparatus, "Dr. Furry told us, "Oh, the apparatus has 
a pointer and we have to measure the position of the pointer." In that 
case he didn't talk about other measurements, but the measurement of 
the pointer.  Wow why is that? To this I don't have any answer, and - 
well, I don't mean to repeat again what I repeated three times.  I can't 
make a contradiction out of it, and it is not possible to make a 
contradiction, because the theory is logically consistent.  But, there 
is something here which makes me at least, very uneasy. 
Now, this brings me to the next question, which perhaps I still 
should classify as not in the content but in language.  When we were 
--when one is young and one enters science, one has such a wonderful 
ideal how wonderful science is and what it will accomplish for us. One 
feels that it would be wonderful to be able to sit in a corner and have 
all our knowledge based on science.  And — whether somebody will come 
in through the door — it would be wonderful to be able not just to say, 
"Oh yes, my girl friend is due just about this time", but somehow to 
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be able to calculate that scientifically.  In other words, there is 
an ideal of what I might call "homo scientificus" — somebody who doesn't 
base his notions on everyday knowledge;  on the properties of, well, 
the girl friend who keeps her appointments or not — but who would like 
to base his knowledge on scientific fact.  Well, we don't necessarily 
want to have this;  but this ideal, I think, exists in us when we enter 
science. 
Now the fact that quantum mechanics gives us probability 
connections between subsequent observations reminds us very much of 
that, because it tells us, "Oh well, we have observed already this and 
that, from this we should be able to calculate this and that." Now, 
this again is, I think, a fallacy.  And I want to point this out because 
I want to return to this question at the end.  Because quantum mechanics 
brought it home to us that we cannot exist or cannot make science without 
being unscientific. 
Professor Furry explained to us that the experimentalist uses 
certain apparatus to measure the position, let us say, or the momentum, 
or the angular momentum.  Now, how does the experimentalist know that 
this apparatus will measure for him the position?  "Oh", you say, "he 
observed that apparatus. He looked at it." Well that means that he 
carried out a measurement on it.  How did he know that the apparatus 
with which he carried out that measurement will tell him the properties 
of the apparatus? Fundamentally, this is again a chain which has no 
beginning.  And at the end we have to say, "We learned that as children 
how to judge what is around us."  And there is no way to do this 
scientifically.  The fact that in quantum mechanics we try to analyze 
the measurement process only brought this home to us that much sharply. 
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I mention this because at the end I would like to return to this very 
same question, which only teaches us a little humility in our science. 
I would like now to enter a little more closely into the content 
of the theory, not only the language.  In other words, to see where 
we stand.  And there are two questions, as I mentioned, which I want 
to discuss in particular:  namely, how relativistic the theory is, 
and how realistic the theory is.  And, as I said, practically all my 
comments will be adverse comments on the theory of measurements.  This 
is not surprising, because the favorable comments come naturally, and 
are made every day.  The fact that we still have problems in physics 
is certainly not new, and the fact that these problems manifest 
themselves also in the theory of measurement is very natural and not 
at all surprising. 
Now as to relativistic nature, the situation is, I think, this: 
What is it that we measure? We measure, according to Professor Furry 
-although he didn't use this word - the transition probabilities into 
a set of orthogonal states.  Right? This is essentially what we measure. 
He called those orthogonal states nY  and he said that we measure the 
quantity A. So for the operator A the equation would be 
A nY  = An nY . You see, the eigenvalue A is only a label,  What one really 
measures are the transition probabilities into the members of a 
complete orthogonal set. 
Now, how is a complete orthogonal set defined?  It is defined on 
a space-like cut in the universe. Right? It's not the universe in 
space-time. The nY   is defined on a space-like cut in space-time, so 
that we measure the transition probabilities into something which is 
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defined on a space-like cut in space-time.  Well, this clearly is not 
a relativistic concept.  And, of course, what is a space-like cut in 
one coordinate system is tilted in time in a moving coordinate system, 
So that the question, as it's usually formulated, is not relativistic. 
There are two ways to get out of this difficulty.  The nY   is 
a function which, let us say, is defined as a function of x at t 
equals zero.  Now there are two ways to generalize this. 
One way to generalize it is to say, "Oh, well, every measurement 
takes a certain length of time and therefore, what we really measure 
is not something that is defined an such a sharp cut but is defined 
somehow smeared out also in time." Well, possibly this is a useful and 
interesting way to do it.  But this has never really been worked out 
or ever really even considered carefully.  It is a difficult thing. 
The other way to get out of the difficulty is to go to the other 
extreme and say, "We always measure something that is at a point. Namely, 
the field strength at this point or the density, or the current at this 
point." 
Now, if you have something smeared out, and you make a coordinate 
transformation, it still will be smeared out.  If it is a point, and 
you make a coordinate transformation, it still will be a point.  What 
is not relativistically invariant is a "line parallel to this", because 
that will not be a "line parallel to this" after a coordinate 
transformation.  But both the smeared-out thing and the point are. 
The first way looks awfully difficult.  So that one, in this way, 
is naturally led to the — Well, since the first one looks awf — Well, 
whether it's difficult or not, no one really did it seriously. It seems 
that one, in this way, is naturally led to consider field 
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quantities.  This is done seriously and this is the quantum field 
theory in which the observables are localized, not only in time, but 
also in space.  From that point of view, it is quite consistent and 
therefore, if one wants to relieve the non-relativistic nature of 
the observation concept, one must say that every real observable is 
something like a field strength at that point. 
Now this sounds wonderful in principle.  But if we think about 
whether it satisfies the other criterion, whether it is realistic, 
we come to a rather negative judgment.  Bohr and Rosenfeld, as I am 
sure many of you know, analyzed this.  And they came to the conclusion, 
"Yes, it is possible to make such a measurement provided we have an 
arbitrarily big charge in an extremely heavy point concentrated in 
an arbitrarily small space." Well, nobody has yet succeeded to do that! 
Well, it has other problems too. 
So the situation is really this:  If I try to satisfy the 
relativistic requirement — if I ask myself, "Is it relativistic?" — 
I can happily answer, "Yes".  But if I ask myself, "Is it realistic?" 
Well, I'm afraid I must answer "No,  it is not very realistic." The 
measurement of field strength at points, with the accuracy required 
to see quantum effects, not only has not yet been accomplished in 
practice, but evidently runs into very grave difficulties. 
The last question which I would like to ask is, "Is it enough?" 
In other words, could I build up a theory only on this basis? And this 
is satisfied, and in fact it is done.  So the quantum field theories 
operate only with the concept of field measurement, and they work. 
Well, many people say — and, I think, correctly — that they're not 
really terribly consistent in themselves.  But, on the whole, the lack 
of consistency surely does not arise because one does not have enough 
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variables. 
So, if one tries to satisfy the relativistic requirement, one 
is led to measure fields.  It's really not quite right to say that 
one measures only fields — one measures also charges and currents 
— but what I mean by this is that one measures at space-time points, 
rather than either in an extended region or on a cut.  So this is 
the situation. 
I see that in my notes I put down far relativistic, not "yes", 
but "perhaps".  This refers to the fact that we really do not have 
a consistent relativistic theory, so that whether that is a "yes" 
or a "perhaps" is really very difficult to tell. 
The other question which impresses itself on one is, as I mentioned, 
whether the theory is realistic.  Professor Furry's second postulate 
was that every hypermaximal Hermitian operator is measurable.  Well, 
nobody really believes that.  In fact, I am not sure that it is really 
necessary to put up this postulate,  von Neumann put it up, and I have 
used it very often, because it's very convenient if one wants to prove 
something.  It's much easier to prove something if you have many tools 
in your hand and if you can say, "Oh well, now I measure this and then 
I see that it can't be that way." But nobody really believes that 
everything is measurable.  It's absurd to think of it. 
As a matter of fact, if one analyzes carefully what has been 
measured in a quantum sense, it is a depressingly small number.  I don't 
think the position can be measured.  Isn't that right? How da you measure 
it? You have to be everywhere at the same time.  This surely is not 
possible.  In addition to that, clearly if I ask somebody 
to measure something like e to the x, i, d, dx, e to the x, plus one 
 over one plus x2 , he will say "Don't make yourself ridiculous."  
Isn't 
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that it? This is really a very great conceptual difficulty. The 
conserved quantities can be measured. There's a great deal that 
can be said about it, but let me not go too much into it. 
It is easy enough to say that there is a measurement. A really 
phenomenological theory, however, would not only say that there is 
such a measurement, but it would tell how you carry it out. It would 
say, "If you want to measure this quantity, order such and such screws 
from so and so, and put things together this and that way." 
For this reason, Heisenberg in '43, I believe, proposed to base 
everything on the collision matrix. In other words, to admit that 
Hermitian operators are not really measurable, in general.  In fact, 
they are not measurable. But what is measurable is only the momentum, 
and the character of a particle — whether it's a proton or electron 
or whatever it is. Well, not so many other particles do exist in this 
sense in which Heisenberg postulated it. The momentum is a conserved 
quantity, once the two systems separated, and therefore it is not 
necessary to measure it at one cut.  You can measure it, so to say, 
at leisure.  And the practical measurements, either with Professor 
Furry's grading or with the old fashioned systems, are measurements 
essentially of this nature — when it is smeared — well, when the 
measurement occupies a space time volume. 
Let me put down, therefore, the second criticism and its 
elimination, namely "realistic". One wants to make the theory 
realistic and not to demand things which you evidently can't do. 
Now this leads one to the idea of the collision matrix.  You note 
that both these theories have been put forward by Heisenberg.  This 
one was not put forward because he wanted a relativistic requirement 
to be satisfied for measurements, but this one was. You recognize here 
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the two great modern directions of quantum mechanics: the theory of 
the collision matrix and its direct calculation by means of dispersion 
relations, and the theory of the fields.  We have to struggle along 
with them. 
It happens also, that they relieve the two fundamental problems 
of the theory of measurement which come at once to mind.  The unfortu-
nate thing is, of course, that neither of them relieves all 
requirements entirely.  If I go back to my three criteria — whether 
it is relativistically invariant and so on — well, the theory of 
collision matrix and of dispersion relations is relativistically 
invariant. The relativistic requirement is satisfied and there is no 
problem with it. 
Well, it is also sufficiently realistic. 
However, if we ask whether it is enough, whether it is possible 
to reduce every physical problem to a problem of collision - and 
calculate every physical problem by means of the collision matrix- 
I think we have to say that it is probably not the case.  As a matter 
of fact, there is a good deal of discussion on this.  And not very 
ago even I belonged to the school which hoped that it would be enough. 
it I think it was Källen who convinced me that it is not really 
enough. 
Fundamentally it is not enough because the world is c onstantly 
in a collision with us, and there is a constant interaction between 
matter.  Unless we make it the purpose of physics to describe only 
certain carefully made experiments, but not more than that, we 
can't get along entirely with just the collision matrix. It is not 
true that everything is only a collision. The world continues. For 
instance, a gas constantly exerts a pressure on the wall. There 
are many similar examples which show that it is not really possible 
to 
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reduce everything to a collision. And it is not true that the 
collision matrix really solves all problems. There are in this world 
other things of interest in addition to collisions. 
So you see, these two eliminate many of the difficulties and, 
of course, that is why they are so attractive. But neither of them 
seems to eliminate all the difficulties together. 
Now you probably also realize that there is a considerable 
discussion, let me call it, among the physicists, "Which is the more 
promising field?"  It is almost true, unfortunately, that there is 
nobody who is entirely impartial between these two directions of work. 
Some of us believe that the field theories will give the solution of 
the problem — and I could point, even in this audience, to protagonists 
of that point of view.  I could also find people who believe that the 
collision matrix approach will be the ultimately fruitful one. Perhaps 
it is good, for this reason, to emphasize that they are really working 
very closely together and the conflict between the two points of view 
is not so very strong.  As a matter of fact, when it turned out that 
the collision matrix hypothesis was in gross conflict with the field 
theory hypothesis — you remember, with the Mandelstam representation 
— the collision matrix people, who swore up to that time by the 
Mandelstam representation, dropped it most underemoniously and 
returned to the field theory representation. 
Now in one sense, I am practically through with what I wanted to 
say.  But I would like to return to that question which I mentioned 
to you (and which, of course, is a little naive) about the "homo 
scientificus." 
To what degree can we hope that our knowledge will also be 
ultimately supported in its details by science.  I think we should 
realize that when we thought that this can be done for physics alone, 
we were a little too proud of our knowledge and of our discipline. 
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Surely the may knowledge is acquired in general, - and the working 
of the mind, - cannot be understood only by never having paid the 
slightest attention to the question, how the mind works and how, in 
particular, knowledge is acquired.  I think a hope for a really 
integrated knowledge - and for an absence of these very unpleasant 
difficulties, or a reconciliation to this somewhat unpleasant fact of 
the absence of an absolute reality — this cannot come as long as we worry 
only how electrons, protons, and physical objects behave.  It would be 
unreasonable to expect that, just as it was unreasonable to expect that 
we understand the behavior of protons and electrons only by studying 
macroscopic bodies. 
Science has taught us that in order to understand something we must 
devote a great deal of careful thinking and detailed thinking to the 
subject in question. 
This brings me to the last point which I want to make.  Namely, that 
all this teaches us a great deal of humility as to the power of physics 
itself.  It also gives us a good deal of interest in the other sciences, 
in particular to the general question, "How is it that knowledge and 
understanding is acquired either by ourselves, or - well, when we were 
children?" Or, "How is it acquired by other animals?" 
It is perhaps not just a mere accident and coincidence that very 
great strides are made not by us, but by other sciences in these 
directions, and that surprising new results and new recognitions are 
gained in those fields.  I think an integration of more than physics 
will be needed before we can arrive at a balanced and more encompassing 
view of the world, rather than the one which we derive from the ephemeral 
necessities of present day physics, which say that only probability 
connections between subsequent observations are meaningful, without 
really telling us at all anything about the character of observations. 
Thank you very much. 
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One of the Observers: 
Gentlemen, at the session we called before this meeting, we had a 
question session, and we wanted to ask a question very pertinent 
to this point.  Shall we ask the question now? 
Podolsky says: "Yes, let's have the question." 
Carmi: Is it not true that a measurement will take a finite time 
and the measurement could influence previous possible results? 
Dr. Aharonov has some ideas on this and maybe Dr. Rosen could 
fit right in here.  If you make two instantaneous measurements, 
they may overlap because they take a finite time. 
 
measurements which could be carried out in a very short interval of time.  
There are others which may require a long interval of 
 
you have a period in which there is interaction taking place 
 
precise about the state of the object. 
Aharonov says:  Could I add something at this point? There was a 
time when I thought to solve this paradox in the case of measurement 
of position and momentum in the following way: 
TUES: A.M. -2-  
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One of the difficulties of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox is the 
fact that the collapse of the wave function of the far away particle 
occurs instantaneously (immediately when the measurement is done on the 
first particle).  Now consider the case of the state where p1 + p2 = 
2211 aa =- xx .  One finds that in relativistic theories it must take a 
period ?t in order to measure the momentum to the accuracy rp = h/crt .  
But during this period x1 – x2  becomes uncertain since v1 - v2 = (p1 - 
p2)/m  is not certain.  The hope was then that perhaps by the time a 
measurement of momentum is possible, a measurement of position will not 
be possible anymore.  But it is clearly seen that the two periods of 
time are different and therefore the relativistic aspect of the paradox 
remains unchanged. 
TUES:A.M. 
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Dr. Rosen speaking.   I want to make a few rather standard remarks 
about my ideas of measurement.  I'm very glad that yesterday we 
heard the lectures of Professor Furry and Professor Wigner 
because the first one provided the basis for what I want to say, 
and the second one considered some difficulties which would 
otherwise take too long to discuss. Here I want to emphasize the 
following point, one which I 
 
mechanics deals with probabilities, and when we talk about 
 
or a large number of measurements.  It seems to me that the only 
satisfactory way to define the probability of something 
 
then in such and such percent of the cases we get such and 
 
number of systems at the same time.  In other words, we always 
deal with ensembles.  Professor Furry discussed the idea of a 
Gibbs ensemble, but 1 want to go further and say that we have 
an ensemble in every case, whether we have a pure state or a 
mixture.  Now this may be just a matter of words, but I'd like 
to use this idea and introduce names. 
 
 
An incoherent ensemble is what Professor Furry called yesterday a 
mixed state, and a coherent ensemble is what he called a pure state.  
If we carry out a measurement on a single system, then in general, 
we don't know what the result of that measurement 
of the various results.  There are exceptions of course.  There may be 
a state which is an eigenstate of the observable, in which 
 
distinguish between the single system and the ensemble, but in 
general we do have to. Perhaps again this is just a matter of words, 
but I'd like to put it this way. When we are dealing with 
 
we write down equations.  The idea of introducing probability 
amplitudes is, of course, strange from the classical point of 
 
few words about the classical interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
Now I want to make several remarks about measurement.  The whole 
question of measurement is a very complicated topic because 
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easier to discuss, but sometimes somebody really should go into 
TUES: A.M. 
-5- 
 
dent observables whose operators commute with one another, and in 
this case, if the measurement has been carried out exactly, 
 
approximate measurement, a measurement which has some error in 
 
to require analysis.  We should distinguish, of course, between 
 
the ensemble to which the system belongs before the measurement, 
 
ensemble into which it has gone.  This brings up the question of 
reduction of the wave packet, which is the great mystery in this 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
the one system that we are dealing with from the old ensemble to 
 
would like to think of it as something objective and not 
 
 
  
 
 
much yesterday and today, and if you carry out a measurement on one 
system here and get a certain result which implies a definite 
 
of the measurement here is transmitted instantaneously to the 
 
also raise questions about consistency with relativity theory 
 
no difficulty because Eddington once remarked; "We can transmit 
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You have no assurance that this is the particle that you were 
one way of looking at it. 
Another way of looking at it is to talk about the state of the 
system in the same way as one talks about the state of the system 
when one is considering quantized fields, namely, as a state which is 
not localized to any particular part 
associated with all of space and does not require any transmission 
 
the object system and the instrument interacting for a time and 
 
and if we then carry out a measurement on the instrument, giving 
 
out the measurement on the instrument and get a certain result, then 
because of the correlation, you are certain to get one particular 
result if you were to carry out the appropriate 
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instrument, then before the signal associated with this measure- 
ment reaches the object, you have the possibility of obtaining 
 
result, namely, the one that is associated with the result that 
measurement on the instrument the result for the object has 
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TUES: A.M. 
Conference - October 1-5, 1962 -10- 
Tuesday Morning - October 2 
Kaiser Kunz is speaking:  So in a sense, it's not a signal sent 
at all. 
Aharonov says:  Yeah, we all agree that there is no way to send 
a signal by this kind of correlation. 
 
theory when we have more information. 
Furry speaks:  Yes, there are, of course, many, many ways to 
calculate velocities faster than that of light.  The simplest one 
is that if I fire a bullet in this direction with three-fourths 
the speed of light and fire another bullet in the opposite 
direction with three-fourths the speed of light, and you ask me 
the relative speed of those two things, obviously it is for me 
three-halves the speed of light.  There is no contradiction in 
relativity. What relativity tells us is that if either one of 
the people who are on the projectiles that are fired take the 
measurement, they will, of course, get less than c, but for me 
it's a matter of simple arithmetic. 
Aharonov interjects:  Yeah, but --- 
Furry continues:  there is no reason I can't use simple arithmetic 
and get three-halves c.  Similarly here, if I make a measurement 
and from it I conclude right now, without sending signals, that 
the state of spin further away has a certain property, I can 
TUES:A.M. -11- 
make the assertion instantaneously of what will be found if one 
makes a measurement and doesn't state whether one has already 
made it, makes it right now, or makes it later.  It doesn't 
matter.  I make the assertion.  This is not sending a signal and 
relativity theory limits only the sending of signals.  This has 
been pointed out in connection with propagation of electromagnetic 
waves where the phase velocity may very well be faster than the 
speed of light, but the signal velocity is always not greater than 
the speed of light. 
Podolsky says: The question of sending a signal arises this way. 
Supposing we have two photons with opposite angular momentum. We 
can measure the x component of one, and then we know what the 
x component of the other is going to be.  If we measure the y 
component, we know what the y component of the other is going 
to be.  The question was, by maneuvering the first measurement, 
can we tell something to the fellow at the other end who is 
going to make a measurement on the second photon? We can say, 
for instance, that the question is, "is it a boy or a girl?" 
and so all we have to do is transmit one bit of information. 
Can we do it by deliberately choosing the measurement one way 
or the other so the other fellow will find out what we have 
chosen by making a measurement on the other photon? It turns 
out that it can't be done. 
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Rosen speaks:  Let us take the case of spins.  Suppose we 
know that the two spins have to be opposite. We can have a 
measurement carried out on the first, on the instrument as we 
call it. We will find the spin is up, and so we conclude that 
the spin of the object is down.  A person near the object which 
is correlated with the instrument may carry on a measurement on 
the object immediately after that and he will find that the spin 
tion transmitted. 
Aharonov says:  Just let me add one more point.  I think that 
your question stimulates further clarification.  You said that 
if we project a light sending information classically, but here 
there is a difference.  You see, classically, suppose we get 
here — 
Aharonov replies:  The reason why one "feels" that the measurement 
of the first particle "does" something to the second particle in 
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the quantum case, contrary to the classical case, is the 
following;  In classical theory every coordinate of a particle 
is fully determined.  This means that when you get a signal from 
a far away star and you beam something about its orbit, you have 
learned about "something" that you believe was there all the time. 
In quantum theory, position and momentum do not "exist" together. 
Once you have chosen in this setup to measure position, you and 
everyone else have lost the opportunity to know the momentum. 
And even more, in a sense the far away particle was put in a 
state in which there is not a definite momentum at all.  If, on 
the other hand, momentum was measured, the far away particle was 
put in a wave-like state and one can later perform an 
interference experiment on it.  So the "feeling" is that by 
measuring 
the first particle something is "done" to the second particle. 
It is either put in a particle-like state or in a wave-like 
state.  Let me just add that this "feeling" is not necessarily 
correct, but it is there, and this is really the difference 
between the classical and quantum case. 
Then Dr. Furry illustrated the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen "paradox" 
with the following story: 
First, you get two envelopes.  Then some person, who 
becomes incommunicado or commits suicide immediately afterwards, 
takes one or the other of two playing cards, the red or the black, 
(we don't know which) and tears it in two, and puts half in each 
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envelope.  One of the envelopes is sent to Chicago and at any 
time we can tell what the color of the half card in that 
envelope in Chicago is just by opening the envelope we have here. 
We can tell it instantaneously.  It doesn't matter if they are 
opening the envelope in Chicago simultaneously with the one we 
have here, or before, or after.  They will always correlate. 
This correlation was established in a way that didn't involve 
any violation of relativity, because they were both together at 
the time they were put into the envelopes. 
Podolsky speaks:  Yes, but there is a big difference here. 
Furry replies: Oh, I know, because you used many decks. 
Podolsky then says:  No! (laughter)  Not only that, but our open- 
ing one envelope to determine what the card is in Chicago does 
not in any way affect the possibilities in Chicago.  While in 
this quantum mechanical experiment, it does, depending on 
whether we choose to open one envelope or the other. 
Furry says: Well, I don't know whether Professor Rosen wants 
to yield long enough for me to describe my set of envelopes 
which corresponds more closely to your example. 
Rosen says:  Please go right ahead. 
Furry continues:  It's enough to use, say, two envelopes. 
We enclose them in a slightly infernal box so that the removing 
of one of these envelopes from the box will promptly result in 
the complete obliteration of the other one.  Now we have two of 
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these boxes, each with two envelopes.  The person tears apart 
a card out of a deck and puts half in each of these two 
envelopes.  For one of them he chooses a card which is either 
a black suit or a red suit.  For the other one he chooses 
either a low card or a high card.  He puts the black or red 
in the left-hand envelope, the low or high in the right.  Then 
one box is sent to Chicago and the other is kept here.  Now you 
see, there can never be any contradiction if we pull out the 
black or red and look at it.  The other one is destroyed as 
soon as we pull it out by the infernal arrangement of the box. 
If we pull out black or red, we now know that if the correspond- 
ing envelope is pulled out in Chicago, we know what the answer 
will be.  If the other envelope is pulled out in Chicago, we 
don't know anything.  In any case, however, the sending of the 
box is perfectly well understood.  There is no contradiction with 
relativity, and the attaining of information from one place or 
the other is just what it sounds like.  The difference, of course, 
between the classical and the quantum picture is that the quantum 
mechanical state does not correspond to this because this nice 
classical picture of the box with two envelopes is the hidden 
parameter description and the hidden parameter description is 
denied in quantum mechanics.  But this is the only difference 
between the two things and there is no difference at all about 
the questions of information and of distance and time. 
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Podolsky says:  Thank you.  I think that's a very good example. 
Rosen continues:  Well, in talking about measurements and the 
reduction of the wave packet we come upon this relevant points 
Just what does happen in the measurement? The fact is that at 
some stage we have to think of the measurement as making a 
decision among a number of different possibilities, singling out 
one result from a number of potential results.  That is the 
essential feature in the final stage of the measurement.  Simply 
calling one thing an object and the other an instrument in itself 
does not insure this, because one could treat both of them 
quantum-mechanically.  As Professor Wigner pointed out, you have 
the same problem about carrying out the measurement on the 
 
or other, we are able to cut this chain and say that there are 
 
have the property that they make a decision and give us one 
 
wrote down, so that we get one term instead of the whole series. 
 
wave packet.  Now at this point I think it is appropriate to 
mention Dr. Everett's point of view, in which he does not accept 
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the idea of the reduction of the wave packet.  I hope he will 
correct me if I say this incorrectly and I hope he will add 
something to what I say.  As I understand it, he considers this 
whole series as continuing to exist even after the measurement 
has been carried out.  He does not want to distinguish between 
the actual result as obtained in a given case and the other 
possible results which might have been obtained, so that even 
 
term.  He thinks of the wave function as changing only in 
 
without the possibility of this sudden change in the wave function, 
which we call the reduction of the wave packet.  My own feeling 
 
Hugh Everett speaking:  I think you said it essentially correctly. 
My position is simply that I think you can make a tenable theory 
out of allowing the superpositions to continue forever, even for 
a single observer. 
Shimony suggests: It seems to me that if this is the case, there 
are two possibilities.  The two possibilities involve awareness. 
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awareness is associated with one of these branches and not with 
    Rosen interrupts: Wait just a moment.  I think perhaps it would 
help the group if you (Everett) could give us a little bit 
number of, let's say, originally identical object systems.  At 
the end of this sequence there is a large superposition of 
states, each element of which contains the observer as having 
 
element as what we think of as an experience, but still hold 
that it is tenable to assert that all of the elements simul- 
 
fact, if one takes a very large series of experiments, in a 
certain sense one can assert that for almost all of the 
 
ordinary picture of quantum mechanics.  That is very briefly 
it. 
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Podolsky speaks:  Perhaps it might be a little clearer to most 
people if you put it in a different way.  Somehow or other we 
have here the parallel times or parallel worlds that science 
fiction likes to talk about so much.  Every time a decision is 
made, the observer proceeds along one particular time while the 
other possibilities still exist and have physical reality. 
Everett says:  Yes, it's a consequence of the superposition 
principle that each separate element of the superposition will 
obey the same laws independent of the presence or absence of 
one another. Hence, why insist on having a certain selection 
of one of the elements as being real and all of the others 
somehow mysteriously vanishing. 
Furry says: Actually, wouldn't you prefer to say that no 
decisions were made, but to the observer looking back it looks 
in retrospect as if the decisions were made.  The observer also 
exists in all the other states, and in each of them as he looks 
back, it looks as if the appropriate decisions were made. 
This means that each of us, you see, exists on a great many 
sheets or versions and it's only on this one right here that 
you have any particular remembrance of the past.  In some 
other ones we perhaps didn't come to Cincinnati. 
 
think is tenable, and I think it's the simplest one that can 
arise. We simply do away with the reduction of the wave 
packet. 
Podolsky speaks: It's certainly consistent as far as we have 
heard of it.  The question arises as to what happens if we have 
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a large number of observers and how these worlds of individual 
observers fit in together.  
Everett replies: Well, again, all of the consistency of ordinary physics 
is preserved by the correlation structure of this state. You'll always 
find that an observer who repeats  
 
 
Podolsky speaks:  It looks like we would have a non-denumerable infinity 
of worlds. 
Everett:  Yes. 
Podolsky continues: Each proceeding with its own set of choices 
that have been made. 
Furry says:  To me, the hard thing about it is that one must 
picture the world, oneself, and everybody else as consisting 
not in just a countable number of copies but somehow or 
another in an undenumerable number of copies, and at this my 
imagination balks.  I can think of various alternative Furrys 
doing different things, but I cannot think of a non-denumerable 
number of alternative Furrys. 
(Podolsky chuckles) 
 
 
 
(Correction made by Everett, bottom of page 20) 
Imagine a very large series of experiments made by an observer. 
With each observation, the state of the observer splits into a 
number of states, one for each possible outcome, and correlated 
to the outcome.  Thus the state of the observer is a constantly 
branching tree, each element of which describes a particular 
history of observations.   Now, I would like to assert that, for 
a "typical" branch, the frequency of results will be precisely 
what is predicted by ordinary quantum mechanics.  Even more 
strongly, I would like to assert that, as the number of observa- 
tions goes to infinity, almost all branches will contain 
frequencies of results in accord with ordinary quantum theory 
predictions.  To be able to make a statement like this requires 
that there be 
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sum of orthogonal states.  There is one consistency criteria 
which would be required for such a thing.  Since my states are 
 
branches after a branching process.  Now this consistency 
criterion can be shown to lead directly to the. squared amplitude 
of the coefficient, as the unique measure which satisfies this. 
 
nary quantum mechanics hold.  Now I could draw a parallel here 
to statistical mechanics where the same sort of thing takes 
place.  Here we like to make statements for almost all 
trajectories. They are ergodic and things like that.  Here 
also you can only make such a statement if you have some under- 
 
statistical mechanics it turns out there is uniquely one measure 
of the phase space which you can use, the Lebesgue measure. 
This is because it is preserved under the transformation of 
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Podolsky says to Shimony:  Do you wish to comment on this? 
Shimony: You eliminate one of the two alternatives I had 
in mind. You do associate awareness with each one of these. 
Everett replies:  Each individual branch looks like a perfectly 
respectable 
world where definite things have happened. 
Shimony speaks:  Then the question that I have about the 
alternatives that you have chosen is: what, from the standpoint 
of any one of these branches, is the difference within a branch, 
between your picture of the world and one in which there are 
stochastic elements? 
Everett says: None whatever.  The whole point of this view- 
point as that a deduction from it is that the standard interpre- 
 
this viewpoint, get some hold on approximate measures and this 
type of thing. 
Podolsky:  Thank you, Dr. Everett. 
 
several roads leading from it.  He decided to follow one of 
them and certain things happened.  Then the story went back to 
the same point and he decided to go along another road from 
the fork and something else happened to him, and so on for 
 
Aharonov: I think we should be happy because other parts of us 
are perhaps doing much nicer life because they have chosen 
different branches. 
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that has been referred to a number of times, which the litera- 
ture has often referred to as the EPR paradox.  The first point 
 
implies no criticism of the correctness of quantum mechanics. 
As we all know, from what Professor Wigner impressed upon us 
last night, in a certain domain quantum mechanics is correct 
and is self-consistent.  The question that was raised in the 
 
 
reality.  That perhaps could be called the classical point 
of view.  On the other hand, the orthodox quantum mechanical 
cannot be verified by any measurement. We know that in recent 
years the attitude has been that only things which can be 
verified by measurement have any meaning, and that any 
discussions about things which cannot be verified are meaningless 
 
correspond to a precise value of a certain physical quantity, 
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in a certain sense,  Then we can ask, of course, 'Why bother 
raising this question in the first place?'  I think the answer 
 
do not have any bearing on the results of measurement within 
the framework of quantum mechanics as it exists at present, we 
point to the possibility of other theories, more complete ones, 
 
different form, one which is more complete, which has 
elements 
in it having a one to one correspondence with what one says 
in 
classical theory is reality. The other one is, of course, to 
 
at the attitude of some quantum mechanicians because of a 
certain dogmatism that they display in these discussions. 
There is an old saying that the revolutionary of yesterday is 
the conservative of today.  Some people even refuse to 
 
nobody here in this discussion is considered to be guilty. 
Furry says: There also are people angry that the word orthodox 
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is used.  (Chuckles among the panel) 
Wigner says: No, I don't think so.  I think I started to use 
that word and if anyone's orthodox, I am orthodox. 
Furry:  Oh, there are orthodox people who are not angry at 
the word orthodox.  There are also the orthodox people who do 
 
Rosen: Now I would like to say a few more words about this 
so-called paradox.  I think all the panelists are familiar 
 
classical point of view, does not disturb the system about 
which you ultimately get information.  Here I would like to 
 
as it exists and the way in which it describes physical systems 
on the one hand and, on the other hand, the analysis of a 
 
attention, for example, to the work of Heisenberg.  In his 
little book on the physical foundations of quantum theory, he 
analyzes various conceivable measurements in detail, and shows 
that in every case one arrives at the uncertainty relation. 
 
measuring instrument and the electron, that is to say, because 
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quantities with complete accuracy.  There is always a certain 
 
Heisenberg principle. When we go over to the quantum formalism 
 
property that it cannot give us information beyond the limits 
 
is fine because the information that the wave function gives 
us is not any more precise than what we could have obtained 
by a measurement on the system, taking into account the 
disturbance produced on the system by the measurement.  On 
 
information.  The system is not being disturbed, and we do not have 
an explanation for the uncertainty principle in terms of the 
disturbance on the system. Nevertheless, the uncertainty 
principle holds, and we get the situation that I have 
 
that the description given by quantum mechanics is incomplete, 
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know that it has an exact coordinate. That is to say, it is 
described by a wave function called a delta function, telling 
it is, but we will know its momentum.  Now there are two ways 
obtained is the momentum which the electron had just before the 
measurement, since we can make a momentum measurement which 
possible values of momentum, that is to say, it was in a state 
is more or less, I think, the orthodox quantum view. In this 
Merzbacher asks:  Is this what Professor Furry refers to as 
realistic? 
Furry comes in: Well, the point of view that it already had 
the momentum before we measured it would be a realistic point 
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be a realistic point of view.  Of course, quantum mechanics does 
not allow that in this case.  This is a point in which Bohm intro- 
duces the word potential or potentiality. When a system has a 
wave function which is not an eigenfunction of a given observable, 
then it does not have a value for that observable.  It has only 
potentialities for having various values and when we make the 
measurement of one of these quantities, the quantity in question, 
one of these potentialities gets realized.  This is, I think, the 
 
just that way before Bohm wrote his book on quantum mechanics.  I 
think that this is probably the best statement of the quantum 
mechanical view that we are venturing to call the orthodox view of 
the subject, the view which I think probably most of us hold.  But 
like many orthodoxies, it is possible to hold to this orthodoxy 
without ever having examined terribly closely just all that it 
implies.  Bohm, in his book, examined it far more closely than most 
of us have. 
Aharonov says:  I think that's a good way of putting it. 
Rosen:  I think we should stop now for some coffee. 
TUESDAY MORNING AFTER BREAK. 
 
made a remark to me and I feel that everybody should hear it so 
would you please say the same thing that you said to me?  (he says 
to Guth) 
Guth:  Professor Rosen referred to a book by Heisenberg in which he 
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mentioned two things.  One, discussion of experiments.  (Guth makes 
some remarks which were not recorded clearly) 
Furry interrupting Guth:  You think you should obtain exactly the 
factor h over four pi? 
Guth:  Exactly. 
Furry:  Instead of just approximately? 
Guth:  (continues)  I would like to quote Pauli who did a somewhat 
similar derivation.  He discusses the question whether, in a rela- 
tivistic theory, one can measure rx better than h/mc and then 
he discusses it in theory of relativity but then he adds...   rx 
up to h over mc. Where this result can be assigned fundamental 
physical significance, can be decided only when you have a consistent 
formalism, but I think there is a gap here in derivation of measure- 
ment theory...very interesting and very enlightening discussions 
and exact theory and these discussions come out with the right 
results... 
Furry replies:  There is one paper of this general sort in which 
a little more care was taken with the factors and which, as I 
remember it, it comes out precisely right.  This is not the discussion 
of the cases which Heisenberg talked about.  It is the paper that 
Ramsey and I wrote in connection with the Aharonov-Bohm effect, 
and I think that if you will look at that you will find that the 
 
remember it, the paper was written with a slight variety.  There 
TUES:AM -30- 
were two cases discussed, the electrostatic and the magnetic.  In 
one of them we made it all come out exactly and in the other one we 
left it a little sloppy, so that you have a sample of both sorts of 
discussions.  That is, I think it probably can be done in all these 
elementary cases.  Now the other thing, the one about the h over mc. 
 
What really happens when you try to push this h over mc is going to 
be that you just don't have one particle any more, but you produce 
pairs. 
 
the discussion that I started before the intermission.  The point 
I had made there was that there are two ways of looking at this 
electron.  One was that it had a coordinate and momentum just before 
the last measurement and that the wave function is not able to des- 
cribe a state in which both of these have exact values.  That is what 
is referred to as the realistic point of view.  The other one is 
that before the measurement, since the electron is in a state which 
is an eigenstate of the position but not of the momentum, the electron 
 
 
is not as detailed as you believe the reality itself to be.  That 
first point of view, then you say that quantum mechanics is incom- 
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of view, of course, then quantum mechanics is complete because 
reality is what is given by quantum mechanics, so that by definition 
there is a one to one correspondence...I purposely stressed in the 
beginning the idea of having to interpret the wave function or the 
state of a system in terms of an ensemble, because that could be 
used in the present discussion. You see, when we have a state of a 
system in which the electron is described as having an exact position 
 
I would like to say a few words.  Professor Wigner discussed it last 
niqht.  He qave a very good proof of the nonexistence of hidden 
 
I think that one would have to specify exactly what one means by 
hidden parameters before one decides whether they are permissible 
 
ensemble of many electrons, each of which has this particular 
 
having a momentum according to quantum mechanics. 
 
one can set up a picture which is consistent with quantum theory and 
 journal so that it was never abstracted and very few people ever 
heard of it.  It's in the Journal of the Elisha Mitchell Scientific 
Society, volume 61, page 67, (1945). 
 
great while, on physics.  It so happens that the University of 
North Carolina was founded in 1795 and on the occasion of the 
sesquicentennial celebration I was asked to submit an article. 
 
 
166 to 193, 1952. Of course, he knew nothing about what I had done 
at the time he wrote this. The idea involved is that when you take 
a time dependent Schrodinger equation for a particle, let us say, 
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Rosen:  I should explain that this is a journal published at the 
 
very fine papers in which he did a much better job than I did and 
rrr  
 
Correction to equations on page 33 
 Hamilton-Jacobi equation of classical physics for the motion of a 
particle in a potential field. Quantum mechanics has introduced 
 
describing a classical ensemble of particles, each of which is 
distributed with a density r  and each one has a velocity at a 
 
some measurement where a particular particle is located. You have 
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if you carry out a measurement and find that the particle is at a 
certain place, then, provided you have already solved these equations 
a classical manner.  Now this can be regarded as giving a more 
complete description than the usual quantum mechanics does, without 
 
"How is this possible?"... 
Wigner interrupts:  The function is time-dependent.  The potential 
is time-dependent. 
Rosen:  That depends on whether you're dealing with a stationary state 
or not. 
Wigner:  But in general, it's time-dependent, and also there is the 
 
this is just a way of visualizing things.  I want to stress that 
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potential.  Is this equation supposed to describe the motion of 
a single particle or is it suppose to describe... What is it 
supposed to describe? 
Rosen:  That's a very good point.  Thank you.  The way I would put 
 
is that this describes, as I said in the very beginning, an ensemble 
of particles.  However, this is a coherent ensemble and there is 
somehow a certain correlation or interrelation among the different 
members of the ensemble.  Of course, quantum mechanics agrees with 
 
in such a way that the motion is described classically, provided 
you assume that there is some kind of force acting on it which is 
associated with the ensemble, namely, this additional term. 
Wigner:  So that it would not be valid for a single particle? 
Merzbacher:  You can shoot the particles in separately, can't you? 
In other words, the single particle knows that all the other 
members of the ensemble have come before or are coming later, somehow 
or other.  Is that true? 
 
 
Wiqner:  Perhaps we shouldn't enter this discussion. 
 
to have a classical picture of the behavior of the electron, then 
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this goes out in general. 
Wiqner:  But the h doesn't bother me. What bothers me is that 
proper... 
 
talking about a single particle which is in a certain state, accord- 
ing to quantum mechanics that means that it is in a certain ensemble. 
 
classically you have to say that in addition to the classical force 
which acts on it, there is another force which is associated with 
the ensemble, in spite of the fact that you are looking at a 
 
Podolsky interrupts:  Isn't it true that what is described by 
these equations is a set of surfaces and all that we know is that 
 
know where on the surface the particle is unless that is specified. 
Rosen:  Or measured. 
Podolsky:  or measured. 
Furry:  You do not have a density specified. 
 
You have an ensemble which contains many particles, each behaving 
 
ment and locate the particle in a certain place, then according to 
 
 
 
Furry:  What do you do after that measurement? You have not changed 
your R once you make a measurement, you must change your R to an R 
which is say a delta function around where the particle is? 
Rosen:  Of course, this presupposes that everything you talked about 
yesterday holds. 
Furry: Yes, this is just quantum mechanics. 
Rosen:  This is the picture as it was just before the measurement. 
If you carry out the measurement, you change things, and then the 
picture is changed. 
Aharonov:  Can you introduce the measurement with some kind of 
potential and do this, perhaps, to collapse the wave packet? Since 
each wave is supposed to be classical, we don't believe that some- 
thing really collapsed.  It should be simply something like coupled 
waves and when you get more information, it's going to be changed. 
That's the way it looks. 
Rosen:  The process of measurement is something which quantum 
mechanics 
 
to describe it? 
Aharonov:  But you invent a certain environment just to solve this 
problem of measurement and now you tell us we are not supposed to 
discuss it. You invent a certain something or other just to solve 
this problem. You invent hidden variables just to solve this problem 
and now you tell us we are not supposed to discuss it. 
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this picture, you can also know what its momentum is, because of 
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of measurement, but just to give one a picture... 
Aharonov:  Oh. 
 
within the framework of quantum theory. 
Podolsky:  In other words, is there such a thing as a hidden para- 
meter possible in spite of von Neumann's proof? 
Rosen:  Yes. 
Wiqner:  That is a proof that there are hidden parameters. 
Aharonov:  Yeah. 
Wiqner: What is a hidden parameter? 
Aharonov:  A hidden parameter is supposed to tell us what will be 
the result of the measurement in the theory of observables. 
 
themselves do not contribute to the state of the system, but are 
determined by the system.  You see, for example, the potential 
 
get a picture in which the particle moves classically, provided a 
suitable force acts on it. The force always acts on it in such a 
way as to make it behave statistically according to the laws of 
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quantum mechanics. 
Podolsky:  Dr. Guth. 
Guth:  I think what this equation means along some comparison with 
classical statistical theory on the scattering process.  You assume 
the conservation of number of particles and that can be expressed 
by...At this point I would like to add that these equations are 
incomplete because we reach a boundary condition and single value.  
But you can get the boundary condition to be expressed in terms of 
r  and S or in terms of r  and p.  These are essentially the 
quantum mechanical current and v is essentially the quantum mechan- 
ical current, and I think you see that it is completely equivalent 
to the Schrodinger equation, just in a little different form. 
Then we ask the question, which form is the most useful, one consid- 
eration or the other consideration? I think the classical picture 
comes in only if one adds something to the formalism.  The classical 
picture adds something which is really not important to the forma- 
lism.  If one says that it is a quantum potential, we consider it 
like a classical elastic or hydrodynamic potential subject to a 
classical potential.  But that might be helpful and might throw some 
interesting light, but I would like to express the point that this 
is completely equivalent mathematically with the Schrodinger equation 
Podolsky:  Dr. Rosen already said that this is completely equiva- 
lent to the Schrodinger equation, that this is just another way of 
writing it. 
Guth:  There is nothing classical about it except the looks.  You 
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see the quantum force changes everything completely.  Just let me 
say one word about this question of completeness or incompleteness. 
You see, classical scattering theory is not a complete theory because 
it is a statistical theory.  The classical scattering theory is not 
a theory like quantum mechanics.  Nothing about statistical theory 
and classical scattering theory and what not, hidden parameters too. 
In classical theory we can introduce hidden parameters, in scatter- 
ing theory we can introduce hidden parameters with which we can 
measure position and velocity, but it would be to go astray.  Nobody 
as far as I know has even carried out an experiment to show that 
particular algebra, particular gauge transformation, particular 
alpha particle...So it seems to me that with the quantum force in 
classical scattering theory one can introduce as a hidden variable, 
but there is no point doing it because everything becomes terribly 
complicated and it is a useless theory.  I think I could reproduce 
something from the pages of this paper. 
Rosen:  Now, I want to come back to this point for a moment. When 
I discussed this I was somewhat more cautious, I think, than Bohm. 
I pointed out that this was a possible way of interpreting quantum 
mechanics.  I also pointed out that there are some difficulties, 
perhaps, in such an interpretation, and I gave an example of this 
sort of treatment.  One likes to think of classical mechanics as 
being the limit of quantum mechanics when you let h go to zero.  If 
you take these equations and let h go to zero, the first of these 
equations goes over to the usual Hamilton-Jacobi equation, or at 
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least it looks as though it does.  However, I want to caution you 
that that will not always be the case in practice.  It depends on 
the nature of the function Y  that you have to start with.  For 
example, if you use a free particle and you take Y  to be of the 
form 
( )pxhiAe  then this expression Vq comes out zero.  On the 
other hand, if you take Y  to be of the form )cos( h
pxA  then Vq 
comes out to be  p2/2m .  Here it is a constant. You see in this 
 
However, it does provide a certain rough picture of a classical 
nature, if one wants such a thing in order to interpret quantum 
mechanics. I think someone wants to ask a question. 
Podolsky says:  Oh yes, Dr. von Roos. 
von Roos:  In my opinion, the difficulties that you have according 
to the classical limit theory, are due to the fact that Y  has an 
essential singularity as h goes to zero.  But if you do all this, 
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for instance, with a quantum mechanical distribution 
function, then there is no trouble in taking this limit.  
Rosen:  Isn't the last case an example of a quantum 
mechanical distribution function? 
von Roos:  No, that's a wave function.  That's not a quantum 
mechanical distribution function.  
Wigner: What do you mean, a quantum mechanical distribution func- 
 
 
them that you get here and so... 
Furry:  This example brings out very clearly that you have ruled 
out the superposition principle when you impose these reality 
conditions. 
Rosen:  Yes. 
Furry:  Of course, taking a real part is not a linear operator. 
linear combination of two exponential functions corresponding to 
that you can either talk about particles or talk about interference, 
but not about both at the same time.  But I think perhaps I have said 
enough about this question.  I simply brought it in to give an 
example of what some people might consider to be the introduction of 
hidden parameters. 
Wiqner:  It doesn't seem to me that von Neumann said that it is not 
possible to introduce hidden parameters. Surely it is possible, but 
he said you can't explain the results of the measurements and their 
statistical nature as a consequence of hidden parameters. And now 
returning to what Professor Aharonov said, namely, that you did not 
give a theory of the measurement and therefore, you surely did not, 
excuse for being so explicit, you surely did not give the explanation 
of the measurement of the statistical element which, according to 
everybody, occurs in the course of measurement, as a result of hidden 
parameters.  In principle, it seems to me that this example is saying 
that we don't have to have the uncertainty principle. (pause) Well, I 
had a very malicious remark to make. 
Furry:  Go ahead. 
Rosen:  The more malicious the better.  (laughter)  
Wiqner:  One could say just as well that the velocities always travel 
with (Wigner seems to say) seven c's.  Then the uncertainty principle 
would be completely abolished. The velocity would always 
 
TUES:AM -43- 
Correction to page 44: 
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be absolutely certain.  The position would always, of course, 
be given by quantum mechanics and the velocity would always be 
(he seems to say) 77 c's. Well, the uncertainty principle would 
be a good excuse to me.  This abolishes the uncertainty 
principle in very much the same way.  It introduces something 
that he calls velocity and nobody else will call it velocity.  
It will be infinite on numerous occasions and it doesn't seem 
to make very much sense. The potential which he introduces is 
for a single particle in a stationery field, a time dependent 
potential, which also has infinities in general and it has 
infinities where the particle surely is not.  It doesn't seem 
that this is the most 
Wigner: What causes the potential? 
Rosen:  I want to express again that this is not anything that can 
have a bearing on the outcome of the measurements beyond what 
quantum mechanics predicts.  It simply enables us to visualize, if 
one wants 
 
going on in a classical way.  If one wants to have a 
classical picture this, in principle, provides one. Now the 
uncertainty 
 
measurement, not as a result of the behavior of the 
individual particle itself, whatever that may mean. 
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Wiqner: You cannot imagine a state in which position and 
velocity are very closely determined. But it doesn't seem that 
the velocity which is obtained this way has more to do with 
anything observable than if I say the velocities, but perhaps I 
should relent and say only point 77 c (0.77c).  (laughter) 
Rosen:  It doesn't matter.  This is not a relativistic theory. 
You can take 7 hundred and 7 c if you want to.  (More laughter) 
I want to say one thing in connection with your remark, Professor 
Wigner. 
Wiqner:  I'm sure I wouldn't mind. 
Rosen:  This is simply a way of providing a more complete 
 
here it is. 
Podolsky:  Thank you, Dr. Rosen. 
THE PANEL DISCUSSION  
Panelists: Y. Aharonov, W. Furry, B. Podolsky, N. Rosen, and E. P. Wigner. 
Professor N. Rosen, Chairman, opening this session Tuesday afternoon, October 2. 
Ladies and Gentlemen:  As you know, the purpose of this gathering is to have a 
question and answer session. Dr. Werner has given me a list of questions which 
were formulated this morning by, I believe, most of the members of this group. 
We'll just take them one at a time and see what we can do. I understand that 
we are to refer these questions to the people sitting on the stage. However, 
if they don't know the answers, we will refer them to the audience, but if 
they don't know the answers, well (laughter). So let's begin. The first 
question is as follows: "What is meant by the statement that an operator is 
observable? How does one distinguish which are observable?" 
 
Furry: Well, this depends on who is talking. Well, if I use the vernacular, it 
depends on whom do you string along with. Professor Wigner remarked last 
night, and I remarked yesterday afternoon, that if you're making a 
mathematical theory, it's nice to have powerful mathematical weapons. When you 
make the assertion that every Hermitian operator has a spectrum that can be 
measured, that is if a set of eigenvalues and eigenfunctions exist for this 
operator, then you assume that it is measurable and that the possible values 
obtained in measurement are the eigenvalues. This is what you do if you're 
interested in powerful mathematical assumption to make it easy to do various 
deductions. On the other hand, very eminent physicists have taken the 
position, held strongly to the position, that one should regard as measurable 
only things for which we can describe, at least in principle, an actual 
physical arrangement for making the measurement. 
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part of his handbook article. This adds a little bonus, I might say, for 
the old custom of learning to read German which was universal among 
graduate students when I was one, and is not so universal today. These 
include, of course, position within certain limits, and momentum, energy, 
angular momentum, and, as Professor Wigner said last night, that's just 
about the end of the list. I can't think of any case where anyone has 
worked out a way of measuring anything else. And, of course, it is rather 
rarely in the 
 
When we do physics we talk about position, momentum, energy, angular 
momentum. 
Is there something else? Yes, I guess we measure time. But that comes under 
a special category. Time, of course, is not an operator in the non-
relativistic 
quantum mechanics. This is an important distinction. So that our procedure 
for measuring time is just a procedure for tagging things with a parameter, 
time being the parameter. 
Rosen: "How about energy?" 
Furry: "Energy, angular momentum, momentum, and position. These are things 
which are represented by operators that are genuinely measurable in the sense 
that people have described them by some experimental arrangement. Now if 
you arm yourself only with positions, it is much more difficult to prove all 
the theorems which are proved so rapidly if you arm yourself with more 
powerful assumptions. 
Wigner: How can you measure position? 
Furry:  Well, with Heisenberg's gamma ray microscope. 
Wigner: You don't measure position with that. At what time do you measure 
position? When you send out the gamma ray, or when it arrives, or in between? 
Furry:  I would say at a time which is calculated from the time when the 
gamma ray is sent out, allowing for effects (of transmission). 
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Wigner: But that is not an operator anymore. That is not an operator  
because an operator gives x at time t equals zero, let us say.  
Aharonov: But what about using separating shutters?  
Wigner:   That comes closer.  
Furry:   Yes, that is the method Bohr  ordinarily used. I was "off the beam"  
in mentioning this other thing. On the other hand, in connection with that  
business of measuring with the gamma ray microscope, one should remember that  
one can plan ahead and send out the rays which will hit the part icle in a 
certain limited region located at a given time. When one did this, of course,  
one might fail and might not see a particle. There might not be a particle  
in that position. It's typical of these discussions of experiment that one  
allows for them to fail frequently and that one agrees that the successful  
cases will be regarded as typical. 
Rosen: Mr. Aharonov. 
Aharonov: Well, I just wanted to mention that in the case where one is limited  
to a small number of operators one might simply measure the ener gy. If the 
energy is a sufficiently detailed function of position and momentum, one can  
measure energy jumps and from the spectrum calculate operators which are  
functions of energy. So life is not so bad.  
Furry: That's right. The single measurement of ener gy will get you quite 
a lot of different operators associated with it. 
Rosen: Are there questions from the audience? 
Dr. Carmi:  (questioning from the audience to Professor Wigner) a) What is  
a measurement apparatus? b) What is the relationship between obse rvables and 
dynamical invariants of the system? Some people feel that there is much more  
to this relationship than there appears to be on the surface.  
Wigner: Well, I am afraid I am one of those people for several reasons.  
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When Dr. Furry explained how you measure position, he said that to measure 
position — well, first he said that with a gamma ray microscope. I think 
that it is a very useful thing to analyze in detail what you really measure by 
the gamma ray microscope. But he withdrew from the gamma ray microscope, and I 
think, with good reason, from the point of view of orthodox measurement theory. 
Not, of course, from the point of view of really withdraw ing from a microscope 
with a gamma ray, or with visible light or ultraviolet. But then he said, "Let 
us erect barriers between, so that they separate the space into many regions. 
Then the electron or a particle will be in one of them, and. then we can 
leisurely investigate in which one it is". Well, now this shows th at we convert 
a position into a stationary state and therefore, what is measured at all with 
ease are stationary properties. How this point was brought out very much more 
generally and much more formally (by generally already means much more 
formally) by an investigation which I hesitate to mention because I embarrass 
one of the audience, Yanase of Arake and Yanase. They investigated in general 
what operators can be measured, according to the orthodox theory of quantum 
measurement, which we heard yesterday from Dr. Furry, and they found that only 
those operators can be measured without approximation really bona fide which 
commute with all conserved quantities. Now one of the conserved additive 
quantities is energy, so that they must be already then stationar y quantities. 
But it is also evident that in a relativistic theory, if it commutes with 
energy, it will have a very hard time unless it commutes with momentum also. 
And, of course, in the previous example which Dr. Furry mentioned, namely the 
measurement of the position, he destroyed the invariants of the system by 
erecting the barriers. The ba rriers were supposed to be at rest in one 
coordinate system but not at rest in other coordinate systems so that this is 
not really a contradiction, 
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In fact. Furthermore, it isn't a bona fide measurement because it does not leave the 
system alone. It changes the system. It changes the wave function very 
considerably, even the particles. But, let us not go into that. But you see as a 
result there is both a visualizable connection and a formal connection between the 
two. There is a visualizable connection in as much as it is very difficult to mention 
something that is really easily measurable, that is not stationary, let me say. There 
is also a formal connection because, by an analysis of the general theory of 
observation which Dr. Furry explained to us yesterday, it does follow that no such 
measurement is possible, unless the measured quantity is among other things 
stationary. Now Dr. Furry postulated an interaction between instrument and object and 
said, "Well, there is such an interaction." However, it is clear that such an 
interaction must be consistent with the principles of invariance. By analyzing the 
possible interactions, which are consistent with the principles of invariance, their 
conclusion was drawn by Araki and Yanase. 
Rosens Any other comments on this question?  Then we'll go on to the next. The 
previous question was, "What is meant by the statement that an operator is observable? 
How does one distinguish which are observable?" The next question is: "Is it 
justified to make a theory ignoring at the outset questions of the measuring process, 
and then expect to obtain, by means of that theory, a description of the measurement 
process?" I would like to refer this question to my colleague, (laughter) 
Aharonov: The point of view that measurement theory is something very special seems 
to me a very subjective point of view. Some people think that action and interaction 
between human beings and nature is something very specific and very different from 
other interactions and that, therefore, it should have a specific kind of 
consideration in the theory. But this is not the 
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case. There are all kinds of interactions going on all around. In general, 
interaction takes place when there is no human being around. There are all kinds 
of interactions going on which define things in the same way as a measurement of 
these prepared especially by a human being. Therefore, when we extend the theory 
to describe other things consistently, we eventually hope that these 
considerations would also be valid for measurement processes in that, after all, 
only special kinds of interaction take  place in nature anyhow. So my answer is, 
of course, that we don't have to put it in a form where the theory is consistent 
with any other kind of interaction which is not a measuring process. We believe 
it should also be valid for consideration of measurement processes. 
Podolsky: That assumes, however, that measurement process involves nothing but 
interaction. But actually it involves a good deal more.  
Wigner: But, Doctor, would you consider, would you continue this statement a 
little bit further? 
Podolsky: No, not much, (laughter) This involves reference to the question of 
reduction of a wave packet. You say at a certain point you read a pointer or 
something like that. You have the object on which the measurement is performed. 
You have the measuring instrument. You establish a correlation through 
interaction at the appropriate time, establish a correlation between what the 
instrument shows and what the object is doing, or the state of the object. Then 
you say we read these measurements and ignore the others . As you pointed out, 
Professor Wigner, we cannot separate the measuring instrument from all the other 
objects, and so what we are saying is merely that in order to measure something 
about the electron, we have to measure something about this measuring instrument. 
Well then, how do we go about measuring that about the measuring instrument? 
Then we've got another measuring instrument 
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unless we can somewhere say "Well now, I know what this measuring instrument is 
doing". But that is an additional assumption.  
Wigner: Thank you, that makes that point very clarified.  
Aharonov: May I just add my point of view? The idea of the intera ction 
details should be reduction of the wave packet. I think it is inconsistent to 
say that when there is a special interaction which we call a measurement 
process, namely, which we expect only when we human beings are coming and 
looking at the thing, that then it should, collapse suddenly. We really should 
believe that when we consider a large enough system, independent of the fact 
that we call it a measurement process, that simply this kind of interaction is 
going on. There the collapse should happen ind ependent of whether we call it a 
measurement process or not, or whether we prepare it as a measurement process. 
So if we find by analysis that there is some difficulty about the reduction of 
the wave packet, it is a difficulty of the theory as a whole and not only of 
the measurement process. That's my point. I'm saying that if the theory is 
consistent independently of the question of measurement theory, it should also 
answer problems in measurement theory, because measurement theory serves only to 
point out some special difficulties of the theory because these are independent 
of the question of measurement.  
Podolsky: I don't agree with that and I stick to my previously stated opinion 
which I don't think is necessary to repeat. 
Wigner: Well, let me say someth ing, if you permit me, Mr. Chairman. There are 
perhaps two points of view on this subject. The one pertaining to — (almost 
drowned out by laughter) that seems to be a controversial statement! In view of 
your radical perspective, there is a German physicist , Ludwig, who made use of 
exactly the point of view of Dr. Aharonov. He says that quantum mechanics is 
not suited for describing macroscopic objects because, if you  
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have an interaction with a macroscopic object, this mysterious thing which is 
called the collapse or contraction of the wave packet takes place under all 
conditions. Now this is the view of Ludwig and evidently of Dr. Aharonov. I must 
say that there is another point of view. Ludwig's paper appears in the 
Heisenberg Festschrift. They evidently have very good security because about two 
months before the paper appeared I asked Heisenberg what his view was on this 
question and he had no idea of Ludwig's p aper. But he quickly characterized it 
by a similar description to the one Dr. Podolsky gave. Anyway, the other point of 
view is that quantum mechanics applies even to macroscopic objects and the 
collapse of the wave packet takes place (excuse me for the laughter) only through 
the act of cognition. And this, of course, is an entirely tenable argument — a 
tenable point of view. It says, if I can place into other words the statement 
which has been repeated over and over again, that quantum mechanics gives us o nly 
probability connections between subsequent impressions or observations or 
cognitions. Now I never succeeded to find out what Dr. Dirac thinks about it, 
because he dodges the issue.(laughter) But there are two points of view, and I 
think we must admit that we don't know with absolute certainty the answer. Is 
that correct? I agree with Dr. Podolsky's opinion. 
Rosen: I'd like to add a few remarks first. I'm a little worried at the use of 
the word cognition because the human being himself is involved in a particular 
way in this. I prefer to believe that the physical world is not determined by 
what we think about it or know about it. If it were a machine rather than a human 
being which carried out the measurement and recorded the results of the 
observation, I prefer to believe that the results would be  
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Wigner: It is contrary to the principles of present day quantum mechanics. 
It may be true, but it is contrary to the principles of present day quantum 
mechanics. 
Rosen: I would like to clarify this. Do you mean to say that if a machine 
wrote down on a piece of paper the results rather than for a human being to 
 
Wigner: But the machine would not write it down (according to quantum theory -
editor). The piece of paper on which the machine was supposed to write it down 
would be in a linear combination of two states, with one answer and with the 
other answer, and therefore the statement that the machine wrote it down is 
(Wigner struggles to find words) And therefore, the statement that the 
machine wrote it down is, eh, uh, eh, ...   It is very difficult to say 
things. It's really very difficult to say these things without giving the 
impression that one, well, is as, uh, uh, orthogonal to the fact — an if 
an electron is, as if I would say that an electron is either in this state or 
in that state. If it is actually this state, — . 
Rosen: Do you mean you want to treat the electron as a quantum mechanical 
system and the sheet of paper as a classical system? 
Wigner: I think, well, according to the principles of quantum mechanics, the 
present day principles of quantum mechanics, there is no distinction because 
both are described by state vectors and not by classical concepts.  
Furry: There is an old tradition in the quantum theory of justifying the 
various statements about what the result of observation might be in cases 
where they are sometimes very surprising from the classical point of view, by 
illustrating that the amount of physical intervention in the system involved 
in the procedures necessary to get the measurement in question, the disturbance 
of the system is sufficient to produce the given results. This 
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is the standard argument, of course, for explaining the fact, that an 
these eigenvalues are perhaps quite different from each other, When we prepare 
the systems exactly the same way, we sometimes get one eigenvalue and sometimes 
another. This means that the system did not actually have one of these 
eigenvalues. (At least I hope Professor Rosen will let me finish my considera-
tions before he attacks this.) The orthodox view is that systems do not 
actually have those values. But it should be possible in all of these cases to 
show, if we actually examine the amount of intervention necessary to make the 
measurement, that it was capable of communicating to the system the right amount 
of this quantity to shift it by amounts comparable to the difference 
 
up when we repeat the same experiment identically, under identical conditions 
several times. Examples of this are well known. I could multiply them. Now it 
seems to me with regard to this sort of argument, that the original particle, 
atomic or subatomic, is on a quite different footing from the piece of paper or 
the counter dial on which the machine records results. We cannot really agree 
that the amount of intervention we use, namely a flashlight to look at the dial 
or to look at the paper, is going to be enough actually to disturb physically 
what is written on the paper or the setting of the counter. In this position, I 
am sorry Professor Wigner, but I believe that I must align myself with the 
gentleman on my right (Aharonov).  
Podolsky: Well, I would object to that.  
Rosen: (chuckles) 
Podolsky: (continuing) This may take a minute. I feel some kind of an 
indication here that if human beings were not mixing into this measurement 
process, that things would go on just the same as if they were mixing in. 
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My idea is that if they were not mixing in, you wouldn't have this microphone 
here, you wouldn't have that recording device, we wouldn't have most of these 
things if we just left everything to nature. 
Aharonov: Suppose that now we go away and all these things are here. What do 
they do? 
Wigner: I think that on the argument Dr. Furry went over on that point, that 
the instrument can't impart sufficient angular momentum, or whatever it is, 
there is no question. The question is only "what is the end result of the 
interaction?" The end result of the interaction, according to quantum 
mechanics (and again quantum mechanics may not be valid) is not that it is 
written down on paper with certainty, either of the two answers, but that it 
is a linear combination of the two and, up to that point, there is no 
reduction of the wave packet. The wave packet is still there. I could make 
many examples, but let me read a statement which I happen to have here. 
Heisenberg made it. "The conception of objective reality evaporating into the 
mathematics". He says in so many words that there exists a conception of 
objective reality evaporating. You can't say it much more strongly!  
Furry: Well, with all due respect to one of the greatest figures of twentieth 
century physics, Werner Heisenberg, I would much sooner take your authority, 
Professor Wigner, to the extent which I have taken it, which everybody can 
observe (laughter), because I have an opportunity to try to get you to try to 
explain what you're saying. I can't make him try to explain it. In fact, I 
think this just reflects some philosophical point of view on the part of 
Heisenberg with which one might or might not agree. I think there is a real 
point here, that they think there is a difference between the amount of 
intervention when we look at a counter, say, and when we look directly at the 
electron. There is a word which Professor Rosen used repeatedly this morning 
which I think is a good one in this connection, 
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and that is the word coherence in respect to these states. I think it is really 
a question of coherence. I am afraid these remarks are not very mature. They 
have just been dashed off partly on the bus ride in a conversation with 
Professors Carmi and Aharonov. You may say that I am just a "reed in the wind", 
and that Aharonov just influenced me last in what I am saying. (laughter)  The 
question of coherence is really important here, and we have to remember what we 
mean by coherence. A lot of the books we use are bad on this point. They say the 
scattering is coherent, for instance, when the frequencies do not change. Well, 
that is true. In incoherent scattering the frequencies ought to be distinct. 
But that is not the point. The point in scattering being coherent or incoherent 
is this. If we have a couple of atoms here and you scatter some waves around 
them, it is really the following. You have a wave function originally here for 
the particles, we'll call it t ; you have a couple of wave functions, say U0 and 
V0, for these two scatterings. They are probably the same wave function, ground 
state say. I use different letters because I want to associate one with one 
atom and one with the other. The initial wave function is this, (he writes 
on the board)  Then the scattering occurs and there is some outgoing wave 
from each of these. So I have a fancy wave function 1t ; after the passage of 
time and scattering has happened (still writing on the blackboard) and there 
will be two parts. There will be many parts, in fact. There will be one which 
I might better call 00t  and that is the one which is still associated with both 
the state U0 for this particle and the state V0 for the other. This will, of 
course, contain two actual waves: the one that was scattered out from this one, 
and the one that was scattered out from this one. Those two waves both have the 
same functional coefficient, depending on the coordinates of these two things. 
We can just cancel if we want to and 
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calculate the relative phase of the two contributions. We can thus get a definite 
interference. We have a definite phase relation. Now there are 
other parts, of course. There is 10t   which is the function for the electron 
that has to be multiplied by this one shifted up to the state one and the other 
one to state zero. Since this one is the particle that's disturbed, 
we know this is the one that did the scattering. On the other hand there 
is 01t  , which will be a wave more or less coming out from that one, and 
will have disturbed it. Then you get from V0 to v1 . Of course there will be 
other ones if there are other higher states these things can have. Now the point 
is, this wave coming off from this one, and that wave coming out from that one 
will not interfere, because here are different functions of the other variables 
associated with them and there is no way to assign a phase relation between these 
two waves. That is then the actual case of coherence. It may be that the state 
one has exactly the same energy as the state zero. But it's a different wave 
function and thus one can't say that there's a definite phase relation here. Now 
it just seems that whenever we 
 
its position — that we always use something like, say, the filament in an 
amplifier tube. We could probably use lots of amplifier tubes, transformers, and 
what not, and who knows what all. We don't know the position of all those 
particles. Depending on what's happened, the wave functions of many things have 
changed. They are put in at random without our knowing much about them, without 
our knowing about them actually to begin with, the way one actually builds 
apparatus. It seems to me that there is complete lack of coherence then between 
the two possible positions of the counter, or between the two possible things the 
pen may have written on the paper. It 
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seems that there is no possibility of interference between them, because the wave 
function that we write then is long and complicated. It always contains quite a 
number of factors associated with it, depending on which of the two things has 
happened in the counter or to the pen. In this sense we know the wave function 
has this form. Because the wave function has this form, even though it is a wave 
function, it has exactly the same properties, so far as the counter or the piece 
of paper is concerned, as the mixed state. That is, interference is absolutely 
impossible and, from, this point of view, one might as well call it a mixed 
state. Now this argument, of course, did not originate on the bus ride. It has 
been attempted in various papers. I have never personally been terribly 
satisfied with it because one can never take the mathematical steps of changing 
this into an actual density matrix. But I think it should carry a good deal of 
weight in our attempts to think about it. 
Podolsky: Professor Furry, just for completeness, will you give us an example of 
a coherent state, a coherent case? You have given an example of an incoherent 
case. 
Furry: Well, of course the coherent case never actually comes in precisely in a 
measurement.  The thing we think of in measuring here is finding out which 
particle scattered it. If there is no change in the state of the scatterer we 
cannot tell which one scattered it. It is precisely because we can't tell which 
one scattered it that we can get the interference pattern.  
Aharonov: May I just say one more word? First of all, I would like to say that 
I did not mean to imply that one can get from the usual quantum theory the 
situation in which we know enough about all the macroscopic things so that we can 
really say that this is a collapse of the wave packet. We get rid of this, so to 
say, collapse of the wave packet. I think we can use 
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quantum theory as such to describe any kind of interaction in any large system 
with any number of degrees of freedom. If you take it as a closed system you 
will never get any kind of a collapse, and you will always get all of these 
possibilities at the same time. Now there are some people who feel that 
you're not allowed to discuss the case of measurement. You can never put 
observables in the system that you are considering and therefore you are in a 
good situation as long as you discuss what you are allowed to by the 
mathematics. You have no problem because all these possibilities together are 
true enough that you can leave them as long as you, the observer, don't come 
and look at it. When you come and look at it then the collapse has occurred, 
has happened. But an observer is such a complicated thing. It includes all 
kinds of other things involving biological problems and so on, that we shall 
never be able to describe by quantum theory. Therefore I doubt that we can 
treat it as a problem at all.  Therefore, I doubt that there exists any 
problem at all, because as long as you describe things that don't involve the 
observer there is no necessity for this collapse. If we were to try to 
describe the observer, we would have to give up from the beginning, because 
the observers anyhow are too complicated to describe. What I try to say now is 
that there is a very nice example which Einstein once raised. If you take a 
radioactive atom and a geiger counter and you let both stay alone, the geiger 
counter is supposed to make a huge boom when the radioactive atom emits a 
particle. Now you can think that this huge boom happened even when there was 
no observer around, therefore, there really should be a wave function of the 
geiger counter and the atom which should undergo some kind of collapse 
independently of whether there was an observer in the room to get deaf when 
this huge boom happened, or not. That's my point of view, — that quantum 
theory is not complete in the sense that it does 
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not give collapse when it really should objectively happen, (some laughter) 
Rosen: May I add a remark to this? I know people in the audience have 
 
states. In general we have a linear combination of the two. Mow the electron 
 
picture a transition from one of these to the other. Nevertheless, you say 
 
until somebody looks at it. You agree with that? In spite of the fact that 
transitions are not possible in the physical sense?  
Wigner: There's no transition. 
 
Furry: Even an act of cognition cannot wipe out a word of it. (laughter) 
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Wigner : No! I think that there is, according to quantum mechanics — 
Aharonov interrupts: You're right! 
Someone else: Exactly. 
Aharonov: According to quantum mechanics --   
 
system which gives you a definite answer. 
Furry: (starts to interrupt) 
Rosen: (interrupts the interruption) Now I have a second question which is  
 
two states corresponding to this in a linear combination? In that case, I 
would like to know where is the decision finally made, (low chuckles in the 
audience) 
Wigner: This is a very pert inent and very disagreeable question. (There is 
much laughter) Let me say that I agree first of all with Dr. Aharonov. I 
fully recognize the validity of his point of view. He says quantum mechanics 
is not valid for such processes and nobody told me that it  is valid. I have 
no special message from anybody which tells me that it is valid. And I also 
agree with Dr. Furry that it's a very important point. In the case of a 
complicated system this wave function is, in practice, terribly difficult to 
distinguish from the mixture of these states. But there are, in principle, 
methods to distinguish it. I could give examples in simple cases when it 
really can be distinguished. I can give a general description how it always 
can be distinguished, but it's not a practica l one. Namely, I put a little 
mirror in front of every particle which reflects it back and then the whole 
thing runs back in time. Then this state will produce back this state, but  
-18- 
but the mixture of these two states will not produce this state. But as 
Professor Furry so aptly said, it is awfully difficult to do such a mirror 
experiment, to put such a mirror in front of every particle. Therefore, in 
practice the two are not distinguishable. Now whether you therefore say that 
it is not a wave function, not a linear combination, but a mixture —— well, I 
think this is a matter of taste. It doesn't make any difference whatever if 
I owe you a hundred dollars or not, because I will deny it anyway. (Much 
laughter)  I will pretend that I don't owe you a hundred dollars. This is a 
matter of taste or what not. There is no practical difference. I fully agree 
with Professor Furry that if this is at all complicated there is no practical 
way to distinguish between linear combinations and mixtures. But if I talk of 
a mixture, that is along the same line of question as whether I owe you a 
hundred dollars. So you see, this is not a scientific question but a question 
of expression.  
Furry: There are, in fact, you know, two traditional ways to talk about what 
we mean by a mixture. And it may not be an accident that Bohm, in his book, 
does not ordinarily use the one that I used yesterday. He uses the other 
one. The one I used yesterday is in terms of this density matrix with a bi-
linear form in wave functions. Bohm prefers usually to talk about a mixed 
state, but he has only a linear form which specifies that the phases are 
random. Now if you will accept that as a definition of a mixture, then this, 
of course, is a mixture as soon as the phases have become random.  
Wigner: But they are not random.  
Aharonov: (starts to interrupt) 
Furry:  It depends upon the definition of random, then. Random is --  
Wigner: No! (laughter) 
Furry:  You define random as something that there's no human control over, 
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and no way at all of having knowledge of. 
Wigner: (interrupts) You can say that of the other one also. You wrote 
here a factor one, not a factor i or minus one. You wrote here a factor 1, 
and not a factor   , which would -- 
Furry; (interrupts the interruption) But it doesn't matter because the 
phase of v1 relative to v is completely arbitrary. 
Wigner: No! 
Furry:  (keeps going on) 
Wigner: (keeps declaring)  No! No! No! 
Aharonov: (attempts to interject) The v 1 relative to u. 
Wigner: (goes on)  No, you told us exactly that u1, to u0 is in the same 
relation as v1 to v 0 so that —— 
Furry: (then interrupts)  There is just the same change in energy that a 
delta function makes. 
Wigner: But then you didn't write down the right wave function. 
Carmi: (Speaks from the audience) May I just add one word to this 
discussion? This is a question from Professor Wigner's point of view. 
Something about spin echo. This is probably the situation which you are 
trying to — 
Wigner: (starts to speak again) Well, I did not think of the spin echo 
also, but as Dr. Carmi pointed out, the skill of the experimentalists makes 
it possible to measure something which, up to that time, nobody ever dreamed 
of measuring. We should not be too quick to decide that it cannot be measured. 
Aharonov;  That's right. But you agree that when we push it up to something 
that has written up and down there is probably — 
Wigner: I do agree with you, that I don't believe it is possible to 
bring it back to an interference. Certainly, I have no idea how to bring 
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it back. But you see, your point of view is terribly dangerous because there 
is a continuous transition from a very simple system to a very complicated, 
system. Therefore, if I follow Dr. Aharonov's argument, there is a continuous 
transition in quantum mechanics between a wave function and a mixture. That 
is all right. But if I, just on my own, decide that from now on I will call 
it a mixture, then for somebody else, this is a different story, because I 
either call it a mixture or a wave function. Furry; Now there appear here, of 
course, only two other factors, namely, in the case we talk about 
macroscopically there are not two, there are ten to 
 
Aharonov: But it is all continuous from one to the other.  
Furry: Oh yes, you can go continuously if you count all the way from two 
up to ten to the twenty-first, but — 
Aharonov: (interrupts) So the point is that the theory is not very 
satisfactory. The theory is not telling us when exactly the wave function 
will collapse. Now it's a question in principle, not only a practical one. 
Furry: Something to make the argument interesting. There is a prevailing-
climate of feeling that the theory is not satisfactory; that I also am not 
completely satisfied with the theory, (laughter)  
Rosen: I think perhaps I have a question from the floor.  
Merzbacher: (speaks from the audience)  I think the question has already 
been answered whether the consistent orthodox — Professor Furry calls it 
orthodox, I gather — (much laughter) 
Furry: (interjects)  I am not fully orthodox. My classes never hear a word 
of this, (a great deal of laughter) 
Merzbacher: There is the orthodox interpretation that the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen paradox, so-called, does not really require us to go so far as 
Professor Wigner goes. It seems to me that it does. 
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Rosen: We're coming to a question which deals with this. Perhaps we can 
go on to that point. Oh, a question from the audience. 
Soules: (speaks from the audience) I'm a little bit confused as to how  
and where we found out that the two scattering atoms were in the states 
U0 and v0  except by just doing what we have already done. Don't we beg 
the question. 
Furry: Oh, no. You can look at it afterwards you see. 
Soules: That's what the experiment told us. That they were in the ground  
state then. 
Furry: Before the scattering. Then after the scattering we find that one 
of them is not in the ground state and we know that it was the one that  
did the scattering. And since both these last two terms are associated with  
the situation of the scatterers, which would let us look and see which one 
did the scattering, then there can't be any interference. This is the 
statement in words. The statement in mathematics is quite clear that we  
don't know anything about the phase between the two uv products.  
Professor Wigner thinks we do know the relative phase. 
Aharonov: (interrupts) Certainly we do, because we could reverse it in 
time and then if you take — 
 
Wigner: (interrupts) There is a lot in quantum mechanics. I don't think I 
know everything that is determined by the laws of quantum mechanics. I 
didn't say I know everything that is determined by the laws of quantum 
mechanics. I know I don't know everything of that. But it is determined by 
the laws of quantum mechanics, even if I don't know what it is.  
Aharonov: (begins to speak)  
Furry: (jumps in) Yes, you would say it is the orthogonality of these  
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functions, and not any question about their phase fundamentally, that makes  
the incoherence. 
Aharonov: Yes, that's right. 
Furry:  There is a distinct probability that you are right, (much laughter) 
Rosen:  Well, I see we have covered one question so f ar on the list, so  
perhaps we should go on to the next. 
Podolsky: We don't have to answer all the questions, (more laughter) 
Rosen: Well, are there any more remarks on this one? One question out of  
 
asks "How would you formulate what you consider to be th e best reply to the 
arguments of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen?" I suppose I should refer this to — 
Furry: People who want to reply to it. (laughter)  
Wigner: What about Dr. Podolsky? 
Podolsky: No, I'm on the wrong side, (more laughter)  
Rosen: Before we start answering this question, I would like to make some  
remarks for the benefit of the team on the other side. In our paper the  
point that was made is essentially as follows; It was not asserted that  
quantum mechanics is incorrect. It was only stated that it w as believed 
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other without disturbing the second system for which the information is being 
obtained, since there is no interaction. We can do this since we have the 
wave function that gives the correlation between the two systems in  
it is not something that ca n be settled by any operational procedure of 
measurement. All right, now let somebody else consider the question.  
Aharonov: May I try to give the answer that I think Bohr would give to this — 
what Bohr would say about it? Bohr would say that the problem h as come because 
we do something not in a correct way. What we do in the wrong way is to think 
about the two particles, that they are distinctly separate systems, which we 
consider to be quite independent systems. We think about them as existing 
independently of what the experiment is doing on it. We can choose to do one 
experiment and get one kind of result, or to do another experiment and get 
another kind of result. Before it was done we can choose to do one kind of 
experiment. He seems to think of a syste m such as two electrons separated from 
all the rest of the things that exist in nature. Consider a system of two 
electrons in one environment and consider it one system, and consider a system 
of two electrons in another environment and call it a different system. So then 
if we choose to carry out a measurement on the first particle in one kind of 
environment we put it in one kind of environment, which is a measuring apparatus 
for a position. Together these two electrons with the measuring apparatus we 
call it one kind of system. 
  
Addition to page 23 
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If, on the other hand, we have chosen to make an experiment to measure 
momentum, then this was an  entirely different kind of system. It's not the 
same system we had for the other experiment, but it's an entirely different 
system. We see, therefore, it's not inconsistent to think that one system 
has a well defined momentum and another system has a well  defined position. 
These are two different systems which cannot be considered at the same time. 
Two different systems. He uses the word "complementarity" here to say that 
these are really two different systems and we can never talk about them in 
the same c ontext. This is the way that I think Bohr would try to answer it. 
I'm certainly not saying that this is my answer. I'm just trying to say 
what I think he would say. 
Aharonov: To this I think Bohr would say that it's not that the system  
hasn't a coordinate when it is an uncertain coordinate state, but it's a  
different system. There is one system with a measuring apparatus for  
momentum and another system with a measuring apparatus of coordinate. These  
are two different systems and you can't compare them. It's  not that in one  
case the same system has a coordinate and the other one doesn't have a  
coordinate, because these are two different systems. He says it's not  
possible to call it an electron apart from its classical environment ....  
 
if a system is in a state in which a given physical variable does not have  
 
measurement, when we carry out a determination of some kind, so that one  
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Kaiser Kunz: (from the audience)  If those two measurements commute, then 
what are you going to say? 
Aharonov: Well, you can say it is true that in the theory you have development 
of a complete system, and you consider only one at a time. Well, you ca n say 
you're making measurements on a complete system and you consider it only in its 
own environment. If you make measurements in another environment, it's an 
entirely different system, but this is still a consistent scheme. You can make 
it two systems. I t's a mixture. But it seems to me that the case in which you 
measure two complementary things are two entirely different systems. You can't 
call it an electron with a well defined position in one case, and the same 
electron with a well defined momentum in another case. This is the only 
consistent way that I know of  translating into words what the mathematics of 
the theory is saying. I'm not saying that this is an acceptable way. I'm saying 
this is the only consistent way of translating the mathematics into words. 
Merzbacher: (speaks from the audience)  Would Professor Wigner say that this 
is the only consistent way to translate the mathematics of quantum theory into 
words? 
Wigner: I think this is an awfully strong statement that it is the only 
consistent way. I would feel much happier if this very, very strong  
statement were a little, were not made in --  
Aharonov: (interrupts) I should correct it to say that this is the only  
consistent way that I know. 
Furry: Well, that is interesting, because you're a studen t of Bohm, and I  
would have thought that Bohm's doctrine of potentialities was also a  
consistent way. 
Aharonov: Well, you see, uh, when Bohm looks at the paradox, he always  
has trouble. He hasn't solved the paradox yet.  
 in a much more satisfactory way? 
Aharonov:  Ah, but then how would you transform the collapse? 
If you really look at the system as a quantum mechanical system, then you 
can do just one measurement, or another measurement. Then you really have 
to look at this collapse as something that you have done to the system 
and have just transformed it far away. 
Wigner: No, no, I don't think so. This collapse of the wave packet, in 
my opinion, is only an expression. Well, what is the wave packet good for, 
is the question which one asks. In my opinion, the wave function has only 
the one purpose, namely, to calculate the probabilities of future events. 
And. that is the only purpose of the wave function. Now if I look at the 
wave function as a tool for calculating things, then clearly, if I learn 
something and some information enters my cognition, from then on I will use 
a different wave function. This is not even quantum theory. If I pull out, 
perhaps I should do that, a bill out of my pocket and look at one side and 
I say I know how the other side looks, from there on my description of this 
bill will be different. The purpose of the wave function is nothing else. 
It does not have a mysterious reality. It is only a tool for calculating 
probabilities for the outcome of events. 
Aharonov:  The mathematics is entirely clearly satisfactory, I think. 
But now, how do we translate it into a picture, to look on the problem in a 
pictorial way? Namely, I want to think of the electron, not as something 
mathematical, something to calculate probabilities, but to think of it as 
some kind of a system. How should we look at it, picture it? That's the 
point. 
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Wigner: I don't know. It seems to me that I have a hard time understanding 
this. Perhaps, if I were very disagreeable, I would say that we should not — 
Aharonov: Have a picture of it? 
Wigner:  I wouldn't say we shouldn't have a picture of it. But we shouldn't 
elevate the picture to a principle which stops us from thinking. And we 
should not elevate a particular picture to such a degree which stops us from 
thinking in terms of quantum physics. 
Aharonov: I see. 
Wigner: I think that a picture is a wonderful thing for some purposes, 
but for other purposes it will not work so well. 
Aharonov: Yes, but then I think you are not criticizing the picture that 
Professor Bohr had in mind when he tried to convey this language into 
pictures. That's the only picture that he is willing to accept, and indeed 
that's the only picture consistent with quantum physics, I think. 
Wigner: Please don't misunderstand me. I'm perfectly willing to concede 
that you may be right, that quantum mechanics is inaccurate for macroscopic 
systems, that there is something else. Ludwig, well Ludwig, goes terribly 
far but there is something along that line that really the accuracy of, or 
the appropriateness of, quantum mechanics for macroscopic bodies may be 
questioned. 
Aharonov: I'm trying also to ask how is quantum theory visualized if we 
take quantum theory as it is at present without any changes at all. It still 
does not give us an exact basis to calculate mathematically. I also want to 
have some kind of picture in mind. We have said that if we follow Einstein 
and others at the beginning, we have a picture of some kind of a wave 
packet. And we interact with it with an apparatus. The wave packet 
collapses in a measurement of position or expands into an apparatus if it 
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measures momentum. It's hard to explain, but we can still get used to it — the 
idea that the apparatus can do all these things. And then, suddenly with this 
example we can already explain how the apparatus can do this here but not there 
faster than the speed of light. It's not a consistent or satisfactory picture 
to see all these things happening without any reason. Right? So then the only 
picture that I think one can follow reasonably is the one where we say that 
there is a different system, the elect ron interacting with one system, one kind 
of apparatus is an entirely different system from an electron interacting with 
another apparatus. 
That is what I think Bohr is trying to do. And I don't know of any ---  
Wigner: Could I go along with Dr. Merzbacher an d say this is exaggerated 
because the electron will not be two kinds of pictures where the electron  
is different depending on -  
Aharonov: (interrupts)  Yes, I go along with that too. I don't like it  
myself, but I don't know of any language that -  
Wigner: I don't know either. It is a fact that these wave functions are 
awfully difficult, relatively difficult to visualize, and what can we do 
about it? 
Band: (speaks from the audience)  May we not look at this wave function that 
Dr. Furry wrote down there as tel ling us the probability of two alternative 
events, you might say the scattering from one and the scattering from the other. 
The probability is referring to a whole series of observations, one observation 
cannot change this. The wave function is still there  to guide the future 
observations. One observation would tell me I have a scattering from the top 
particle. This does not change the wave function for following observations. 
Furry:  We'll re -prepare it. 
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Band:  You have to re-prepare it to give any meaning to the wave function. 
Furry: Yes, but if you collect all the observations, then you will get the 
full pattern and will cause some interference because of that top term 
(points to the blackboard). Or if you can tell which, it will show a general 
smear because the two bottom terms will not interfere. Now we can do 
otherwise. You can collect only those in which subsequently you learn that 
the top particle is scattered. In that case you would, of course, only get 
a broad smear here at the top. Where, if you collected only the ones that 
the bottom one had scattered, you get a smear at the bottom. If you cover 
both of those in a little region, that's the region you get some interference 
in the top term when you don't know that it's been scattered. 
Band: My point is that for one measurement, just because you find one of 
these particles has been scattered from the top to the center, this does not 
mean you should collapse the wave function. 
Furry: It means you should correct. 
Band:  Yes, just correct. 
Furry: You could sent in a new particle and then, of course, you have the 
same wave function. 
Band:  I see no mystery about collapsing of the wave function after you've 
done something to it. 
Furry: Everyone has said that. When we think about what you do when you 
make the observation finally, you obtain knowledge about the system and  
there's nothing miraculous. There's nothing more natural than that the  
formula you write to treat your probability predictions about the system 
should change when you change your knowledge of it. I don't think it's a  
real paradox. The essential paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and. Rosen comes, 
I think, only from the strong temptation that it offers to a number of us. 
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but not to me actually. I am too orthodox for that. You see really the 
definition of orthodox is how you're going to spend your time, how you're 
willing to spend your time, (laughter)  Bohm, by the time he finished his 
book, I'm sure had strong inclinations not to be orthodox. But he remained, 
orthodox until he finished his book. He then became heterodox because he then 
began spending his time trying to make a different theory. Well, I never 
spent my time being unorthodox, (laughter) Well, uh, what was I saying? 
Aharonov: You were trying to say there is no difficulty.  
Furry: Well, I was saying the difficulty it really raises is not this one. It 
tempts a person to think that there must be hidden parameters, by George! 
(uneasy chuckle in the audience) Because, if you can find out the position or 
the coordinate, at the same time that you're on one side of the room and the 
particle is on the other side of the room, you can make either of these 
measurements on something that you have separated from the particle.  
Band:  Dr. Furry, some of our group would like you to say over again what 
you said about the cards before -- the card trick you played on us. 
Furry: Oh, I'll play the card trick in a moment. 
Band:  That is exactly on this line. 
Furry: If I could do that, the feeling is that, by George, that particle over 
there really has a position because I can find it out, if I choose. It also 
really has a momentum because I can find that out, if I choose, without 
touching the particle, or without coming near it. Since it really has both, 
and since quantum mechanics does not allow it really to have both, the theory 
must be incomplete. But there must be a better theory which contains both as 
real properties of the particle. Now the danger is the hidden parameters, 
because they are not visible in quantum mechanics. 
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Aharonov: How about hidden parameters and your card game?  
Furry: The card game has the hidden parameters in it because, by George, 
the cards are classical objects. 
Band: Would you explain that card trick for this audience?  
Furry: Well, I explained it pretty fully before when I talked in terms of 
ordinary playing cards, but now I'll explain it better by providing two decks 
of cards. All of one pile of cards look the same on the back. Half of them 
have a red spot on the front side and half of them have a black spot on the 
front side. Now the other pile of cards is just like it, except they look 
the same on the back, but half of them have a blue spot on the front, and 
half of them have a yellow spot on the front. And the spots are good size, 
you see, so if I tear a card into two halves I'll have part of the spot on 
each half. So now I have two boxes. Each box has two envelopes, a right-
hand envelope, and a left-hand envelope. And now I have Mr. X to do this bit 
of service for us. Mr. X takes a card from the red-black pile. He can 
select one or draw it an random. I don't care. He takes a card, tears it in 
two and puts half of it in the right-hand envelope of each box. He takes a 
card, from the blue-yellow pile, tears it in two and puts half of it into 
the left-hand envelope in each of the two boxes. I mean half in the left-
hand envelope of one box and half in the left envelope of the other. And then 
one box is mailed to Chicago. How this is a classical experiment, you see so 
far. I mean it corresponds to a classical situation, because now I can open 
this one at my leisure. I can now open both envelopes at my leisure. But 
these boxes correspond a little more closely to quantum mechanics than that, 
because each of these boxes is rigged with a little charge of incendiary 
explosive alongside of each envelope. And each charge is rigged, in such a 
way that it will explode and burn up its envelope 
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instantly if the other envelope is removed. That means you can't measure 
one if you measure the other. Now that's true of both boxes. Now if I look 
at this box to find out if it's red or black, I'm forever deprived of 
looking into the box to see if it's blue or yellow, and vice versa. That's 
also true of the other box which is now in Chicago. Of course, in the 
meantime, Mr. X has jumped off of the top of a building or out of a window 
or something. He just corresponds to interaction. (laughter)  He just 
corresponds to the interaction which existed only from time zero up to 
capital T. So we now have this situation - we don't really need to look at 
either one of them, in fact. We don't need to look at the right-hand 
envelope in the Chicago box to find out whether it has red or black in it, 
if you look at this one. If you look at this one, you'll know it will be 
the other half of the same card, the same for the blue or yellow. If you do 
pull out the same one in both boxes, you'll find the same answer. You'll 
find that they match. If you want to get a complete measurement, you look at 
one envelope in one box, and the other envelope in the other. But that 
doesn't have anything to do with this illustration. Now the point I made in 
discussing this box thing this morning, was that there is no transmission of 
a signal faster than light or anything like that. Well, if I look at this, 
say the right-hand envelope, and find red or black, then I can at once say 
what the same one is in Chicago. The transmission all happens when the box 
is taken to Chicago. There's nothing about sending a signal, sending 
information or a signal. We know it just because we know the way these 
boxes were prepared. The fact that the box was actually prepared in this 
way is now brought into play, and the same holds true for 
back to the slightly dirty cracks about sending signals faster than light and 
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so on. I do not think there is anything and I do not believe there is 
anything in this theory. (He pounds the table) 
Aharonov: I don't believe it either, of course. That's one way to speak 
about it. 
Furry: It is not right. 
Aharonov: And I agree, all through the illustration of the box, for in 
quantum mechanics we say the particle has a wave function and it may be a 
perfectly natural way of keeping a record. The information we have about 
it is due to the notebook that we kept on all that happens, you see. 
Band: If you put a half-red in a left-hand box and the other half-red in 
the other box -  
Furry: Half of the card that came out of the red-black pile will go into 
one of the two envelopes in each of the two boxes, and half of the card 
that is blue or yellow will go into the other. 
Band: How do you know the red half-card is in this box? How do you know that 
the other half of that one isn't in the other box? 
Furry: (declares emphatically) It is! 
Band: But why can't you pull that out? 
Furry: (exclaims) You can! If you check the same envelope in both boxes 
you'll always get a consistent result. But you know from the way the thing 
is set up the results will be consistent. 
Band:  Oh, you keep them in the envelope No. 1, or the envelope No. 2, and 
the other half of the card is in the corresponding envelope. 
Furry: Right!  If the little man does the job for us and then ceases to 
exist. He took the card and tore it in two, put half of it in one box and 
half in the other, in the proper envelopes. And for this reason, I know 
what the color in one is if I look in the other, without needing to look in 
the other. If I do look, I merely get a check. 
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Rosen: I think Dr. Soules has a question. 
Soules:  I was just going to ask, with regard to the paradox we're talking  
about, is it well established that a state actually exists in which the red -- 
Furry: This, of course, is just a game. This is a classical example. I have 
brought it as close to the quantum mechanics as possible with those charges of 
incendiary. But it is not the proper quantum mechanical case. There really is 
half of the red or black card and half of the blue or yellow card in the box 
in Chicago. In the quantum mechanical case that would correspond to saying 
that the particle that's now over on the other side of the room really has a 
position and really has a momentum, and I can find out what they are, one or 
the other of them. And this is denied by wave mechanics, because there is no 
wave mechanical state that has both precisely defined position and precisely 
defined momentum. So it's precisely this. You see, in other words, this 
classical thing I have reeks with the 
 
the very dubious and unorthodox phase space of hidden parameters. And 
Professor Wigner doesn't believe they exist and neither do I. We're orthodox 
to that extent. Incidentally, the argument he gave last night for disproving 
them — I deny that it's the von Neumann argument. I think if he rereads 
chapter six, or whatever chapter it is, or maybe it's chapter four, he will 
find that it's not the von Neumann argument. It is a better argument than the 
von Neumann argument because it is not merely mathematical. But it's much more 
convincing.  (laughter) In fact, I think it is much more of a scourge of the 
infidels (laughter) and I propose to call it the Wigner proof. 
Kaiser Kunz: I remember in my elementary work having to work out certain 
problems involving, let us say, a quadratic equation. I get two solutions. 
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Then the question is, are they both good or not? We substitute back and find 
that one of them is an extraneous solution. It seems to me that there is a 
certain parallel case here of a more sophisticated kind. We're simply saying 
that quantum mechanics will give us a right or correct solution. 
 
speak, is that which actually occurs. Whether it occurs during cognition, or 
whether somehow or another we blame it on the process of measurement that 
occurs, seems to be the debate. The basic thing seems to be pretty clear. It 
is that quantum mechanics gives us multiple values, so to speak, and our 
problem philosophically is, when do we pick the solution. We make it. We 
 
correct solution. 
Furry:  If you're positivistic minded enough, there is no problem, there 
is no trouble. The logical positivists love this.. 
Podolsky: The question is, really, what is it you do observe and how do we 
observe it? 
Kunz:  I think this morning we got even another viewpoint, which is that 
even the observation doesn't determine which one we really have. Regardless 
of whether we get the multiple valuedness, it continues on indefinitely. 
 
Wigner: It depends also on whether we select out. 
Kunz:   Yes. 
Wigner: Yes it does. Now that is the point of view of Dr. Everett. 
Rosen: Would you like to comment, Dr. Everett? 
Everett: Yes. Well, what he said pretty much covers it. 
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Rosen: Well, who else would like to add to this? Professor Podolsky thinks 
 
So then we'll continue. 
Soules: I was going to ask you if my point of view of the photon as a quantum 
particle is a correct one. It may not be. It seems to me the photon exists 
only in two states. Either it exists or it does not exist. And the collapse 
of the wave function is a very natural thing to happen to photons. One finds 
a photon by killing it and the wave function immediately is annihilated. Is 
this analogy perfectly fair? 
Furry: The trouble is that the wave function doesn't collapse to nothing in 
these cases that we're talking about, say that of a non-relativistic electron. 
It collapses down to something we now know about the particle.  
Soules:  Of course, this is a much more complicated set of states compared 
to what I'm talking about.  
Furry: Yes. 
Wigner: I think Professor Werner -  
Rosen:  Oh, sorry.  
Werner: I think the group who met at a Question Workshop this morning would 
also be interested particularly in hearing what the two members, Rosen and 
Podolsky, might like to say about their present view on the Einstein, 
Podolsky, and Rosen question. 
Podolsky:  Well, I do not agree with Bohr for one thing. We can take the  
case of two particles that constitute a system of total, say angular momentum, 
zero. 
Wigner:  For example, the spin angular momentum. 
Podolsky: Oh, yes. They separate. Suppose they were together and then 
they separate. Then we know the net change in angular momentum will be zero.  
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Then we know that the angular momentum of one will be opposite to the angular 
momentum of the other. After they have separated we can bring in the apparatus 
for measuring the angular momentum on one of them. The other particles, being 
far away, I don't think should be affected by it. So we can then measure the 
component of angular momentum in the x direction. Or we can change the 
apparatus around and measure the component of the angular momentum in the y 
direction. In each case we will know what the angular momentum of the other 
particle will be. The x and y components do not commute, so we get back 
again the same paradox. The whole question, it seems to me, hinges on this: 
How much reality are we going to attribute to the wave function? If the wave 
function is merely a statement of our knowledge summarized in some way, well, 
then, there is nothing wrong with saying that when we find out something about 
one particle, then we can change the wave function in some way, so that we will 
know something about the other particle. But if we're going to attribute 
reality to the wave function, the situation is different. Then by doing 
something to one particle and its wave function we change the wave function 
for the other particle. We have a collapse of the wave function, if you like. 
But that, I think, implies a kind of action-at-a-distance. We do something 
here, and something else happens some place else instantaneously. This is not 
the 
kind of action that you can use to transmit signals --  that the box 
experiment with cards pretty well establishes --  so there is no contradiction 
with the theory of relativity. We do not transmit the signal faster than 
light, but we can change the wave function all over the place instantaneously. 
Of course, if it doesn't have reality instantaneously, because it doesn't 
have reality imputed to it, then.....  I do not want to assert one or the 
other. Let's see, there are two possibilities. Either it has reality, in 
which case we are doing something, uh -- 
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Werner: You mean to say that if it has reality, then we are doing some kind of 
action at a distance. If it has reality, then something or other happens over 
there all of a sudden when you are doing something over here.  
Podolsky:  That's right. Either it has no reality or else we're doing 
something so that we have an action-at-a-distance. 
Band; (interjects)  What is -- 
Podolsky: But which one of those two, I wouldn't commit myself. 
Band: What is reality, Mr. Podolsky? 
Podolsky: Something more than just subjective information. 
Aharonov: Who would like to challenge that? (Podolsky chuckles) 
 
Furry; You mean you also teach your students quantum mechanics? 
 
I picture it as a particle with position and momentum, even though the wave 
 
quantum mechanics in the following way. Since quantum mechanics gives 
 
assertions that apply not to one particle but to an ensemble of particles, 
and I would like to say something along the lines that Dr. Furry discussed 
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coherent ensemble that corresponds to a pure state, and an incoherent 
 
Band: One question from our group, Dr. Shimony. 
Dr. Shimony: (speaks from the audience)  I think much of what I wanted to 
 
macroscopic objects, there are states that have no classical analog, they are 
states which are superpositions, states in which macroscopic observables have 
different values. And various physicists, Ludwig in particular, have claimed 
that these states are in a sense undetectable. They are undistinguish-able from 
mixtures. Now we know that experiments are devilishly ingenious. 
 
Furry:  Well, we've thought about this awfully hard up here. And I must say, 
I am convinced that I was incorrect and that Professor Wigner is entirely 
correct in saying there's no trouble about phases in the little case 
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of three coordinates I had up here. The reason for the incoherence is actually 
an orthogonality here and not a question of indeterminate phase. This will 
remain true, I'm sure, no matter how many coordinate systems there are, no 
matter how many more coordinate systems I put on. He is entirely correct about 
all of that. One could, I think, offer in this connection a third way of 
defining what we mean by a mixed state. We can say that typically the mixed 
state is defined either as I did it yesterday, with an actual collection of 
bilinear expressions in the wave functions. Or it's defined with a linear 
combination, with the prescription that one is to average over all the phases 
that are completely unknown. One can also say that one has a mixed state 
whenever one has a linear combination in which independent coordinates or 
orthogonal wave functions occur in each of the terms so that interference is 
made impossible by that. Now if one did that, that would justify this idea — 
which has been so often suggested and never 
satisfactorily established mathematically -- of what happens to the 
macroscopic case. So that the reduction of the wave packets, so-called, has 
practically been accomplished. It merely remains for us, perhaps, to look and 
see which parts it's collapsed into. However, Professor Wigner made a remark 
which you have just made also. There's no telling what the experimentalists 
will learn to measure next. It seems a little hard for me when I think of 
something that has been done on a photographic plate. And then when this 
technician reaches up and grabs a large bottle of reagent and slops some into 
the tray and develops this thing and certain grains get developed. It seems 
to me that so many new coordinates are brought in and such completely unknown 
and randomly chosen coordinates in this reagent that determines the 
development of the grains. Well, really I believe those grains developed 
whether I looked at them or not, you see, and I'm really too old 
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to believe in the branching that Mr. Everett believes in, — in the parallel 
universes of Mr. Everett and things like that. But for instance, if I were to 
take cosmic rays that come right down through the air of this room rather 
frequently. They are leaving trails of ionized molecules. The fact that we 
haven't set up the right conditions of super-saturated vapor to render them 
visible doesn't mean they aren't really there. But according 
 
even in the cloud chamber unless you take a picture! (Furry shouts) And they 
are not even in the cloud chamber or in the picture then unless you look at 
it! (Furry shouts until Wigner finally speaks again). 
Wigner: It is done. It is surely agreed that it is done. We will surely 
admit that it is done. 
Aharonov: (tries to speak) 
Furry: I can't go that far, somehow. 
Wigner: It is done. If I will surely admit that it is done. 
Rosen: Any other comments? 
Carmi: I would like to pose the same question from a little bit different 
angle. Again I would like to ask Professor Wigner about it. What would he 
say is the quantum mechanical definition of the classical body? 
Aharonov: You mean macroscopic. 
Carmi:  Yes, macroscopic. 
Wigner: I might use the example which Professor Furry put forward. 
Namely, a classical object is an object which I cannot break into two 
coherent states and observe that it's in two coherent states. Let me amplify 
this just a little bit. If I have an electron, and catch it in these two 
states in which the spin is up and down, I can break it into a state of a 
linear combination of these two in which the spin is in this direction and I 
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can afterwards check. In other words, I can prepare a linear combination 
and then see that it was a definite linear combination, we know that, of 
course. I can combine it with coefficient l and l, it will be directed this 
way, directed in this direction. If I take a linear combination with l and i 
it will be in this direction, and with l and -l, down. 
Shimony:  This is a most interesting definition, partly because of what it 
omits. You don't make any reference to number of degrees of freedom in 
this definition as you. have just said it, so that (Wigner begins to interrupt 
him, but stops.)  Shimony continues: It could be that the structure is 
important. 
Wigner: It could be, but I don't know. And in following Professor Furry's 
thought — 
Merzbacher:    I don't think you've given the definition quite yet. 
Wigner:      No,  I did not. 
Merzbacher:  Oh, I don't think you've finished. You haven't referred to 
the definition yet. 
Wigner: No, I did not give a very complete example for the other thing. 
Now similarly it is clear that if I have a solid body, it could be here, it 
could be here, it could be here. Or I could make possibly a linear 
combination of it's being here, and its being here, with a coefficient 1. 
And I could make a linear combination with a coefficient i. Now the two 
would have different properties. If I let it fall on a mirror and reflect 
it back, they could behave differently. But if I, in practice, am not able 
to do it so that I can check afterwards that the two coefficients are in 
the ratio of either 1 or i, then I would say it is macroscopic. This also 
means that it is not the body which is macroscopic, but certain properties 
of it are macroscopic. 
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Aharonov:  What about the fact that if it's here or there? It's only 
a different phase relation between momentum states. 
Wigner:  Well, that is true. 
Aharonov: I mean because, after all, that's the fact that if you say it can  
be either here or here, it means you can distinguish between different 
combinations, linear decompositions of momentum states of the same classical 
object. 
Wigner: Yes, that is true. Let me say again what Dr. Aharonov said, because 
he said it very fast. "Now surely", Dr. Aharonov said, "you talk foolishly" 
Aharonov: (interrupted) I didn't say that. 
Wigner: If I had been he, I would have said it — "you talk foolishly". 
Because the mere fact that the body is here and that we certainly can 
accomplish, means phase relations between its states of momentum in this 
direction. Right? 
Aharonov:  Right. 
Wigner: Because the fact that we say that its at point zero means that the 
different momentum states are in phase, and that is just another expression 
for this. But you said, and I hope now to say, that the body is not 
macroscopic, but as I said, it is the property that is macroscopic and the 
property which is not macroscopic.  
Furry: In fact, you said that only some coordinates of it would be 
macroscopic. You 
mentioned position and by this one presumably means the center of mass 
position. The center of mass, of course, is never a macroscopic coordinate. 
You could always reduce it to another Schrodinger equation in that coordinate. 
The center of mass, even of the moon, you see is a quantum mechanical thing. 
It is, of course, so heavy that the uncertainty principle doesn't make any 
trouble with astronomy, but the center of mass --  
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Wigner: If I follow your definition, I would say it is a macroscopic 
coordinate, the center of mass, because I cannot make a linear combination 
with definite coefficients between different positions of the center of 
mass. 
Furry: Oh, yes, you can. It's just a coordinate of this point in space, 
but there is one factor in the wave function for the whole business, for the 
whole moon. You can write one which depends on the center of mass only and 
that's just as definite a factor that wave function has as we would say a 
hydrogen atom has such a factor. 
Wigner: Yes, but it is one position. If I want to put the article here 
and here, if I want to take something as light as this, — even something 
as light as this, — and I want to put it here and here with equal probability 
and establish a phase relation between the two parts of the wave function, 
then I will not be able to. 
Aharonov: Is not your point the following: Make the phase relation between 
these two positions — you get more definite momentum. Now since the mass is 
very heavy, the momentum can be different in quite a large amount without 
affecting the velocity of the particle. Therefore, you can have quite an 
arbitrary phase relationship between position and still not say very much as far 
as velocity is concerned. Then we have to wait for a very long time until 
these two states are really distinguished as far as velocity or later 
position will be. So it's a problem of how long can you wait and how long 
can you really isolate the system. And there are all kinds of complicated 
questions. 
Wigner: We have the two states if one waits long enough. You can 
distinguish them, because the difference is magnified. 
Furry: It's being bombarded by all those photons. 
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Aharonov: Yes. You can have a way. 
Wigner: Well, I don't know. I am probably a little out of my depth when I 
answer that question. 
Rosen: We have covered two questions so far. If there are no further 
comments on them we have just time enough to touch on the next question, 
which is as follows: "Does the concept of gauge have physical significance? 
If so, what. If not, why not get rid of it in the mathematical formulation. 
I think perhaps Dr. Aharonov would like to answer. 
Aharonov: Well, I consider the question of gauge. One has to distinguish 
between the classical electromagnetic theory and the quantum electromagnetic 
theory. By the way, does the question refer to the gauge of electromagnetic 
theory? 
Rosen: It doesn't say. 
Aharonov: Well, there's a gauge in general relativity theory. Let us stick 
to electromagnetic theory. First of all, when you consider the gauge in 
classical electromagnetic theory it will disclose invariance under gauge 
transformation. On the other hand, it's also true that if one wants to 
discuss the theory in canonical formalism, namely to introduce the 
Hamiltonian and so on, one has to use the potentials, and therefore, one gets 
the problem of gauge. The question - why do you use it, why don't you get 
rid of it, even there is a matter of convenience. If, for example, it's more 
convenient you might choose to describe the theory in a canonical formalism, 
or to use the theory in canonical formalism, and therefore to use some things 
which are not actually observable. To the question of why don't you get rid 
of these things, well, it's a matter of convenience. We don't just get rid 
of potentials just to avoid something that we use in classical theory, 
because the formalism with potentials is more — well, I think it's 
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more convenient to handle. When one comes to quantum theory, as long as 
one discusses c-number gauge transformations -- by this I mean that if 
you change potentials only by well defined classical numbers --  then the 
same story is still true. One can make such a gauge transformation and not 
change any observable consequences of the theory. Again the gauge is more 
convenient to use with potentials because of the reasons that I gave before. 
But then, there is something new here in quantum theory because one can 
describe quantum gauges. Namely, one can describe a situation in which 
potentials are not exactly defined even though they don't correspond to 
electric or magnetic fields. They are correlated with different kinds of 
quantum operators. And in this case I want to get to make a point that there 
is some new significance of these quantum fluctuations of potentials, some 
new theories of quantum fluctuations of potentials. But I think these 
theories are now being formulated and we don't know how far one can get. There 
is only some indication that there are some new possibilities. Perhaps there 
is some new information for interaction. So to conclude, I would say the 
following: As far as classical electromagnetic theory is concerned, it is 
nearly impossible to discover a theory in which the gauge and electromagnetic 
potentials of the theory are physically necessary. They are just for 
convenience in classical questions of calculating interaction. Now when you 
get to quantum theory, there are some other problems. It's still an open 
question how far one can go.  
Rosen:  Any further comments on this question? 
Wohlkopf:  (speaks from the audience) Even if one accepts the fact that 
potentials are very useful in the description of an electromagnetic system, 
one might ask the question, "Exist there mathematical quantities in which the 
potentials are uniquely given so that the equation of a gauge transformation 
doesn't even enter the picture?" 
-47- 
Rosen:  (to Aharonov) Do you want to answer this too?  
Aharonov: Yes. I do not think there already exists such a case because 
when you go into quantum theory one can take any classical well defined 
function, and perform a gauge transformation, and no observable will be 
changed. So, therefore, I don't believe that one has a theory where the 
potentials are defined uniquely completely. Maybe from the measurements 
in the laboratory this distinction will apply. I hope that I have 
answered your question. So that is the case as far as I know it  
Rosen: Even if you impose the Lorentz condition on the potentials, there 
is still a possibility of a gauge transformation of a restricted kind. And 
when the gauge function satisfies the wave equation that's as much 
restriction as one can impose upon it. Any other questions or comments? 
If not, I think our time is about up. I would like to thank the audience 
for its patience all through this discussion. 
End of Tuesday afternoon Panel Discussion. 
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The Evolution of the Physicist's 
Picture of Nature 
An account of how physical theory has developed in 
the past and how, in the light of this development, 
it can perhaps be expected to develop in the future  
by P. A. M. Dirac 
n this article I should like to discuss 
the development of general physical 
theory: how it developed in the past 
and how one may expect it to develop in 
the future. One can look on this con-
tinual development as a process of evo-
lution, a process that has been going on 
for several centuries. 
The first main step in this process of 
evolution was brought about by Newton. 
Before Newton, people looked on the 
world as being essentially two -dimen-
sional—the two dimensions in which one 
can walk about—and the up-and-down 
dimension seemed to be something es -
sentially different. Newton showed how 
one can look on the up-and-down direc-
tion as being symmetrical with the other 
two directions, by bringing in gravita-
tional forces and showing how they take 
their place in physical theory. One can 
say that Newton enabled us to pass from 
a picture with two-dimensional sym-
metry to a picture with three-dimension-
al symmetry. 
Einstein made another step in the 
same direction, showing how one can 
pass from a picture with three-dimen-
sional symmetry to a picture with four-
dimensional symmetry. Einstein brought 
in time and showed how it plays a role 
that is in many ways symmetrical with 
the three space dimensions. However, 
this symmetry is not quite perfect. With 
Einstein's picture one is led to think of 
the world from a four-dimensional point 
of view, but the four dimensions are not 
completely symmetrical. There are some 
directions in the four-dimensional pic-
ture that are different from others: di-
rections that are called null directions, 
along which a ray of light can move; 
hence the four-dimensional picture is not 
completely symmetrical. Still, there is a 
great deal of symmetry among the four 
dimensions. The only lack of symmetry, 
so far as concerns the equations of phys-
ics, is in the appearance of a minus sign 
in the equations with respect to the time 
dimension as compared with the three 
space dimensions [see top equation on 
page 8]. 
We have, then, the development from 
the three-dimensional picture of the 
world to the four-dimensional picture. 
The reader will probably not be happy 
with this situation, because the world 
still appears three-dimensional to his 
consciousness. How can one bring this 
appearance into the four-dimensional 
picture that Einstein requires the physi-
cist to have? 
What appears to our consciousness is 
really a three-dimensional section of the 
four-dimensional picture. We must take 
a three-dimensional section to give us 
what appears to our consciousness at one 
time; at a later time we shall have a  
different three-dimensional section. The 
task of the physicist consists largely of 
relating events in one of these sections to 
events in another section referring to a 
later time. Thus the picture with four-
dimensional symmetry does not give us 
the whole situation. This becomes par-
ticularly important when one takes into 
account the developments that have 
been brought about by quantum theory. 
Quantum theory has taught us that we 
have to take the process of observation 
into account, and observations usually 
require us to bring in the three-dimen-
sional sections of the four-dimensional 
picture of the universe. 
The special theory of relativity, which 
Einstein introduced, requires us to put 
all the laws of physics into a form that 
displays four-dimensional symmetry. But 
when we use these laws to get results 
about observations, we have to bring in 
something additional to the four-dimen-
sional symmetry, namely the three-di-
mensional sections that describe our 
consciousness of the universe at a cer-
tain time. 
Einstein made another most important 
contribution to the development of our 
physical picture: he put forward the 
general theory of relativity, which re-
quires us to suppose that the space of 
physics is curved. Before this physicists  
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had always worked with a flat space, the gravitation as well as to the other 
three-dimensional flat space of Newton phenomena of physics, and this has led 
which was then extended to the four- to a rather unexpected development, 
dimensional flat space of special relativ- namely that when one looks at gravita- 
ity. General relativity made a really im- tional theory from the point of view of 
portant contribution to the evolution of the sections, one finds that there are  
our physical picture by requiring us to some degrees of freedom that drop out 
go over to curved space. The general re- of the theory. The gravitational field is  
quirements of this theory mean that all a tensor field with 10 components. One 
the laws of physics can be formulated in finds that six of the components are ade- 
curved four-dimensional space, and that quate for describing everything of physi- 
they show symmetry among the four cal importance and the other four can be 
dimensions. But again, when we want to dropped out of the equations. One can- 
bring in observations, as we must if we  not, however, pick out the six important 
look at things from the point of view of components from the complete set of 10 
quantum theory, we have to refer to a  in any way that does not destroy the 
section of this four-dimensional space, four-dimensional symmetry. Thus if one 
With the four-dimensional space curved, insists on preserving four-dimensional 
any section that we make in it also has to symmetry in the equations, one cannot 
be curved, because in general we cannot adapt the theory of gravitation to a dis - 
give a meaning to a flat section in a cussion of measurements in the way 
curved space. This leads us to a picture quantum theory requires without being 
in which we have to take curved three- forced to a more complicated description 
dimensional sections in the curved four- than is needed by the physical situation, 
dimensional space and discuss observa- This result has led me to doubt how 
tions in these sections. fundamental the four-dimensional re- 
During the past few years people have quirement in physics is. A few decades  
been trying to apply quantum ideas to ago it seemed quite certain that one had 
 
to express the whole of physics in four-
dimensional form. But now it seems that 
four-dimensional symmetry is not of such 
overriding importance, since the descrip-
tion of nature sometimes gets simplified 
when one departs from it. 
Now I should like to proceed to the 
developments that have been brought 
about by quantum theory. Quantum 
theory is the discussion of very small 
things, and it has formed the main sub-
ject of physics for the past 60 years. 
During this period physicists have been 
amassing quite a lot of experimental in-
formation and developing a theory to 
correspond to it, and this combination of 
theory and experiment has led to im-
portant developments in the physicist's 
picture of the world. 
The quantum first made its appear-
ance when Planck discovered the need 
to suppose that the energy of electro -
magnetic waves can exist only in mul-
tiples of a certain unit, depending on the 
frequency of the waves, in order to ex-
plain the law of black-body radiation. 
Then Einstein discovered the same unit 
of energy occurring in the photoelectric 
effect. In this early work on quantum 
theory one simply had to accept the unit 
of energy without being able to incor-
porate it into a physical picture. 
The first new picture that appeared 
was Bohr's picture of the atom. It was a 
picture in which we had electrons mov-
ing about in certain well-defined orbits 
and occasionally making a jump from 
one orbit to another. We could not pic-
ture how the jump took place. We just 
had to accept it as a kind of discon-
tinuity. Bohr's picture of the atom 
worked only for special examples, essen-
tially when there was only one electron 
that was of importance for the problem 
under consideration. Thus the picture 
was an incomplete and primitive one. 
The big advance in the quantum 
theory came in 1925, with the discovery 
of quantum mechanics. This advance 
was brought about independently by two 
men, Heisenberg first and Schrodinger 
soon afterward, working from different 
points of view. Heisenberg worked keep-
ing close to the experimental evidence 
about spectra that was being amassed at 
that time, and he found out how the ex-
perimental information could be fitted 
into a scheme that is now known as 
matrix mechanics. All the experimental 
data of spectroscopy fitted beautifully 
into the scheme of matrix mechanics, and 
this led to quite a different picture of the 
atomic world. Schrodinger worked from 
a more mathematical point of view, try-
ing to find a beautiful theory for describ- 
3 
ISAAC NEWTON (1642-1727), with his law of gravitation, changed the physicist's picture 
of nature from one with two-dimensional symmetry to one with three-dimensional symmetry. 
This drawing of him was made in 1760 by James Macardel from a painting by Enoch Seeman. 
ing atomic events, and was helped by De 
Broglie's ideas of waves associated with 
particles. He was able to extend De 
Broglie's ideas and to get a very beautiful 
equation, known as Schrodinger's wave 
equation, for describing atomic proc-
esses. Schrodinger got this equation by 
pure thought, looking for some beautiful 
generalization of De Broglie's ideas, and 
not by keeping close to the experimental 
development of the subject in the way 
Heisenberg did. 
I might tell you the story I heard from 
Schrodinger of how, when he first got 
the idea for this equation, he immediate-
ly applied it to the behavior of the elec-
tron in the hydrogen atom, and then he 
got results that did not agree with ex-
periment. The disagreement arose be-
cause at that time it was not known that 
the electron has a spin. That, of course, 
was a great disappointment to Schro-
dinger, and it caused him to abandon the 
work for some months. Then he noticed 
that if he applied the theory in a more 
approximate way, not taking into ac-
count the refinements  required by rela-
tivity, to this rough approximation his 
work was in agreement with observa-
tion. He published his first paper with 
only this rough approximation, and in 
that way Schrodinger's wave equation 
was presented to the world. Afterward, 
of course, when people found out how to 
take into account correctly the spin of 
the electron, the discrepancy between 
the results of applying Schrodinger's rel-
ativistic equation and the experiments 
was completely cleared up. 
I think there is a moral to this story,  
namely that it is more important to have 
beauty in one's equations than to have 
them fit experiment. If Schrodinger had 
been more confident of his work, he 
could have published it some months 
earlier, and he could have published a 
more accurate equatio n. That equation is 
now known as the Klein-Gordon equa-
tion, although it was really discovered by 
Schrodinger, and in fact was discovered 
by Schrodinger before he discovered his 
nonrelativistic treatment of the hydro-
gen atom. It seems that if one is working 
from the point of view of getting beauty 
in one's equations, and if one has really 
a sound insight, one is on a sure line of 
progress. If there is not complete agree-
ment between the results of one's work 
and experiment, one should not allow 
oneself to be too discouraged, because 
the discrepancy may well be due to 
minor features that are not properly 
taken into account and that will get 
cleared up with further developments of 
the theory. 
 
ALBERT EINSTEIN (1879-1955), with his special theory of relativity, changed the physi-
cist's picture from one with three-dimensional symmetry to one with four-dimensional sym-
metry. This photograph of him and his wife and their daughter Margot was made in 1929. 
That is how quantum mechanics was Although Einstein was one of the great 
discovered. It led to a drastic change contributors to the development of quan- 
in the physicist's picture of the world, turn mechanics, he still was always rath- 
perhaps the biggest that has yet taken er hostile to the form that quantum 
place. This change comes from our hav- mechanics evolved into during his life- 
ing to give up the deterministic picture time and that it still retains, 
we had always taken for granted. We are The hostility some people have to the 
led to a theory that does not predict with giving up of the deterministic picture 
certainty what is going to happen in the can be centered on a much discussed 
future but gives us information only  paper by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 
about the probability of occurrence of dealing with the difficulty one has in 
various events. This giving up of deter- forming a consistent picture that still 
minacy has been a very controversial gives results according to the rules of 
subject, and some people do not like it at quantum mechanics. The rules of quan- 
all. Einstein in particular never liked it. turn mechanics are quite definite. People 
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 know how to calculate results and how to 
compare the results of their calculations 
with experiment. Everyone is agreed on 
the formalism. It works so well that no-
body can afford to disagree with it. But 
still the picture that we are to set up 
behind this formalism is a subject of 
controversy. 
I should like to suggest that one not 
worry too much about this controversy. I 
feel very strongly that the stage physics 
has reached at the present day is not the 
final stage. It is just one stage in the evo-
lution of our picture of nature, and we 
should expect this process of evolution 
to continue in the future, as biological 
evolution continues into the future. The 
present stage of physical theory is mere-
ly a steppingstone toward the better 
stages we shall have in the future. One 
can be quite sure that there will be better 
stages simply because of the difficulties 
that occur in the physics of today. 
I should now like to dwell a bit on  
the difficulties in the physics of the 
present day. The reader who is not an 
expert in the subject might get the idea 
that because of all these difficulties 
physical theory is in pretty poor shape 
and that the quantum theory is not much 
good. I should like to correct this impres -
sion by saying that quantum theory is an 
extremely good theory. It gives wonder-
ful agreement with observation over a 
wide range of phenomena. There is no 
doubt that it is a good theory, and the 
only reason physicists talk so much about 
the difficulties in it is that it is precisely 
the difficulties that are interesting. The 
successes of the theory are all taken for 
granted. One does not get anywhere 
simply by going over the successes again 
and again, whereas by talking over the 
difficulties people can hope to make 
some progress. 
The difficulties in quantum theory are 
of two kinds. I might call them Class One 
difficulties and Class Two difficulties. 
Class One difficulties are the difficulties 
I have already mentioned: How can one 
form a consistent picture behind the 
rules for the present quantum theory? 
These Class One difficulties do not really 
worry the physicist. If the physicist 
knows how to calculate results and com-
pare them with experiment, he is quite 
happy if the results agree with his ex-
periments, and that is all he needs. It is 
only the philosopher, wanting to have a 
satisfying description of nature, who is 
bothered by Class One difficulties. 
There are, in addition to the Class One 
difficulties, the Class Two difficulties, 
which stem from the fact that the present 
laws of quantum theory are not always 
adequate to give any results. If one 
pushes the laws to extreme conditions— 
to phenomena involving very high ener-
gies or very small distances —one some-
times gets results that are ambiguous or 
not really sensible at all. Then it is clear 
that one has reached the limits of appli-
cation of the theory and that some fur-
ther development is needed. The Class 
Two difficulties are imp ortant even for 
the physicist, because they put a limita-
tion on how far he can use the rules of 
quantum theory to get results compara-
ble with experiment. 
I should like to say a little more about 
the Class One difficulties. I feel that one 
should not be bothered with them too 
much, because they are difficulties that 
refer to the present stage in the develop-
ment of our physical picture and are 
almost certain to change with future de-
velopment. There is one strong reason, I 
think, why one can be quite confident 
that these difficulties will change. There 
are some fundamental constants in na-
ture: the charge on the electron (desig-
nated e), Planck's constant divided by 
p2  (designated h ) and the velocity of 
light (c). From these fundamental con-
stants one can construct a number that 
has no dimensions: the number 2/ ech . 
That number is found by experiment to 
have the value 137, or something very 
close to 137. Now, there is no known 
reason why it should have this value 
rather than some other number. Various 
people have put forward ideas about it, 
but there is no accepted theory. Still, 
one can be fairly sure that someday 
physicists will solve the problem and 
explain why the number has this value. 
There will be a physics in the future that 
works when 2/ ech  has the value 137 
and that will not work when it has any 
other value. 
The physics of the future, of course, 
cannot have the three quantities h , e and 
c all as fundamental quantities. Only two 
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NIEIS BOHR (1885-1962) introduced the idea that the electron 
moved about the nucleus in well -defined orbits. This photograph 
was made in 1922, nine years after the publication of his paper.  
MAX PLANCK (1858-1947) introduced the idea that electro-
magnetic radiation consists of quanta, or particles. This 
photograph  was made in 1913, 13 years after his original paper 
was published. 
of them can be fundamental, and the 
third must be derived from those two. It 
is almost certain that c will be one of the 
two fundamental ones. The velocity of 
light, c, is so important in the four-
dimensional picture, and it plays such a 
fundamental role in the special theory of 
relativity, correlating our units of space 
and time, that it has to be fundamental. 
Then we are faced with the fact that of 
the two quantities h  and e, one will be 
fundamental and one will be derived. If 
h  is fundamental, e will have to be ex-
plained in some way in terms of the 
square root of h , and it seems most un-
likely that any fundamental theory can 
give e in terms of a square root, since 
square roots do not occur in basic equa-
tions. It is much more likely that e will 
be the fundamental quantity and that 
h  will be explained in terms of e2. Then 
there will be no square root in the basic 
equations. I think one is on safe ground 
if one makes the guess that in the physi-
cal picture we shall have at some future 
stage e and c will be fundamental quan-
tities and h  will be derived. 
If h  is a derived quantity instead of a 
fundamental one, our whole set of ideas 
about uncertainty will be altered: h  is 
the fundamental quantity that occurs in 
the Heisenberg uncertainty relation con-
necting the amount of uncertainty in a 
position and in a momentum. This un-
certainty relation cannot play a funda-
mental role in a theory in which h  
itself is not a fundamental quantity. I 
think one can make a safe guess that 
uncertainty relations in their present form 
will not survive in the physics of the 
future. 
Of course there will not be a return to 
the determinism of classical physical 
theory. Evolution does not go backward. 
It will have to go forward. There will 
have to be some new development that 
is quite unexpected, that we cannot 
make a guess about, which will take us 
still further from classical ideas but 
which will alter completely the discus-
sion of uncertainty relations. And when 
this new development occurs, people 
will find it all rather futile to have had so 
much of a discussion on the role of ob-
servation in the theory, because they will 
have then a much better point of view 
from which to look at things. So I shall 
say that if we can find a way to describe 
the uncertainty relations and the in-
determinacy of present quantum me-
chanics that is satisfying to our philo-
sophical ideas, we can count ourselves 
lucky. But if we cannot find such a way, 
it is nothing to be really disturbed 
about. We simply have to take into ac-
count that we are at a transitional stage 
and that perhaps it is quite impossible to way to handle these infinities according 
get a satisfactory picture for this stage. to certain rules, which makes it possible 
I have disposed of the Class One dif- to get definite results. This method is  
ficulties by saying that they are really  known as the renormalization method, 
not so important, that if one can make 
progress with them one can count one- I shall merely explain the idea in words, 
self lucky, and that if one cannot it is         We start out with a theory involving 
nothing to be genuinely disturbed about. equations. In these equations there occur 
The Class Two difficulties are the really certain parameters:  the charge of the 
serious ones. They arise primarily from electron, e, the mass of the electron, m, 
the fact that when we apply our quan- and things of a similar nature. One then 
turn theory to fields in the way we have finds that these quantities, which appear 
to if we are to make it agree with special in the original equations, are not equal 
relativity, interpreting it in terms of the to the measured values of the charge and 
three-dimensional sections I have men- the mass of the electron. The measured 
tioned, we have equations that at first values differ from these by certain cor- 
look all right. But when one tries to solve     recting terms —re,  rm and so on—so 
them, one finds that they do not have any that  the  total  charge  is  e + re  and 
solutions. At this point we ought to say the total mass m + rm. These changes  
that we do not have a theory. But physi- in charge and mass are brought about 
cists are very ingenious about it,  and through the interaction of our elemen- 
they have found a way to make prog- tary particle with other things. Then one 
ress in spite of this obstacle. They find  says that e + re and m + rm, being 
that when they try to solve the equations, the observed things, are the important 
the  trouble  is  that  certain  quantities things. The original e and m are just 
that ought to be finite are actually in- mathematical parameters; they are un- 
finite.  One gets integrals that diverge observable and therefore just tools one 
instead of converging to something defi- can discard when one has got far enough 
nite. Physicists have found that there is a to bring in the things that one can com- 
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LOUIS DE BROGLIE  (1892-    )  put forward the idea that particles are associated with 
waves. This photograph was made in 1929, five years after the appearance of his paper. 
pare with observation. This would be a 
quite correct way to proceed if re 
and rm were small (or even if they 
were not so small but finite) corrections. 
According to the actual theory, however, 
re and rm are infinitely great. In spite 
of that fact one can still use the formal-
ism and get results in terms of e + re 
and m + rm, which one can interpret 
by saying that the original e and m have 
to be minus infinity of a suitable amount 
to compensate for the re and rm that 
are infinitely great. One can use the 
theory to get results that can be com-
pared with experiment, in particular for 
electrodynamics. The surprising thing is 
that in the case of electrodynamics one 
gets results that are in extremely good 
agreement with experiment. The agree-
ment applies to many significant fig-
ures—the kind of accuracy that previ-
ously one had only in astronomy. It 
is because of this good agreement that 
physicists do attach some value to the 
renormalization theory, in spite of its 
illogical character. 
It seems to be quite impossible to put 
jthis theory on a mathematically sound 
basis. At one time physical theory was all 
built on mathematics that was inherently 
sound. I do not say that physicists always 
use sound mathematics; they often use 
unsound steps in their calculations. But 
previously when they did so it was 
simply because of, one might say, lazi-
ness. They wanted to get results as 
quickly as possible without doing un-
necessary work. It was always possible 
for the pure mathematician to come 
along and make the theory sound by 
bringing in further steps, and perhaps by 
introducing quite a lot of cumbersome 
notation and other things that are desir-
able from a mathematical point of view 
in order to get everything expressed 
rigorously but do not contribute to the 
physical ideas. The earlier mathematics 
could always be made sound in that way, 
but in the renormalization theory we 
have a theory that has defied all the at-
tempts of the mathematician to make it 
sound. I am inclined to suspect that the 
renormalization theory is something that 
will not survive in the future, and that 
the remarkable agreement between its 
results and experiment should be looked 
on as a fluke. 
This is perhaps not altogether surpris -
ing, because there have been similar 
flukes in the past. In fact, Bohr's elec- 
tron-orbit theory was found to give very 
good agreement with observation as long 
as one confined oneself to one-electron 
problems. I think people will now say 
that this agreement was a fluke, because 
the basic ideas of Bohr's orbit theory 
have been superseded by something 
radically different. I believe the suc-
cesses of the renormalization theory will 
be on the same footing as the successes 
of the Bohr orbit theory applied to one-
electron problems. 
The renormalization theory has re -
moved some of these Class Two dif-
ficulties, if one can accept the illogical 
character of discarding infinities, but it 
does not remove all of them. There are 
a good many problems left over concern -
ing particles other than those that come 
into electrodynamics: the new particles -
mesons of various kinds and neutrinos. 
There the theory is still in a primitive 
stage. It is fairly certain that there will 
have to be drastic changes in our funda-
mental ideas before these problems can 
be solved. 
One of the problems is the one I have 
already mentioned about accounting for 
the number 137. Other problems are 
how to introduce the fundamental length 
to physics in some natural way, how to 
explain the ratios of the masses of the 
elementary particles and how to explain 
their other properties. I believe separate 
ideas will be needed to solve these dis -
tinct problems and that they will be 
solved one at a time through successive 
stages in the future evolution of physics. 
At this point I find myself in disagree-
ment with most physicists. They are in-
clined to think one master idea will be 
discovered that will solve all these prob-
lems together. I think it is asking too 
much to hope that anyone will be able to 
solve all these problems together. One 
should separate them one from another 
as much as possible and try to tackle 
them separately. And I believe the fu-
ture development of physics will consist 
of solving them one at a time, and that 
after any one of them has been solved 
there will still be a great mystery about 
how to attack further ones. 
I might perhaps discuss some ideas 
I have had about how one can possibly 
attack some of these problems. None of 
these ideas has been worked out very 
far, and I do not have much hope for any 
one of them. But I think they are worth 
mentioning briefly. 
One of these ideas is to introduce 
something corresponding to the luminif-
erous ether, which was so popular among 
the physicists of the 19th century. I said 
earlier that physics does not evolve back- 
7 
 
 
 
FOUR-DIMENSIONAL SYMMETRY introduced by the special theory of relativity is not 
quite perfect. This equation is the expression for the invariant distance in four-dimensional 
space -time. The symbol s is the invariant distance; c, the speed of light; t, time; x, y and z, 
the three spatial dimensions. The d's are differentials. The lack of complete symmetry lies 
in the fact that the contribution from the time direction (c2dt2) does not have the same 
sign as the contributions from the three spatial directions ( — At2, — dy2 and — dz2). 
SCHRODINGER'S FIRST WAVE EQUATION did not fit experimental results because it 
did not take into account the spin of the electron, which was not known at the time. The 
equation is a generalization of De Broglie's equation for the motion of a free electron. The 
symbol e represents the charge on the electron; i, the square root of minus one; h, Planck's 
constant; r, the distance from the nucleus; i^, Schrodinger's wave function; m, the mass of 
the electron. The symbols resembling sixes turned backward are partial derivatives. 
SCHRODINGER'S SECOND WAVE EQUATION is an approximation to the original 
equation, which does not take into account the refinements that are required by relativity. 
ward. When I talk about reintroducing 
the ether, I do not mean to go back to 
the picture of the ether that one had in 
the 19th century, but I do mean to intro-
duce a new picture of the ether that will 
conform to our present ideas of quantum 
theory. The objection to the old idea of 
the ether was that if you suppose it to 
be a fluid filling up the whole of space, 
in any place it has a definite velocity, 
which destroys the four-dimensional 
symmetry required by Einstein's special 
principle of relativity. Einstein's special 
relativity killed this idea of the ether. 
But with our present quantum theory 
we no longer have to attach a definite 
velocity to any given physical thing, be-
cause the velocity is subject to uncer-
tainty relations. The smaller the mass of 
the thing we are interested in, the more 
important are the uncertainty relations. 
Now, the ether will certainly have very 
little mass, so that uncertainty relations 
for it will be extremely important. The 
velocity of the ether at some particular 
place should therefore not be pictured as 
definite, because it will be subject to un-
certainty relations and so may be any-
thing over a wide range of values. In that 
way one can get over the difficulties of 
reconciling the existence of an ether with 
the special theory of relativity. 
There is one important change this 
will make in our picture of a vacuum. We 
would like to think of a vacuum as a 
region in which we have complete sym-
metry between the four dimensions of 
space-time as required by special relativ-
ity. If there is an ether subject to uncer-
tainty relations, it will not be possible to 
have this symmetry accurately. We can 
suppose that the velocity of the ether is 
equally likely to be anything within a 
wide range of values that would give the 
symmetry only approxi mately. We can-
not in any precise way proceed to the 
limit of allowing all values for the veloc-
ity between plus and minus the velocity 
of light, which we would have to do in 
order to make the symmetry accurate. 
Thus the vacuum becomes a state that is 
unattainable. I do not think that this is a 
physical objection to the theory. It would 
mean that the vacuum is a state we can 
approach very closely. There is no limit 
as to how closely we can approach it, 
but we can never attain it. I believe 
that would be quite satisfactory to the 
experimental physicist. It would, how-
ever, mean a departure from the notion 
of the vacuum that we have in the 
quantum theory, where we start off with 
the vacuum state having exactly the 
symmetry required by special relativity. 
That is one idea for the development 
of physics in the future that would  
 
ERWIN SCHRODINGER (1887-1961) devised his wave equation by extending De Broglie's 
idea that waves are associated with particles to the electrons moving around the nucleus. 
This photograph was made in 1929, four years after he had published his second equation. 
change our picture of the vacuum, but lines of force are a way of picturing elec- 
change it in a way that is not unaccept- trie fields. If we have an electric field in 
able to the experimental physicist. It has any region of space, then according to 
proved difficult to continue with the Faraday we can draw a set of lines that 
theory, because one would need to set up have the direction of the electric field, 
mathematically the uncertainty relations The closeness of the lines to one another 
for the ether and so far some satisfactory gives a measure of the strength of the 
theory along these lines has not been dis - field—they are close where the field is  
covered. If it could be developed satis - strong and less close where the field is  
factorily, it would give rise to a new kind weak. The Faraday lines of force give 
of field in physical theory, which might us a good picture of the electric field in 
help in explaining some of the elemen- classical theory. 
tary particles. When we go over to quantum theory, 
we bring a kind of discreteness into our 
Another possible picture I should like  basic picture. We can suppose that the 
 to mention concerns the question of continuous distribution of Faraday lines  
why all the electric charges that are ob- of force that we have in the classical pic- 
served in nature should be multiples of ture is replaced by just a few discrete 
one elementary unit, e. Why does one lines of force with no lines of force be- 
not have a continuous distribution of tween them. 
charge occurring in nature? The picture Now, the lines of force in the Faraday 
I  propose  goes  back  to  the  idea   of picture end where  there  are charges. 
Faraday lines of force and involves a  Therefore with these quantized Faraday 
development of this idea. The Faraday lines of force it would be reasonable to 
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suppose the charge associated with each move about. Some of them, forming 
line, which has to lie at the end if the closed loops or simply extending from 
line of force has an end, is always the minus infinity to infinity, will correspond 
same (apart from its sign), and is al- to electromagnetic waves. Others will 
ways just the electronic charge, — e or have ends, and the ends of these lines  
+ e. This leads us to a picture of discrete will be the charges. We may have a Hne 
Faraday lines of force, each associated of force sometimes breaking. When that 
with a charge, — e or + e. There is a di- happens, we have two ends appearing, 
rection attached to each line, so that the and there must be charges at the two 
ends of a line that has two ends are not ends. This process—the breaking of a line 
the same, and there is a charge + e at  of force—would be the picture for the 
one end and a charge — e at the other. creation of an electron (e-) and a posi- 
We may have lines of force extending to tron (e+). It would be quite a reason- 
infinity, of course, and then there is no able picture, and if one could develop it, 
charge. it would provide a theory in which e  
If  we   suppose   that   these   discrete appears as a basic quantity. I have not 
Faraday lines  of force  are  something yet found any reasonable system of equa- 
basic in physics and lie at the bottom of tions of motion for these lines of force, 
our picture of the electromagnetic field, and so I just put forward the idea as a 
we shall have an explanation of why possible physical picture we might have 
charges always occur in multiples of e. in the future. 
This happens because if we have any There is one very attractive feature  
particle with some lines of force ending in this picture. It will quite alter the  
on it, the number of these lines must be discussion of renormalization.  The re- 
a whole number. In that way we get normalization we have in our present 
a picture that is qualitatively quite rea- quantum  electrodynamics  comes  from 
sonable. starting off with what people call a bare 
We suppose these lines of force can electron—an electron without a charge 
on it. At a certain stage in the theory one 
brings in the charge and puts it on the 
electron, thereby making the electron 
interact with the electromagnetic field. 
This brings a perturbation into the equa-
tions and causes a change in the mass of 
the electron, the Am, which is to be 
added to the previous mass of the elec-
tron. The procedure is rather roundabout 
because it starts off with the unphysical 
concept of the bare electron. Probably in 
the improved physical picture we shall 
have in the future the bare electron will 
not exist at all. 
Now, that state of affairs is just what 
we have with the discrete lines of force. 
We can picture the lines of force as 
strings, and then the electron in the pic-
ture is the end of a string. The string it-
self is the Coulomb force around the 
electron. A bare electron means an elec-
tron without the Coulomb force around 
it. That is inconceivable with this pic-
ture, just as it is inconceivable to think of 
the end of a piece of string without think-
ing of the string its elf. This, I think, is the 
kind of way in which we should try to 
develop our physical picture—to bring in 
ideas that make inconceivable the things 
we do not want to have. Again we have a 
picture that looks reasonable, but I have 
not found the proper equations for de-
veloping it. 
I might mention a third picture with 
which I have been dealing lately. It 
involves departing from the picture of 
the electron as a point and thinking of 
it as a kind of sphere with a finite size. 
Of course, it is really quite an old idea 
to picture the electron as a sphere, but 
previously one had the difficulty of dis -
cussing a sphere that is subject to ac-
celeration and to irregular motion. It 
will get distorted, and how is one to deal 
with the distortions? I propose that one 
should allow the electron to have, in 
general, an arbitrary shape and size. 
There will be some shapes and sizes in 
which it has less energy than in others, 
and it will tend to assume a spherical 
shape with a certain size in which the 
electron has the least energy. 
This picture of the extended electron 
has been stimulated by the discovery of 
the mu meson, or muon, one of the new 
particles of physics. The muon has the 
surprising property of being almost iden-
tical with the electron except in one 
particular, namely, its mass is some 200 
times greater than the mass of the elec-
tron. Apart from this disparity in mass 
the muon is remarkably similar to the 
electron, having, to an extremely high 
degree of accuracy, the same spin and 
the same magnetic moment in propor-
tion to its mass as the electron does. This  
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WERNER HEISENBERG (1901-    ) introduced matrix mechanics, which, like the Schro-
dinger theory, accounted for the motions of the electron. This photograph was made in 1929. 
leads to the suggestion that the muon 
should be looked on as an excited elec-
tron. If the electron is a point, picturing 
how it can be excited becomes quite 
awkward. But if the electron is the most 
stable state for an object of finite size, 
the muon might just be the next most 
stable state in which the object under-
goes a kind of oscillation. That is an idea 
I have been working on recently. There 
are difficulties in the development of this 
idea, in particular the difficulty of bring-
ing in the correct spin. 
I have mentioned three possible ways  
in which one might think of developing 
our physical picture. No doubt there will 
be others that other people will think 
of. One hopes that sooner or later 
someone will find an idea that really fits 
and leads to a big development. I am 
rather pessimistic about it and am in-
clined to think none of them will be good 
enough. The future evolution of basic 
physics —that is to say, a development 
that will really solve one of the funda-
mental problems, such as bringing in the 
fundamental length or calculating the 
ratio of the masses —may require some 
much more drastic change in our physi-
cal picture. This would mean that in our 
present attempts to think of a new physi-
cal picture we are setting our imagina-
tions to work in terms of inadequate 
physical concepts. If that is really the 
case, how can we hope to make progress 
in the future? 
There is one other line along which 
one can still proceed by theoretical 
means. It seems to be one of the funda-
mental features of nature that funda-
mental physical laws are described in 
terms of a mathematical theory of great 
beauty and power, needing quite a high 
standard of mathematics for one to un-
derstand it. You may wonder: Why is 
nature constructed along these lines? 
One can only answer that our present 
knowledge seems to show that nature is 
so constructed. We simply have to accept 
it. One could perhaps describe the situa-
tion by saying that God is a mathema-
tician of a very high order, and He used 
very advanced mathematics in construct-
ing the universe. Our feeble attempts at 
mathematics enable us to understand a 
bit of the universe, and as we proceed 
to develop higher and higher mathe-
matics we can hope to understand the 
universe better. 
This view provides us with another 
way in which we can hope to make ad-
vances in our theories. Just by studying 
mathematics we can hope to make a 
guess at the kind of mathematics that 
will come into the physics of the future. 
10 
 
LINES OF FORCE in an electromagnetic field, if they are assumed to be discrete in the 
quantum theory, suggest why electric charges always occur in multiples of the charge of the 
electron. In Dirac's view, when a line of force has two ends, there is a particle with charge 
— e, perhaps an electron, at one end and a particle with charge + e, perhaps a positron, at 
the other end. When a closed line of force is broken, an electron-positron pair materializes. 
A good many people are working on the tions and then needing a few years of 
mathematical basis of quantum theory, development in order to find the physical 
trying to understand the theory better ideas behind the equations. My own be- 
and to make it more powerful and more  lief is that this is a more likely line of 
beautiful.  If someone  can hit  on the  progress than trying to guess at physical 
right lines along which to make this de- pictures. 
velopment, it may lead to a future ad-         Of course, it may be that even this line 
vance in which people will first discover of progress will fail, and then the only  
the equations and then, after examining line left is the experimental one. Experi- 
them,   gradually   learn   how   to   apply mental physicists  are continuing their 
them. To some extent that corresponds work quite independently of theory, col- 
with the line of development that oc - lecting a vast storehouse of information, 
curred with Schrodinger's discovery of Sooner  or  later  there will be  a new 
his wave equation. Schrodinger discov- Heisenberg who will be able to pick out 
ered the equation simply by looking for the important features of this informa- 
an equation with mathematical beauty. tion and see how to use them in a way 
When the equation was first discovered, similar to that in which Heisenberg used 
people saw that it fitted in certain ways, the experimental knowledge of spectra  
but the general principles according to to build his matrix mechanics. It is in - 
which one should apply it were worked evitable that physics will develop ulti- 
out only some two or three years later. It mately along these lines, but we may 
may well be that the next advance in  have to wait quite a long time if people 
physics  will  come  about   along  these do not get bright ideas for developing 
lines: people first discovering the equa- the theoretical side. 
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Dirac:  I shall talk about a classical model of the electron 
that has a finite size.  It will be assumed to have a definite 
boundary surface on which all the charge is concentrated.  In a 
relativistic theory there is a difficulty in attaching a 
definite shape (e.g. a spherical shape) and a definite size to 
the electron, because when the electron is accelerating, the 
concepts of shape and size are not well defined, unless one 
brings in artificial constraints.  So I shall assume that the 
shape and size are variable, i.e., the electron is deformable. 
We then have to postulate a new force to hold the electron 
together, otherwise it would fly apart under the Coulomb repulsion 
of its surface charge.  The simplest assumption for the new force 
is that it is of the nature of a surface tension.  This assumption 
can easily be formulated relativistically. 
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this theory, we shall want, of course, to apply quantum ideas to it. We 
start off with a classical picture to which we can apply quantum ideas 
later on.  That means we must have a Hamiltonian, or, in more general terms, 
we must have an action principle. So I take it as essential that we should 
have an 
 
principle I mean one comprehensive action principle, such that applying it gives 
us all the equations of motion that we want, namely, field equations for the 
field outside the electron together with the equations of motion for the 
electron as a whole, and equations of motion telling us how the shape and size 
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region of space outside the electron.  I should say that we are 
 
electrons provided they never collide or come into contact with each other.  
If we do formulate the equations for one electron, then the same work will 
formulate the equations for several electrons provided they don't collide.  
So it is sufficient 
is one part of the action integral, Is is another part of the 
action integral, which is the surface integral taken over the surface of the 
electron. This has to bring in the surface tension term. The precise form of 
this I will leave unspecified 
it becomes important to understand exactly how an action principle 
works.  Let us put it in general terms like this. 
variables, q, which specify the physical conditions throughout 
q's.  Then we put these coefficients cn equal to zero and get a set of 
equations that are the equations of motion which 
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a linear function of the rq's and then the action principle 
just doesn't work at all. 
Wigner: No matter what function of q you take, the rI is 
a first order expression, accurate to first order in rq, so 
that it is by definition linear. 
Dirac:  People usually think so, but that is rather sloppy 
thinking and doesn't hold when one goes into it closely. Let 
us apply this action integral to these ideas here. What do we 
take as our q's? Here is our extended electron (he indicates 
a circle on the board). Well, we can take as some of our q's 
all the potentials outside. 
Wigner: As functions of what? 
Dirac: As functions of a system of four coordinates. The 
the surface. 
Wigner: The q's specify the surface variables? 
 
principle. 
Wigner:  The q's specify the surface, as a result of your 
assumptions, namely, that the electric field is parallel to 
the surface but there is no electromagnetic force acting on 
the surface itself. 
Dirac: The things that you are saying now should come out as 
consequences of the action principle. They are not the starting 
point.  The starting point is that we must have an I as a 
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function of certain q's, and then we proceed to vary the q's. 
Now what are the q's? That is the question you have been 
asking. The q's must be sufficient to describe the physical 
state throughout space-time. 
Podolsky:  Isn't it the q's and their derivatives that have 
to be adequate to describe state? 
Dirac: Well, the q's will be the set of things which will 
describe the physical conditions throughout all space-time. 
Wigner: Excuse me Doctor, but it seems to me that's at least 
not clear to me. The q's will describe not only the surface, 
but also the outside so that there will be only q variables. 
Dirac: All the variables in the action principle are q's. 
Wigner: Are q's, ah! 
Dirac: We have one comprehensive action principle which must 
give all the equations of motion. 
Wigner: That's right, well right, but whether you denote them 
all by q is another question. 
Dirac: Well in this discussion here, I have just a single 
variable, q, to denote all the physical variables entering 
into I, and these will be a set of q's. We shall need some 
further q's to specify the surface. The easiest way to do 
that will be to introduce a parametrization of the surface. 
You can introduce things which are not physically meaningful 
if you want to; they don't disturb the action principle. Then 
we may specify the positions in space-time of points on the 
physical conditions completely. We could express our I in 
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terms of those q's, and then we could consider how I varies  
 
linearly when we vary the q's, because we might consider a variation of 
the q's in which the surface is pushed out a little bit like that, (he 
draws a bump on the circle) then consider a second variation of the q's 
which is just minus the first variation of the q's, corresponding to the 
surface being pushed in.  It will be a reflection of the first one 
pushing out (he draws an inward bump). Now the rI in the second case 
will not be minus the rI in the first case because the field here in 
this hump is not the same as the field in this depression . The change 
that we make in I when we stick a hump like that onto our surface is just 
not minus the change, which we make in I when we put a depression in the 
surface like that, and those q's, therefore, will not work. 
Wigner: We are not able to say, within first order of the q's?  
Dirac: Not even within the first order of the q's, no.  
Wigner: Because that is the usual situation.  
Dirac: That is the usual situation, but it doesn't apply here because 
the integral taken over the hump is not the same as the integral taken 
over the depression, even to the first order.  In fact, the integral 
taken over this depressed region is zero. 
Wigner: Integral over, what do you call the first region?  
Dirac: I call this the first region here.  (He points to the bump.) 
Wigner: Integral of what over the depressed region? 
WED:PM-6 
Dirac:  I call this region the depressed region.  (He points to 
the indentation.) 
Wigner: You said the integral. What is the integrand? 
 
Furry:  There seems also to be a little difficulty in using 
these surface coordinates as q's along with the A 's. 
Dirac:  I'm not saying this is the only difficulty; there are 
others as well. 
Furry:  Because when you change the surface you change what 
points x there are at which to specify the A's outside.  You 
change some of the q's and affect how many of the oth er q's 
there are. 
Dirac: Yes, I agree that is also a difficulty.  I don't want 
 
Schwebel:  May I ask a question with regard to the relative size? This 
would be the relative size, because if you had it larger than your 
proposed minimum size, you could have  the...  
Dirac:  No, this is not the minimum size, this is an arbitrary size for 
the particle. We must have the action principle working for an 
arbitrary state.  In fact, there's just no 
 
Schwarzschild minimum size in it. 
Aharonov:  The theory assumes that there is no reason to describe the 
inside of this surface here. You obtain this well defined expression.  
It's just a kind of constraint, if you like.  
Dirac: You can bring them in if you like, but the electro - 
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magnetic field is zero inside. You can bring them in, there's 
no harm in doing it, but it's... 
Aharonov: No, I mean you don't assume that there can be any  
other thing...going on in the inside. 
Dirac: I'm taking this simple model where the field is  zero 
inside, and where the whole of the action consists of this 
outside action and this surface action. 
Wigner:  I understand why you say the I 0 change is not 
oppositely equal if you push it out the surface and if you 
pull it in. If would seem that if you push it out, you abolish 
the electromagnetic field within the... 
Dirac: Within this region. Shall I draw a bigger picture 
here? 
Wigner: Yes, you abolish it within that region. 
Dirac: That's right. 
Wigner: So suppose the field was electric, then you decreas e 
the total energy.  (Again he says) You decrease the total  
energy. 
Dirac, in the middle of this says: Yes, within the electron, 
yes. 
Wigner: When you pull it in? 
Dirac: Yes 
Wigner: You will create that field and... 
Dirac: You mustn't create that field. Yo u mustn't change 
these A's. You must change the parameters which specify the  
surface and not change anything else. 
Wigner: Well, that is not possible. 
Dirac: Well I should have quite a bit of difficulty if that  
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is not possible. Why do you say it is not possible?  
Aharonov: It is not possible according to the equation of 
motion. 
Dirac: But we haven't got any equations of motion yet.  
Aharonov: Yeah, that's the trouble. 
Furry: It's not possible because you abolish some of the 
variables outside when you push out this surface. 
Dirac: Let us have these A's defined throughout space-time 
and perhaps simplify the discussion. 
Wigner: Well, you say the reason for this is, if I understand  
it right, because you want to define some of the q's as functions 
of x's where the x is a definite point in space -time. 
Dirac: Yes, yes. 
Wigner: That is what you want. 
Dirac: Yes. 
Wigner: And this is what makes the definition of q and, let  
us say, the radius, impossible if you want this kind of 
equation. 
Dirac: No, it is not impossible. 
Wigner: Well, it will not be linear outside. 
Dirac: rI is not linear here. Yes, that's what I am saying.  
 
Because that, I think, we could understand. Suppose the 
definition of the q's is impossible. Some of the q's are the 
Aµ(x)'s where mu is of course 1, 2, 3, 4, and x is a definite 
point in space-time. 
WED:PM-9 
Dirac: Yes. 
Wigner: If all the q's are some parameters which determine the position 
of the surface, this kind of q's is not possible because if you do this, 
then indeed, rI would not be linear.  
Dirac:  In the rq's.  
Wigner:  In the rq's.  
Dirac: Precisely correct. Yes.  
Wigner: I understand. Thank you. 
Carmi: Excuse me, I still don't understand, because it seems to me 
that these two sets of variables are dependent on each other by their 
definition. 
Wigner: That's just the trouble. The definition do es not want them to 
be dependent on each other.  It wants them to be in dependent and if they 
are not actually independent of each other, one obtains difficulty. One 
assumes they are independent and works that way with the action 
principle.  
Dirac: You want to start off with the action principle in terms of q's 
which are independent of one another, and which you will vary 
independently and then equate the coefficients to zero and get the 
equations of motion. 
Carmi: What, then, is your definition of those pa rts of the q's 
which make the A's. 
Furry: Well, perhaps this is one of the difficulties that Dirac 
mentions. 
Dirac:  There may be other difficulties as well.  
Wigner: Yes. But I think part of the trouble is that most  
 
other words, that there is a continuum of q's. But that is  
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just what we must have here. 
Dirac: If you just have any action principle for a field theory 
it has to be like that. 
Wigner: Well, that's, of course, evident. 
Dirac: Well, we must choose our q's differently and, so far 
as I know, the only way of choosing q's that will work is 
with the help of curvilinear coordinates.  By introducing 
curvilinear coordinates in a way that I shall describe, one 
can get over this difficulty. Curvilinear coordinates, of 
course, mean quite heavy extra complications in t he mathe- 
 
Aharonov: Could I ask just one more question? Wasn't it possible 
to introduce a set of Aµ(x) also inside and outside?  
Dirac: Yes. You can do that.  
Aharonov: And there are also q's for the surface. Then when  
 
as a result of the equations of motion, then you don't have to 
describe it as the q's being dependent on the surface. Then 
you don't get this trouble that the q's are dependent on each 
other. 
Podolsky:  I don't think that would work because you will be 
assuming that the Aµ(x)'s vary continuously across the boundary. 
Wigner: The result is that they don't very continuously. 
Podolsky: Exactly. 
Aharonov:  That's not the problem so much. 
Wigner: I think Professor Dirac did it differently. 
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Podolsky: All right. We want to know how. 
Wigner: Yes. 
Aharonov: Yeah, but I wanted to ask whether Professor Dirac thinks 
it is impossible to do it in this way. 
Dirac:  I don't think it's impossible.  If you want to, I don't mind your 
introducing the A's inside as well as outside, as further q's.  Then let 
us consider what happens when you vary the q's which specify the surface, 
leaving these other q's invariant. We have to consider that possibility 
and you will find non-linearity. 
Furry: You will find non-linearity only if you make this integral I0 
an integral over all space. That will change...  
Dirac: I don't mind. That's not essential.  
Wigner: No. No.  That would be fatal.  I think you would have to 
choose the integral on the outside and further introduce also Aµ(x)'s 
on the inside. But I don't think it might work then. 
Dirac: It won't work because we want to get solutions for which 
these are discontinuous. 
Wigner: Yes, and it will be discontinuous if the action integral is 
discontinuous. 
Dirac: If there is disco ntinuity, you won't have rI linear in the 
rq's.  
Wigner:  I don't think, in our opinion, it will be linear in 
rq. 
Furry: Now that you have erased that boundary condition and the 
integral, I don't see how it will be non -linear. But when you drop that 
boundary condition, you lose some of the coupling 
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between the field outside when you shave off the bump. 
Wigner:  In this case the integral must be confined to the 
outside. 
Dirac:  I can put it like this.  There may be some solutions 
for which rI is linear in the rq's, but for the solutions in 
which we are interested, rI will not be linear in the rq's, 
 
Furry:  Then you must vary the  rq's pretty arbitrarily to get all 
the equations. 
Dirac: You have to subject them to arbitrary independent variations.  
This rI has to be zero for arbitrary independent variations of the 
rq's, and that's not possible with this choice of q's. We can make 
it possible by introducing curvilinear coordinates and suitably 
choosing our q's with respect to the curvilinear coordinates. The 
trick there is to introduce curvilinear coordinates so that we have a 
special equation referred to these coordinates for the surface of the 
electron, let us say the equation f(x)=0, and when we do the 
variation process, we don't change f. 'f' is something which is kept 
fixed all through the calculation.  In fact, 
 
 
of our q's.  The Aµ(x)'s inside we can disregard since they are all 
zero.  Then we shall need also some q's which fix the curvilinear 
system of coordinates with respect to some rigid system of coordinates 
which we may take to be rectilinear. We may call this other system of 
coordinates y.  I use the capital Greek suffixes in this second system 
of coordinates to make a sharp distinction between them and the first 
system of coordinates, the x's.  So we have one system of coordinates, 
x, with small Greek suffixes, a second system of 
 
the variation process, this y system of coordinates is kept 
variation for us to be able to have an action principle. 
 
q's now consist of the following:  the q's must consist of sufficient 
parameters to fix one of these coordinate systems with respect to the 
other.  We may take either the x's as functions of the y's or the y's 
as functions of the x's.  It is more convenient to take the y's as 
functions of the x's. 
 
 
 
 
 between the two coordinate systems.  And Aµ(x) for all x's 
with x1 greater than 0 will fix the field outside the 
electron.  This will be the complete set of q's which fixes 
all the things which are physically important.  It also fixes 
some things which are not 
 
fixed by these q's, so that these q's fix a good deal more 
than is physically necessary, but that does not disturb the 
working of the action principle. We can still proceed in 
the standard way of varying the q's and then setting the 
coefficients equal to zero, 
 
can be brought to zero by a suitable choice of the gauge.  
Even if there are several electrons, you can have the A's 
zero inside 
 
possible, although that choice of gauge is rather different 
from the ones physicists usually work with.  We have here 
the boundary conditions which correspond to the surface 
being a perfect conductor.  These boundary conditions will 
lead to A0, A2, and A3, vanishing just outside the surface 
because they have to be continuous, while A1 does not have 
to be continuous and does not 
 
 vanish just outside the surface.  I'm not sure whether I've got these things 
correctly written here.  These are just the conditions for a conducting 
surface expressed in terms of curvilinear co ordinates. 
Furry:  The A's then are a covariant vector in the curvilinear 
system. 
Dirac:  Yes, that is correct.  They express the conditions for a conducting 
surface in curvilinear coordinates.  I shall use the  
 
take on the values 0, 2, 3.  The suffix 1 is different when one is working 
with the surface because of the equation of the surface 
being x1 = 0 and the surface conditions are that A a = 0 just outside 
the surface.  Fab equals 0 just outside the surface.  This gives the usual 
conditions on the normal component of the electric field and the tangential 
component of the magnetic field vanishing to obtain a reference which we 
want here.  
Furry:  What are the Latin subscripts? 
Dirac:  0, 2, 3.  This gives the usual conditions for the vanishing of the 
normal component of the electric field and the tangential c omponent of the 
magnetic field in a frame of reference in which the particular element of 
the surface which we are considering is at rest. 
Podolsky:  I don't understand why you want the normal component of electric 
fields to vanish.  Usually, of course, th at would be better.  
Dirac:  Tangential component of electric field to vanish? 
 
 Podolsky:  Right. 
Dirac:  and the normal component of magnetic field? 
Podolsky:  Oh, yes. 
Dirac:  Yes.  That's perfectly right.  
Carmi:  Could you explain again what the y's are? 
Dirac:  The y's are a fixed system of coordinates which are recti-
linear and orthogonal coordinates.  
Carmi:  And the x's take part in the motion? 
Dirac:  And the x's take part in the variation principle.  The y's 
are fixed.  They are introduced just in order to specify the x's 
 
just remains to fill in this surface integral here.  The simplest 
thing to take is one which corresponds to surface tension, which 
means putting in some numerical coefficients here in this term, 
giving us the strength of this term.  I'm taking this just to be 
the three-dimensional surface area.  This tube, you see, is a three-
dimensional thing in four dimensional space-time.  It will have a 
three-dimensional area which will be just what one might call 
mdX0, dx2, dx3, where m squared is the determinant of gab.  The ab 
 
3 by 3 determinant. 
Wigner:  And the g is a symmetric tensor in terms of the x's? 
 Dirac:  Yes.  The g is symmetric in terms of the x's.  That com-
pletes the assumptions of the theory and the remainder of the work 
is just pure deduction according to standard methods.  I don't need 
to fill in all the details.  We have to work out rI0.  We get 
terms here coming from terms involving rf and some other terms 
involving rgµv Then we express gµv in terms of our q's, namely 
 
Wigner:  How is the y upper defined? 
Dirac:  Just by a suitable change in signs from the y downstairs. 
Wigner:  Just that? 
Dirac:  The y's are just Minkowski coordinates.  Then, of course, 
one carries out the integration by parts in order to get this to 
 
Podolsky:  Excuse me, Dr. Dirac.  But the equation with a mu nu 
equals f mu nu, I don't understand.  
Furry:  Capital letters. 
Dirac:  I'm sorry.  I did that wrong. (He writes Aµ on blackboard.) 
That's the way it should be. 
Podolsky:  Thank you. 
Dirac:  We carry out the integration by parts and get a four-
dimensional integral here.  We also get a surface integral coming 
in so we get another term here, dx0, dx2, dx3.  (he writes) and 
that gives us the expression for rI0. We also have to work out 
 
 positive to give stable electrons.  This comes to just minus a half 
omega times the integral of m cab delta gad dx1, dx2, dx3, where 
cab is the reciprocal matrix to gab. cab is, of course, quite 
 
then we take the sum of these two and put it equal to zero for 
arbitrary variations.  We get then some equations of motion refer-
ring to this four-dimensional region of space outside the electron. 
 
with the Maxwell action for the field outside.  This is just a 
deduction of the Maxwell equations for the action principle in 
 
here has to be added on to this term here to give us equations of 
motion for the surface of the electron.  These equations of motion for 
the electron look like this. We have there four equations for the 
surface corresponding to four delta y's, which we have appearing 
 
 
what  rIs equals. We have to have a minus sign here in order to 
 This matrix here, when r  is equal to 0, 2 or 3, is reduced to a 
single term which cancels with this term here.  This vanishes when 
r  is equal to 0, 2 of 3 and this also vanishes when r  is equal to 
0, 2 or 3 on account of the surface condition fab equals 0.  So that 
of the four equations, the four surface equations which we get from 
our action principle, three of them are satisfied identically and 
only one of them remains effective as an equation of motion.  That 
is, of course, what we want physically.  We just want one equation to 
determine how the surface moves normally to 
 
on account of the other components of this vanishing at the surface. 
We get that finally as our equation of motion for each element of 
 
just the invariant which can be constructed on a field just outside 
the surface, and this thing here has the physical meaning of being 
 
dimensional space-time.  It's got this geometrical meaning. We have, 
therefore, an equation connecting the total curvature with the 
invariant of the field just outside.  That equation is adequate 
 
these equations of motion mean, I've applied them to the spherically-
symmetric solution.  In this solution we have our electron in the 
form of a spherical shell.  The outside is just the coulomb field. 
You can't have any electromagnetic radiation outside because that 
would disturb the spherical symmetry.  The only thing you can have 
 
 in a spherically symmetrical solution is the coulomb field outside. 
We can have the radius of the electron pulsating.  Then the electron 
is expanding or contracting, and we have this equation of motion 
 
equation of motion reduces to under these conditions.  This is the 
total curvature.  It is fairly easy to see where that comes from. 
This is the contribution to the total curvature of the two space 
directions. You get two over the radius, with this correction 
coming in on account of the Minkowski space and the motion of the 
surface, and this is a further term coming in, depending on the 
acceleration of r  and giving the effect of this acceleration as 
an additional curvature.  So that this is what this right-hand side 
becomes.  You see it is only the radial electric field which con-
tributes to this and this contribution is just given by the coulomb 
 
equal to zero when r  is equal to a, where a is the equilibrium 
radius.  That gives us the connection between the equilibrium radius 
and the surface tension.  Then we want to get the total energy of 
the equilibrium state or distribution just to check that with omega 
positive the equilibrium is stable.  Omega has to be taken to be 
 
 
 
 obtain a formula for the energy when 'r  is zero. Take 'r  equal 
to zero instantaneously but not permanently, and the energy will 
consist of e2/r  plus a surface energy term which is proportional 
to 2r  from elementary physical consideration.  And then the mini- 
mum value of this energy must correspond to the state when r&  equals 
zero permanently.  Therefore we just have to take the minimum value 
of this quantity and put that equal to m and in that 
 
 
of the electron is many times the radius itself, so that we have to 
set up some more elaborate theory if we want to treat the one quan- 
 
energy.  The easiest way to get the total energy is to note that 
that one finds this one quantum of energy is very much bigger than 
physical meaning because the one quantum oscillation is not a small 
 
the method of small perturbations.  The one quantum oscillation 
 
elaborate theory is to obtain a Hamiltonian.  We have an action 
 principle, so we have a Lagrangian. We can work out a Hamiltonian 
from it by applying the standard methods.  I don't think I need to 
go through this work because the rules for getting a Hamiltonian 
are all very well determined.  Just to mention the results that we 
get, the Hamiltonian that we find is always positive definite for 
this theory.  That is a satisfactory result, because it means we 
can't get motions such as the non-physical motions which we have in 
the classical point electron.  These non-physical motions of 
 
compensate for the positive coulomb energy. And this negative 
energy means that we have the possibility of growing energy from 
it to any extent that we like, which enables us to have a runaway 
electron without violating the law of conservation of energy. These 
unphysical solutions which we have with the classical point 
electron cannot occur for this extended electron on account of the 
that kind of Hamiltonian but that is quite an awkward thing to 
work out.  I first of all treated that Hamiltonian from the point of view 
of the Bohr-Sommerfeld method of quantization.  With this method of 
quantization you have to put the integral of the action over one complete 
cycle which means twice the value of that integral extending from the 
minimum value of r  to the maximum value of r  for a particular motion.  
One puts this equal to some inte gral multiple of h.  If one wants to take 
the lowest excited state, one would put this numerical coefficient equal 
to one, so we have just h here. Well, one can work out  what the energy 
is with this quantum condition here and one finds it to be about 53 times 
m. 
equation to correspond to this Hamiltonian here.  There is some ambiguity 
when one tries to use that Hamiltonian for a Schrodinger equation , 
because there is more than one Schrodinger energy operator which may 
correspond to a given classical Hamiltonian.  This term here seems to be 
pretty definite, but that term could be inter - 
 
the two factors in reverse order.  All this in classical theory is the 
same.  That is also something which is classically the same as this, but 
in the quantum theory, it's different.  You see the various possible 
things we might take in the quantum theory, which are not equivalent in 
the quantum theory, although they correspond to the same thing in the 
classical theory. 
 
 
(addition to page 23) 
 
Wigner:  There is a danger to these things because they are 
Hermitian, but not self-adjoint in fact, as Professor Furry 
pointed out. 
Dirac: When did he point it out? 
Furry: Yes, when did I point that out? (Laughter)  
Wigner: Well,... 
Furry:  Oh yes.  This is the example I mentioned that there 
are Hermitian operators for which one has no spectrum and for 
which Professor Wigner uses the technical term that they are 
Hermitian, but not self-adjoint. The famous example, in fact, 
is a momentum conjugate to a variable which always has only a 
semi-infinite range of variation. You may remember that in the 
first edition of your book you gave a proof that this Poisson 
bracket relation is actually possible algebraically only for 
variables which have completely infinite ranges of variation. 
Dirac: Yes. 
Furry: And here, since r  has only a semi-infinite range of 
variation, one will have troubles if one doesn't watch out. 
Wigner: Well that actually, excuse me.  I shouldn't have 
embarrassed you Doctor Furry. Well, that's not quite it 
exactly. 
Aharonov: Excuse me.  I...Why doesn't one find something... 
in the same way you find that... 
Dirac:  I shall do that a moment later. All these attempts 
 
giving rise to quite a substantial zero point energy, which  gets 
handed on both to the zero state and to the first excited state. The 
effect of this term is to bring down the ratio of the energy of the 
first excited stated to the energy of the zero state, to something of 
the order of two, or something like that, which is no good at all 
from the point of view of getting the muon. So it would seem that 
one would have to define things differently in quantizing this 
Hamiltonian in order to cut out the zero point energy, if one is to 
get 
 
 anything which is to be at all hopeful for the muon. Well, that is the 
present situation so far, in terms of quantization of this theory.  There 
is of course, the natural thing to do: to try to linearize it by bringing 
the spin variables in. Some people thought about it, but there is 
difficulty in bringing in spin variables, which in the first place 
requires us to bring them in at each point on the surface. That's going 
to bring in infinite degrees of freedom and make the electron far more 
complicated than one would like to have it.  I think maybe future 
progress on this idea will consist in finding a 
minute or two saying something about the gravitational case. There is just 
one interesting result there, and I will take half a minute.  This is 
the gravitational particle. What are you to take for your boundary 
conditions? For the electromagnetic case you have the boundary conditions 
provided by assuming that the surface is a conductor with no electro-
magnetic field inside. What is the corresponding condition in the 
gravitational case? There is nothing corresponding immediately to a 
gravitational conductor. The natural thing to assume is that there is no 
gravitational field inside the particle and that space -time is flat 
inside the particle.  It was a bit disturbing when I had that idea in the 
first place, because 
 
 
complicate the theory too much. But that is, for the present, an open 
question.  That is really all that I have to say on 
 
 parallel to electromagnetic theory.  There is, though, a further 
difficulty, that if you merely bring in a surface tension term the signs 
are not right to give equilibrium.  You have Newtonian attraction 
instead of coulomb repulsion and you can't balance out the Newtonian 
attraction. You would have to have a surface pressure instead of a 
surface tension.  If you just bring in a surface pressure, then you 
find that the signs are wrong to give stability, and with just 
gravitational forces and surface pressure the particle is not stable. 
One has to bring in an extra term with a suitable coefficient to make 
the particle stable.  Of course it is a complication in the theory, 
 
of particles in an Einstein gravitational field. 
Band:  Professor Dirac, could I ask if you would clarify a 
little bit more the picture of a three-dimensional surface 
extended in time.  Is it closed in the time dimension? 
Dirac:  It is a tube. 
Band:  Is the surface integral a bounded integral? What you're 
doing is building a model, and I don't have a picture of what's  
happening. 
Dirac:  Is this that business about how to define the action 
integral? 
Band: Yes. 
Furry:  Yes, over infinite time, say, there seems to be a 
problem. 
Dirac: Well, that balances the integral over the outside 
space which is also infinite in space-time. 
 
reasonable to assume, when one is setting up a corresponding 
gravitational particle, that space-time is flat inside the 
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Merzbacher:  I thought I would remind you of something very old 
that I recalled in connection with Professor Dirac's talk yesterday 
about the quantization of the extended electron, where you have a 
given Hamiltonian and want to learn how to write down the wave 
equation, or something like that.  The question came up as to how 
you do this. You have this problem where there are central forces, 
where the Hamiltonian has this very central nature — R dependence. 
I don't have any particular proposal, but I would like to remind 
you that when Professor Dirac previously solved this problem for 
the point electron, people subsequently looked at it in all kinds 
of different ways.  I think we might learn something from doing 
this.  The paper (which unfortunately I have never seen, although I 
have quoted it) by Schrodinger, was published in the proceedings 
of the Papal Academy.* Professor Dirac will probably have easier 
access to this than I do, since he is a member of the Papal 
Academy.   It is possible that Xavier University has this.  It's a 
very hard paper to find.  I've never been near a library that had 
it.  You can't even get it on inter-library loan. It's a rarity.  
Perhaps there's somebody here who...  
Professor Furry:  The Widener library does not have it.  
Merzbacher continues:  It is at the University of Michigan at 
E. Schrodinger, Commentationes 
Pontificis Academia Scientiarium 2, 231 (1938) 
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Ann Arbor, but they don't ship it out.  The paper I think must 
be in German but the reference is in Latin.  (He writes on the 
blackboard.)  I can't abbreviate it easily because I don't know how 
to abbreviate Latin.  I will look in the library here.  Do you 
think there is a possibility that you have it?  
Podolsky:  There is always a possibility but I doubt if they have 
it. 
(Merzbacher continues to write while someone says something about 
Latin.  Dirac comes into the room.) 
Merzbacher: The main speaker has arrived.  I'll be glad to yield. 
Dirac: Thank you, but please continue. 
Merzbacher continues:  From references to it that I have seen, the 
point of this paper which is a very long one, is apparently an 
effort to write the relativistic quantum theory of the electron in 
general coordinates.  
Von Roos says:  I have a copy of it at home. 
Merzbacher:  We can infer from a subsequent paper of Pauli what is 
in this paper that might possibly be of interest to us.  All I want 
to suggest is that this is a way of looking at an electron that 
could be used again.  I will only point out the physical basis of it 
as I don't have here the four equations as applied to the Dirac 
theory of the electron.  I will do this in a two-dimensional 
formalism, which can be carried over to a four-dimensional situation, 
for a non-relativistic spin particle.  Our spinors will have two 
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components rather than four.  The generalization is quite straight 
forward, as Pauli showed.  The idea is this.  If we have an electron with 
a spin, then of course in the usual theory you write something like this:  
two wave functions which you put together like this. One of them refers 
to spin up, say, and one of them refers to spin down.  Up and down refers 
to these axes, say X, Y, Z.  You single out the Z axis and then, of 
course, you get a representation of sigma matrices, or in the four spinor 
component case, you get alpha, beta, gamma, or rho matrices.  You work 
this out and then solve your problem, say, with the problem of the 
hydrogen spectrum. Schrodinger pointed out what's contained in this 
equation, in the observation that instead of using this representation 
you can use one which in a certain sense is more physical.  I'm reluctant 
to use that term, but certainly this representation is adapted to any 
problem that has spherical symmetry.  Instead of speaking about the spin 
being up or down, you say that when I'm at a point p, with coordinate x, 
y, z, I will analyze my spin not in terms of up or down but in terms of 
in or out.  In other words, I will quantize at every point; I will use a 
different 'direction of quantization,' as the old term went, at every 
point in space. When I go to this point I will study the property of my 
wave function. Here I will again not use up or down, but will use outward 
or inwards toward the center or away from it.  This is, of course, a 
representation which was extremely appropriate in the days of helicity 
studies when people talked of it.  In other words, you project 
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the spin in the direction of the position vector.  Of course, the 
origin is prescribed and fixed, but you have freed yourself from the 
restriction of the coordinate system, much more than you had before, 
when you had sort of a hybrid situation whe re you solved a spherically 
symmetric problem.  Here you talk of spin up and down, but the 
coordinates you discuss in terms of r, q , j .  You solve your problem 
in terms of spherical coordinates when you use the representation that 
I'm talking about now.  Again, of course, you have two components, 
say 1C  and 2C , and you would usually express the functional depen- 
 
remind me that this is an entirely different representation. It's one 
in which this means the amplitude of finding this particle at a 
position with coordinates r, q , j , like here, but with the spin 
pointing away from the center.  This one, then, is the amplitude for 
the spin pointing toward the center.  Now these two descriptions are 
related by a unitary transformation, of course, that is very simple.  
It is some exponential with sigma x's or sigma y's, or something like 
that.  It is, of course, dependent on the position of the particle.  
You make a different spin transformation depending on where you are in 
space.  Now you might ways "Why do all this?"  It turns out that the 
radial equation that you get is quite simple and nice to look at, and 
gets rid of this preferred direction in space.  I think there are 
applications in scattering theory. 
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This representation, the helicity representation, has been used in 
the last few years.  I'll just end on one example of a case where 
the mathematics really becomes very, very simple when you want to 
solve the problem of finding the eigenfunctions and eigenvalues of 
Jz.  Now by Z, I do mean this preferred direction here. When you do 
this, in this particular representation, then you find that 
 
no Zs  in it.  And so you see there is a certain simplicity when 
you work in this representation.  I just wanted to remind you of 
these very old things and suggest that possibly they might be of 
use in connection with some new problems. 
Dirac:  I suppose you have to have special boundary conditions at 
the origin for this transformation. 
Merzbacher:  This transformation, of course, has a singularity at 
 
need to put down the boundary conditions or enumerate them. 
Dirac:  Suppose we had written down these equations.  Perhaps 
you will need to work out the boundary conditions, or at least 
enumerate them for a new wave equation. 
Merzbacher:  That's right. 
Dirac:  Of course they were all worked out in the paper. 
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pointed out the physical meaning of this transformation, and it's 
quite straightforward.  Then you might wonder, of course, how this can 
be, because the eigenvalue problem of Jz is this (he writes JzY  = mhY  
). You solve this differential equation (he writes (h/i)( Y¶ / j¶ )= mhY ) 
and then, of course, everybody knows 
that the answer is very simple, jime .  Then the traditional 
argument goes that when you go around the circle by 2 p  you come back to 
the original value and, therefore, m must be an integer. But that's 
preposterous because we know that the eigenvalues of Jz must be half 
integral, a fact which doesn't seem to follow from this theory.  But, 
of course, upon reflection you see that it does precisely follow, 
because when you go 360° around the Z axis you are changing your spin 
coordinate system as it were* Everybody knows what happens when you 
change your spin coordinate system by 360°: the sign changes, so you 
must not take those solutions which are single -valued, but rather 
those which change sign upon going around the circle. Those are just 
the half integral ones, and you get them quite straightforwardly. 
Podolsky:  Does anyone have any comment on this paper?  
Furry:  This is a very interesting point about the single -valuedness. 
When you use this representation, it turns out that it has to be 
double-valued and I know that Professor Merzbacher could make some 
further remarks on this.  It really has a bearing on these flux 
questions of Aharonov and Bohm. We might, perhaps, ask him whether he 
feels like extending his remarks a little bit. 
TH:AM-7 
Podolsky says, chuckling:  When you say everybody knows, well, I'm 
one of those that doesn't know. 
Furry:  Yes, this was, in fact, a great mystery to me.  I was very 
stupid about it.  Aharonov and Bohm in their second paper made a few 
obvious remarks which made me blush very much because I had not 
thought of them, but there is a good deal more to be said about it. 
This, for one thing, is something that Pauli did not discuss 
correctly at all in the first edition of his article in the 1933 or 32 
handbook, and it's one of the things that's considerably changed in 
the 1950 or 1951 edition.  I can't remember these years exactly. What 
one finds here and there in the literature mainly stems back to the 
incorrect discussion Pauli gave in the earlier version.  Professor 
Merzbacher knows all about this. 
 
the Elisha Mitchell Society. 
Furry continues:  Not quite so obscure, in the sense that all 
libraries have it. 
Merzbacher: Well, I don't have very much to add. 
Podolsky says: Well, this last point wasn't clear to me. 
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point is on the sphere, you have a different transformation. It's 
just a unitary transformation, and it has this singularity at the 
origin.  But anything that deals with spherical coordinates must 
have a singularity at the origin, of course.  
Merzbacher:  When you apply this transformation S, this operator. 
 
I solve the eigenvalue problem, how do I get the magnetic quantum 
number?" You just go through this differential equation and you 
 
from j  augment by 2p  then I should demand single valuedness, I 
should get back to what I had before.  And, if you do this, 
 
integer and we know very well that that's not so. 
Podolsky: Well, that part I understood perfectly well before. 
 
is nothing more than a boundary condition.  The thing that you 
have overlooked is that you have a new coordinate system.  In 
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the old coordinate system where Z was fixed, this was all right as 
a requirement of single valuedness. When you go around in a 
circle behind here like this and come back, then you should return 
to the same value of the wave function that you had before.  But 
now in the new representation where we're using the different 
coordinate system to describe the spin, we are using a coordinate 
axis of quantization which points in the radial direction 
wherever we are.  So as we travel around the point and return to 
the original place, we must change our axis of quantization. We 
are rotating the coordinate system.  Now in rotation of the 
coordinate system we know that as we go around by 2p  there is 
 
Podolsky:  This is the point I didn't know.  That is what seems 
to you perfectly obvious but not to me. 
Merzbacher:  Well, it's because the spin follows the half integral 
 
 
this spin in this direction, it's in an eigenstate.  When you 
take this electron and bodily move it around, rigidly, as it 
were, and bring it back to it's original position, physically 
nothing has changed, of course, but the wave function has changed 
360° there's a change of sign.  This is the famous sign change 
  
Comment on back of page 9 
(referring to page 10) 
TH:AM-10 
sign.  Equivalently when you rotate the coordinate system by 360° 
you have a new wave function which has a change in sign. This does 
not mean that the wave function of the particle with spin in the 
usual old representation is not single valued.  It is. But when you 
bodily move the system you must take this change of sign into 
account, and that's exactly what we have to do here. When we do go 
around 360°, we must change the sign.  The very single-valuedness 
requires us to put in this condition because as we go around there 
will be two changes of sign. Let me write down a typical state: 
( )2(0
ji
e ) I claim, is an eigenstate of angular momentum with m equals one-
half.  There are two changes of sign, and this is a single valued 
wave function. Why? It doesn't look like it. When you change phi 
by 360° there is, of course, a concomitant change of sign because 
the geometrical properties of spinors require an additional sign 
change which just compensates for this change of sign.  So we are 
back to the conclusion that 
 
Podolsky:  Yes. 
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Dirac:  I think this wave function is similar to the one... 
 
Dirac:  That's right.  
Merzbacher:  In fact, if you write down J2 in the new 
representation the eigenfunctions, the operator belongs to the 
symmetric top— 
 
that the single-valuedness of the wave function is not an 
artificial boundary condition that must be brought in afterwards 
somehow to get the right answer, but is quite deeply embedded 
in the principles of quantum mechanics. Why should one demand 
this single valuedness in the old representation or the change 
 
This has puzzled people and, as Professor Furry pointed out, was 
a source of puzzlement to Pauli, who certainly thought about 
this a great deal and made very different statements about it. 
Furry says: Well, Pauli, of course, did not hesitate to make 
statements even though he did not understand it, and this then 
was accepted at face value.  There were some assertions in the 
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1933 edition about currents flowing from pole to pole in the spherical 
coordinate system and strange inadmissable singularities. One finds 
these statements duplicated elsewhere, but if you just sit down and 
try real hard to find these strange things happening, they aren't 
happening.  This is not the reason that one excludes these half-
integral things for the ordinary Schrodinger electron. Now you see we 
may perhaps gradually get Professor Merzbacher to tell us more about 
it.  
Merzbacher: Will there be enough time?  
Dirac:  I think there will be. 
Merzbacher goes on:  This remark was just about the spin, where 
things are complicated.  It came to mind because of Professor Dirac's 
remarks about the fact that if one sat down and wrote out the radial 
equations in this representation, one might say something.  I don't 
know that one would, but the problem of single-valuedness, of course, 
faces you even if you have a 
 
integral values of angular momentum. What do we mean by single-
valuedness? I want to be quite specific.  I mean that given a wave 
function which is a function of the coordinates, as you follow it 
from point P on any closed curve back to the point, 
 
 
 this? People in the old days played with double-valued wave 
functions a good deal.  I think that Eddington had some ideas, 
too.  (To Dirac)  You, perhaps, can correct me on this.  His had 
something to do with the positive and negative nature of 
 
principles of quantum mechanics drive us to the assumption of single-
valuedness.  There is really no choice, because these fundamental 
principles, as I understand them, include one which says that for a 
particle without spin there is some such thing as a probability 
amplitude at a given point in space.  Once you have said this, there 
is no question about single-valuedness or double-valuedness. You 
cannot possibly have double-valuedness anymore at a point.  At a 
point there is, by definition, only me amplitude.  There cannot be 
two.  You can have two only if there is some additional degree of 
freedom that you have neglected in this description.  Then you might 
have two.  In other words, saying that when you go from this point P 
back to it and come up with a different value, it somehow means that 
you are no longer talking about a particle having just X, Y, Z as 
it's complete set of dynamical variables. 
Aharonov:  This quite certainly is not satisfactory.  If only the 
wave amplitude changes sign when you go around with no change in any 
probability, there is no physical meaning that can be 
TH:AM-13 
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connected with this change of sign.  So it might appear, at least 
at first sight. 
 
quantum mechanics as we know it anymore, if you so say that. 
Aharonov:  No. 
Podolsky:  I think you are begging the question. 
Merzbacher says:  No, I don't think I am. 
Podolsky says: You're questioning the assumption of single-
valuedness.  You're saying that the single-valuedness comes in 
because we assume the probability amplitude to be single-valued. 
Essentially, that is what you are saying. 
 
general state can be expanded in terms of probability amplitudes 
that pertain to a particular point. That is, for every point in 
space there is a certain probability amplitude for a given state. 
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Dirac:  I think you might say that if the coordinates X, Y, and 
 
valued. 
Merzbacher:  That's what I am saying.  I think there is really 
nothing else to be said about it.  
Dirac:  If they are just mathematical parameters... 
Furry:  There is a great deal more to be said about it.  I've never 
heard you use this argument before.  I don't think it's in your 
paper, and I don't particularly like it myself.  
Merzbacher: You see, there are arguments which some people 
consider stronger.  I consider them weaker, actually.  I'll 
present one.  
Von Roos:  Maybe the argument would be all right if you say a 
particle is a simple representation of the rotation group. A 
spinless particle is a scalar, and a scalar can only be single-
valued. 
Aharonov: It's like saying a wave function has to be single-
valued. 
Merzbacher:  I agree with Professor Dirac. 
Podolsky: No, let's not get away from this point. You could pretty 
well say that probability is single-valued, instead of saying 
probability amplitude is single-valued. 
Merzbacher:  Quantum mechanics does not say that.  It is a 
separate assumption. 
can see it really is an assumption. 
Merzbacher: Yes, it is an assumption, but I think it is 
implicit in these postulates that there exists a probability 
amplitude. You can't have that and then still admit double-
valuedness.  
Dirac:  I think I would agree.  If you take any representation 
in terms of any observable quantities, then the wave function 
has to be single-valued. 
Merzbacher:  There is no question any more. Now, people 
have...  
Aharonov says:  Now wait a minute. What you understand is not 
clear. You want to say that if we only specify that all the 
observables have to be single-valued, we shall wind up with a 
single-valued wave-function? 
Dirac:  If you are dealing with observable quantities, yes.  
Aharonov says:  I would like to... 
Dirac:  If you have it expressed in terms of any observables 
q, you can infer that Y  as a function of q, has to be single-
valued. 
Aharonov:  This I don't see. 
Dirac: Well, otherwise you can't add together two states in an 
unambiguous way. 
Aharonov:  If one of the states is...  
Furry:  All the states are double-valued. 
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Von Roos says:  In the Dirac equation you can represent the 
spinor by a scalar and make the gamma matrices vectors. This 
has been 
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Aharonov:  Then I can't see how it's possible that... 
Dirac:  No, you don't have a unique sum for two wave functions, 
if there is an ambiguity in sign attached to each of them... 
Aharonov says:  Right.  It depends upon what kind of theory you 
are taking.  If there is more than one sheet in space then are you 
allowed to add all these functions on the same sheet. 
Dirac:  Then you are bringing in further observables. 
 
Someone says:  You have said that there is, in addition to x, y, 
and z, another observable.  Then you say:  I have a particle 
which has but three observables x, y, and z which are a complete 
commuting set, then you have it.  There is no choice anymore. 
Dirac:  Yes, I think you both have the important point.  If a set 
of observables is complete, then the wave function in terms of 
those observables has to be single-valued. Otherwise, you don't 
have a unique process for the addition of wave functions. 
Merzbacher: May I add a sort of philosophical point to this? 
 
there is no choice anymore.  Then if Furry would be convinced by 
the mathematical arguments... 
Furry:  I already know those mathematical arguments and found 
them convincing.  This is a very interesting way to say it and 
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I'm beginning to be convinced. 
Dirac:  The basic assumption is that there is a unique sum for 
two wave functions. 
Furry:  Yes.  One does find, of course, immediately from the 
requirement that operators be Hermitian, that if just one wave 
function out of all the ones you are using is double-valued, then 
they must all be double-valued.  This is indeed the case.  
Dirac:  Then you really have another variable coming in. 
Merzbacher:  That's right.  In fact there is a real physical 
example of this that's a model of such a situation, namely, when 
you talk about the quantum mechanics of rigid bodies.  A truly 
rigid body has an additional degree of freedom as it were. The 
difference between a point particle and rigid body in this 
situation is that when you go around in a circle and come back, 
you express it in terms of representations of the rotation group 
because you use group-theoretical language.  You can contract 
this loop to a zero loop continuously, and there can surely be 
no particular significance to having the z axis stick out here. 
This is why the half integral values of angular momentum are 
excluded normally.  I'll write down a wave function and you'll 
see it very quickly. 
Furry:  I like this argument.  It's one I even thought of myself. 
Merzbacher;  This is an eigenfunction for the differential 
 
  
Furry says:  For many other reasons. 
Merzbacher:  For many other reasons.  Pauli excluded it because 
 
Merzbacher:  Yes.  When you apply any L operator to this, the 
result on the right-hand side should be a linear combination 
 
sub-space so to speak. 
Furry:  Well, I think it works out worse than that, Eugen, I 
think it becomes singular. 
Merzbacher:  Well, it becomes singular but I think that is no 
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of course, and L is one-half.  This looks like a description of 
think it has no place in the theory.  But, then if you don't 
it.  One has to have these things as representations of the rota-
tion group. 
Merzbacher says:  That's right. 
Furry:  You have to have these things as representations of 
the rotation group.  You will not be able to apply any finite 
rotation. 
 
admissible operator. 
Furry:  You will not be able to apply any finite rotation.  When 
you express a finite rotation as an exponential containing an 
angular momentum operator, it means you have an infinite series. 
But that means you must be able to apply arbitrarily high powers 
of the angular momentum operator, and you never can apply 
arbitrarily high powers here.  As soon as you go to some 
modest power this function becomes inadmissible. 
Merzbacher:  I think it's cute, but I think it's unnecessary 
as an argument. 
Aharonov:  May I add some side thoughts to this argument?  It 
is probably true that if one wants to have some meaning for a 
non-single-valued wave function, one has to add an extra degree 
of freedom.  Take the following cases  a force, Fv , that has 
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a quantum theory corresponding to such a thing? Well, it's 
really something that is not given by the usual theory.  So we 
have a case that can be solved classically but not quantum 
mechanically.  But perhaps by being willing to discuss non-
single-valued wave functions one might do it.  Let us take a case 
 
everywhere else you can describe it by a potential which is not 
single-valued.  You have a new degree of freedom which appears 
only in the quantum case, and which tells you how many 
 
One can then quantize it with a non-single-valued Hamiltonian 
and find non-single-valued solutions that will have an extra 
degree of freedom.  The lesson is that when quantizing a 
system like this, one finds not only the points of space that 
are observable but also the number of times the particle 
 
Rosen:  I think your first argument is the most convincing 
one.  The wave function has to be single-valued, because 
 
ambiguous.  However, if you have a multiply-connected region, I 
see no reason why you could not have a double-valued function, 
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Merzbacher:  I certainly accept that.  That is, if you have a 
space where a cylinder will be cut out so that you can never 
penetrate it.  This, of course, is no longer the space in which 
we have defined x, y and z or a complete set of variables. That's 
quite true.  This is an additional specification.  That this is 
an additional degree of freedom for the cylinder, I don't deny at 
all. We have such a space in the quantum mechanics 
 
of an understood model.  In this case we agree that there are 
such things as truly rigid bodies which are not made up of 
particles which you could in principle squeeze together.  Then 
we understand that this rigid body knows the difference between 
going around the circle once and going around twice.  There is a 
physical way of distinguishing whether a rigid body has rotated 
360° or whether it has rotated 720°.  Do you want me to make a 
model? 
Furry:  Well, I just don't understand it.  It gets back to the 
same condition, doesn't it? 
 
who can say this much better. 
Furry:  Be classical if you want to.  I'm just stupid. 
Merzbacher:  (to Dirac)  Do you know it? 
Dirac:  You have a rigid body in any shape you like.  You have 
strings fastened to different points on it which go out to 
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fixed points at some great distance away in space, quite long 
strings, of course.  If this rigid body is rotated twice, you get the 
strings tangled up, but you can disentangle them with out cutting 
them.  If you rotate it just once, the strings are tangled up in such 
a way that you just cannot disentangle them 
 
Merzbacher:  This was known to Hamilton and he gave a fine 
description of it. 
Podolsky:  The strings of it are attached at the ends? 
Merzbacher: What I am saying is this, Professor Podolsky. 
When you have a rigid body and make a 360° rotation, it comes 
back to it's original position, of course. But there is no 
way of shrinking this operation to the null operation.  It 
is not possible. Whereas, if you rotate it by 720°, there is a 
way which I cannot describe, of shrinking that twofold rotation 
to the null rotation, no rotation at all. 
Aharonov: Of course, somebody who did not know it before will 
not be clarified about it now. What does it mean to shrink 
something to nothing? 
Merzbacher: O.K., well what would be a quantum mechanical 
model? There is a model that is used all the time in modern 
physics, and that is the collective model of the nucleus, where 
 
 before, the wave function of the spin one-half particle will 
change sign. Therefore, the relative phase will have changed 
between a rigid body and a single particle wave function.  This 
is actually observable. When you rotate twice you have restored 
the sign and you can no longer distinguish that from doing nothing 
at all. 
Furry: But now it's the spin half particle that's to blame for 
this? 
Merzbacher: Well, I'm just giving you one possible conceptual 
way of making a physical measurement of this.  It would be a 
globe to which is attached a spin half particle.  Then when 
you rotate the globe around there is a relative phase change, and 
we know from our earlier discussion that such things are 
observable. 
Dirac: Well, it's really because of these topological properties 
that spin half exists. 
Merzbacher says:  That's right. 
Dirac: And no other fraction of spin exists besides the spin 
one-half. 
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functions with half-integrals...  I wish Professor Wigner were here, 
he'd straighten us all out on this. Anyway, now you have 
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Merzbacher:   I'll point out one thing that Pauli said very 
nicely about the difference between the half-integral and the 
integral ones. Again it's the same sort of thing really, but 
it's amusing.  Suppose you go from a coordinate system like 
this to a new coordinate system with a zl axis and with xl yl 
 
coordinate system to the other.  Now Pauli points out that 
such a relation cannot hold when 1 is half integral, so there 
are no spherical harmonics for half-integral spins.  And the 
way he points it out is very nice, I think. He says suppose 
you go around a loop (here we have our famous loop) and 
circle the zl axis.  That will change every sign over here, 
but it 
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will do nothing over here because we dan draw a loop which does circle 
the z1 axis and not the z axis.  Therefore, this relation cannot hold 
and there is no representation of the half integral quantum numbers. 
Furry:  And besides this, there is the tangling of the strings which 
also tells us about the difference between 360° and 720°, 
and which is good enough for the not very erudite.  
Merzbacher: Well, there are many places where this is explained.  One 
way of seeing it comes from Professor Wigner's talk. Did you hear it?  
Furry:  I did. 
Merzbacher:  Have you looked at Professor Wigner's book?  
Furry: I have looked at Professor Wigner's book. 
 
with the fact that you know the three-dimensional rotation-group has 
something to do with the surface of a four-dimensional sphere. Two 
rotations which are at opposite poles correspond to the same ultimate 
result, but you have to draw the strings on the surface of a sphere, 
you can't collapse the mapping.  That's 
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one way of looking at it, Apparently the most physical way of 
looking at it is by using Hamilton's, what were they called?  
Someone says:  Three-point variables? 
Merzbacher: No, I don't think so. Are you familiar with it 
Professor Dirac? He gave a physical picture of this and, in 
fact, he applied it to the point. 
Dirac:  I'm not familiar with Hamilton's, but there is a model which 
was given by Miss Ehrenfest, Professor Ehrenfest's daughter, showing 
how two rotations can be continuously shrunk up to no motion at all.  
Suppose you have two cones, one of them a fixed cone and the other 
one rolling around the fixed cone. The two cones have the same 
vertical angle.  (He draws on blackboard) .  This is the fixed cone 
and you take a second cone like 
 
back in it's original position.  Here we have a motion of a 
rigid body which brings it back to it's original position, 
whatever a  is.  Now let us suppose that a  changes continuously 
 
this cone will be very thin , like this, and the moving cone 
just makes two revolutions about an axis, because it's just like 
two pennies on the table rolling one around the other.  It's 
made two revolutions when it goes around, not just one.  So 
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when a  equals naught we have two revolutions about an axis. 
 
moving one now makes just a very slight wobble when a  is nearly 
p, and when a  is equal to p, it makes no motion at all.  This 
is a continuous way of passing from two revolutions to no motion 
at all.  It is impossible to pass in any continuous way from one 
revolution to no motion at all.  
Merzbacher:  That's a beautiful example.  
Dirac:  If it was possible to pass continuously from one 
revolution to no motion at all, there wouldn't be any half-spin. 
 
principles of the single valuedness of the wave function.  It 
comes from our accepting as a general principle that our states 
correspond to vectors in Hilbert space.  Any two vectors have a 
unique sum if we have any representation of these vectors, 
provided it is a complete representation involving single valued 
 
in the representation.  We might now have a short break. 
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Podolsky: Mr. Shimony can tell us something about his ideas on 
the theory of measurement.  He tells me that it's more 
speculative than the other things we heard, and I rather like 
that fact.  
Shimony:  Bohr and Heisenberg pointed out that the peculiar 
problems that come up in interpreting complementary phenomena 
force us to be aware of epistemological problems in the 
foundations of physics in a way in which we, perhaps, were not 
so aware before. I think this is true, but I think the emphasis 
on epistemological problems, in the present foundation of 
physics, is partial wisdom. I think it's very important but 
it's not the whole story, because we have very good reason for 
thinking that human beings are part of nature, and that if we 
want to have a thorough understanding of human beings, as 
capable of knowledge, we have to know where these particular 
creatures fit, in the natural scheme of things 
Now, philosophers have a word for theory of being, as 
contrasted with theory of knowledge.  It is called 
'Ontology.'  I use the expression from time to time. If 
there were nothing in the world but physical entities, then 
ontology would be physics. But since there is some reason 
for believing that there are mental entities, 
 
 
comprehensive.  This is the study of what things there are -- 
in view of the fact that human beings are just one set of 
creatures among many in nature.  I feel that a thorough-going 
epistemology 
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presupposes some sort of ontology and vice versa.  That is, I 
think that one isn't going to have a complete ontology without 
understanding the conditions of knowledge.  There is a sort of 
mutual pre- 
 
I find passages in Bohr in which he speaks as if these two 
investigations are complementary in some generalized sense; that 
one can look into human beings as knowers (and that's one 
investigation) or one can look into them as physical creatures in 
the world (and that's another investigation) and they can't be 
done simultaneously; there's complementarity between them. A sort 
of fanciful historical note is that complementarity in this sense 
can be found in Kant, who has a Critique of Pure Reason and a 
Critique of Practical Reason.  In the Critique of Pure Reason 
there's epistemology without ontology.  In the Critique of 
Practical Reason there is a consideration of human beings as real 
entities. 
Well, with this general point of view, what I am interested 
in, in my own work, is to explore the various possibilities of 
quantum mechanics as it is now formulated, and to see if any of 
them are in principle capable of being understood, not just as 
epistemological theories, but also as ontologies. 
 
mechanics of the sort that Professor Wigner was talking about, the 
sort proposed by von Neumann, in which an observer plays an 
essential 
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which one understands the role of the observer? That is, can one 
have a kind of generalized psychology, if you will, which 
incorporates the data we now have about the psychological behavior 
of human beings, and also the attributions of the power of an 
observer to 
interpretations.  But I won't try that; I leave it to anyone else 
who wishes to do it. 
tation, the one that Professor Wigner was suggesting, the one which 
takes quantum mechanics absolutely literally, which says that even when 
one is dealing with macroscopic physical objects the formalism 
that the reduction of the wave packet does not come at the time of 
the interaction of the physical instrument with a system, but at the 
time that the observer intervenes. 
Now, let's ask, can one sketch out in general terms an ontology in 
which one understands physical things, and also the observer as 
 
two different points of view.  One, what we know about single 
observers. Do we know anything about the ordinary activity of the 
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human mind which makes it reasonable to think that it can perform 
of mind can one think of that one might refer to? Well, one thing 
that one might think of is the fact that under certain conditions 
human perceptions are vague, and under other conditions they are 
distinct.  And one might suppose that vagueness is roughly 
comparable to a superposition in which there are eigenstates 
corresponding to different values of macroscopic observables. And 
precision in per- 
only one eigenstate of a macroscopic observer. 
 
for precision of perception are conditions like having the lights 
turned on, being attentive, being in a fairly good emotional 
state, etc., and conditions for vagueness are just those in which 
these conditions, or one or the other, is missing. 
 
of sharp perceptions if the ordinary conditions for perception are 
good, and a vague perception if the ordinary conditions are 
bad.*(see footnote) 
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of, appears between the first input and vagueness, and the second 
input and precision.  Nothing at all. 
So let's try another possibility.  This is even more fanciful. 
 
ditions? Well, I'll mention Freud's theory of the dream world.  In 
 
in which both are present, both are clear, there is no blurring, 
there is no contradiction.  But somehow, they are both present. 
 
hold at all.  For one thing, the order is all wrong.  Take a case 
in which presumably the input was of the second sort.  The input 
 
And so here are two possibilities.  Now, let us mention a third,  
which is of a quite a different sort.  Various philosophers and some 
physicists in speculative moods, Schrodinger, for example, in his book, 
Mind and Matter, and Bergson, Creative Evolution, and others, suggested 
that, mind is precisely that aspect of nature in which there is 
spontaneity. 
We wish to say, there is a stochastic element.  And certain 
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our circulation has become mechanical beyond our control.  
Therefore, for the most part we have no consciousness connected 
with the operation of circulation.  Our musculature is pretty 
much under our control.  There is a certain amount of 
spontaneity, and therefore, consciousness is connected with it.  
Some processes are somewhere in between.  Breathing, for 
example, is somewhere in between these; presumably if breathing 
became more mechanical, it would lapse 
 
is acquiring a new skill, one has to concentrate on it; one is 
conscious of what one is doing at the beginning, and after the 
skill has become very deeply ingrained, it has left 
consciousness. 
 
troubles of two sorts. One is the difficulty that maybe there is 
depth of our mind, introspection reveals no more spontaneity, 
no more chance elements, no more creativity, when our input is 
of the  
 
introspection is often very deceptive.  And the other is a 
biological argument, namely, we have evidence which is mounting 
and mounting, that the properties of large scale entities and 
large scale organisms can be explained in terms of properties of 
small scale 
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Recent progress in microbiology, of course, is marvelous in this 
way.  Now suppose that creativity, or a spontaneous element, or a 
stochastic element is a characteristic of large scale organisms; how 
could this be the case if it weren't already in some minor way 
characteristic of small scale things? It could be if this creativity 
were a structural property. When one builds a television set out of 
condensers and so on, to say that the characteristic of being a 
television set isn't to be attributed to the components, is trivial. 
This is because the characteristic of being a television set is 
structural, whereas a stochastic element, the property of behaving 
somewhat spontaneously in no way appears to be structural.  So if one 
expects to find this property in large organisms, there is no reason 
for expecting not to find it in their very small components. 
If this is so, then one would guess that the Schrodinger 
equation, which is a deterministic equation for the evolution of a 
 
And this in turn leads me beyond the theories which I am considering. 
That is, I am considering only interpretations of quantum mechanics 
which leave the formalism intact, which don't say that the formalism 
 
have you, which modify the content. 
 
we have no present account of the nature of mind which in any way 
incorporates known psychological evidence, plus the extra character- 
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istic of reducing wave packets.  Now, let me mention just one 
other type of consideration, namely, what happens when you ask, not 
about a single observer but, about a community of them.  That is, 
we would be very unhappy if the formalism of quantum mechanics did 
lead us to solipsism or to something bizarre like a society of 
solipsists.  I think there is a kind of gregariousness in human 
beings, but, carrying gregariousness to the point of forming a 
society of solipsists would be something which I wouldn't understand 
very well. 
Dirac:  What are solipsists? I don't know what you mean. 
Shimony:  Well, a solipsist is one who believes that there is 
nothing in the universe but himself and his own perceptions? a 
society of them would be a rare thing. 
Podolsky: (to Dirac)  If I were a solipsist I would think you are 
only a product of my imagination. 
Aharonov:  Therefore, you wouldn't mind destroying him, because it's 
only an effect on the imagination? 
Podolsky:  That doesn't follow. 
Aharonov:  No?  (Chuckling) 
Furry:  I have some times thought the traffic in Harvard Square 
seems to be made up of solipsists in the background, driving all 
the cars.  (laughter) 
Shimony:  Well, let each one of us try to wish away the others. 
Guth:  We consider a solipsist to be extremely egocentric. 
Shimony:  Very well, let's think about the problems that come up. 
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If we don't assume solipsism, there are, I think, some rather severe 
ones.  I'll now mention a kind of gedanken experiment which 
Professor Wigner has talked about.  Some of you may have heard it 
before, but I hoped he would talk about it here.  Suppose there is 
nothing in the formalism of quantum mechanics which says the 
instrument you use has to be a particular kind of electronic or a 
physical device. Why not use a friend as an instrument? Namely, you 
suppose that a photon if it's right circularly polarized passes 
through an analyzer, and that if it's left circular it does not. If 
it's in a state of linear polarization, it half does and half 
 
is initially in a linear polarized state.  Fine.  Now, how do you 
use your instrument? You use your instrument in the way you 
use any macroscopic instrument; you look at it or you ask the right 
questions, and in particular in the case of a friend, you ask him 
the question, "did you or did you not see the flash?" If he says, 
"yes," then there is such a transition.  For you, the wave packet—or 
if you prefer it, the state—which was a superposition of 
polarization states of the photon plus correlated states of the 
apparatus including analyzer and friend, is now reduced by this 
answer.  Fine.  Now you might ask one further question, "Did you see 
it before I asked you?"  The friend says, "But don't you believe 
me? I told you I saw the flash!"  But, you insist.  He says, "Of 
course I did see the flash long before you asked me." Now how are 
you to interpret 
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his answer? There are a number of possibilities, all of them trouble-
some, all of them leading to some sort of doubt as to whether we have an 
adequate sketch of an ontological theory which incorporates observers.  
One possibility is, no matter what answers the friend gives to you, you 
simply treat them behavioristically, you merely treat him as an 
apparatus.  You don't endow him with any feelings. 
him, he had already made up his mind; that your asking was not what 
reduced the wave packet.  Now, if this is so, then we have something 
which, prior to the ultimate reduction of the wave packet in the 
ultimate observer, there would be a reduction of the wave packet in 
the apparatus.  Well, this seems to indicate that somewhere or 
another, a non-linearity has crept into the quantum mechanics... 
either there is a non-linearity in the sense of a limitation on the 
superposition principle, or there is a non-linearity in the 
Schrodinger equations which governs the propagation of states. 
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Someone asks: Why did you assume that it had not collapsed 
completely when he decides? 
 
the ultimate observer's standpoint.  He's describing the situation 
with a mixture.  He doesn't know all there is to know.  He knows 
with probability half the friend observes so and so, with probability 
half that he didn't.  But the objective situation is one in which 
one or another of the situations envisaged in the mixture is the 
case.  This we know is quite different. 
Someone:  In other words you know that he has already decided this 
but, you don't know what he saw; 
Shimony:  That's right, what I'm saying now, is that if you take 
his report literally, if you believe that he saw before you asked 
him the question, then from your point of view he is in a mixture, 
while from his point of view, he is already in a pure state.  The 
question is, which one. 
Aharonov:  Will you discuss, in relation to this, Everett's 
lines? 
Shimony:  I think that this is an entirely different analysis from 
Everett's. 
Aharonov:  According to Everett there would be no difficulty. 
Shimony:  Right, but look, this is quite a different analysis from 
Everett's, because Everett really doesn't make reduction of the 
 is one of the possible ways of analyzing this Gedanken experiment. 
That's all.  Let me mention one or two more and then we have them 
all before us and then I have very little more to say, except that 
any choice among these several alternatives seems equally bad. 
Guth:  What is this specific reason for the difference between you 
and Everett? 
Shimony:  Let me get to that later.  Let's just survey the possibili-
ties now, there aren't many more anyway.  One possibility is that we 
deny any attribution of feelings to the friend, we treat him purely 
behavioristically.  That's certainly a possibility and we won't rule 
it out, but it certainly is in conflict with many of our instincts and 
our presuppositions.  Another possibility is, that the reduction of 
the wave packet has occurred before the ultimate subject entered on 
the scene. Now this could indicate that... 
Furry:  That would mean that there would be a mixed state for you, 
although a pure state for the friend. 
Shimony:  It would indicate a limitation on the formalism of quantum 
mechanics; that some non-linearity has crept in.  Therefore, our 
initial premise that the formalism of quantum mechanics is to be kept 
absolutely intact, has been violated.  
Furry:  Well, it has been violated only because a sentient observer... 
Shimony: Yes, a sentient observer as contrasted with an instrument 
enters 
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wave packet a part of the formalism. 
 this case, or the friend.  That is certainly a possibility. 
Furry:  It promptly became a pure state. 
Shimony:  That's right. 
Furry:  It promptly became a pure state for the friend. 
Shimony:  That's right. 
Furry:  It also promptly became exactly a mixed state for you. 
Shimony:  That's right. 
Furry:  And then you ask him the question.  It was the reduction of 
the Gibbs ensemble not the reduction of the wave packet. 
Shimony:  Yes, exactly.  And this gets into quite a different line 
of troubles than the ones we have been talking about before.  Here 
the trouble becomes one of causal ordering of the operations of the 
various observers.  And here I think the situation is very similar 
to the one viewed in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox when the 
two parts of the system were separated so far that the act of 
observation of the two parts are outside each other's light cone. 
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Y taking it afterwards? they go apart, and Y looks at his film before 
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Shimony:  It looks as if there is... 
Furry:  I don't see why we should have Lorentz invariance in this 
case, because there are many, I mean all the good old popular examples 
of relativity sound very non-invariant in the experiences of the 
people.  They always say, A and B are in relative motion, A sees B's 
clock running too slow and B sees A's clock running too slow, you can 
very well have these people's eyes observing these systems far apart 
and also being themselves in different states of motion, and each one 
could honestly say that he observed it first.  
Shimony:  Yea, but here there is a causal connection...  
Furry:  There is not a causal connection, there is only a correlation. 
They are both observing the same thing. 
Shimony:  Maybe in Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen there is, but, not in this. 
In this there is a causal connection.  
Furry:  But both observed  the same thing. 
Aharonov:  Suppose one observable is sigma X and the other is sigma Y. 
Furry:  Oh, in that case it doesn't matter, they'll have no corre-
lation and nothing to check.  Either there is a correlation upon 
which everybody can agree and which it really doesn't matter who 
observes first, or else there is no correlation and again it doesn't 
matter who you say observes first.  So let the observers have their 
different opinions. 
Podolsky:  I think we should let Mr. Shimony tell us what he has in 
mind before we go on to something else. 
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Shimony:  This is worth following further.  My argument is that if 
the first observer finally has some report register on his con-
sciousness he is the one who is responsible for the reduction of 
the wave packet, and then there is a causal connection between the 
two observers; and if we are to take this connection in the same 
sense at the causal connection in special relativity, it gets us 
 
who's the one who caused it? 
Furry:  Each can say that he is first, or each can say the other is 
first.  Each can think that he is first, or each can think that the 
other is first. 
Aharonov:  Well, then, you claim that this reduction of the wave 
packet is something that will never be observed. 
Shimony:  Then I don't think you can attribute a causal action to 
the first observer. 
Furry:  I have grave doubt, as to whether one can say, that there 
is anything for which the word causal can properly be used. 
Shimony:  Well, look, I don't like this alternative either.  I'm 
just exploring the various possibilities, and all of them seem to 
be troublesome.  Let me mention just one more alternative, namely, 
that the reduction of the wave packet does not occur, that the 
superposition remains.  This is one of the cases which Ludwig talks 
about, where from the standpoint of the ultimate observer, there is 
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just no way of telling the difference between a superposition and a 
mixture.  He thinks the right way of describing the friend's state 
is a mixture.  He's wrong, it's a superposition, but he's not badly 
wrong, because it doesn't make any difference.  I think I don't like 
this because I think again this means changing, giving up one's 
literal belief in what the friend said.  That is, what you are 
attributing to the friend's state of mind is a kind of 
indefiniteness corresponding to a superposition.  He was saying, no, 
there's no indefiniteness, and you're not taking his report 
seriously.  So I conclude that if one is willing to give up our 
ordinary premises regarding inter- 
 
case where a human observer intervenes.  Well, anyway, I summarize 
by saying that if you ask, as I did in the beginning, for a 
kind of ontological theory in which one not only uses the 
observer 
as a black box, to do certain things, but wants to have an 
 
blind alleys; and I, for one, do not see the way out, and I would 
be very happy for anybody to sketch ways out.  There is one possi-
bility, of course, that is, not to be so rigorous.  Let's change the 
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formalism of quantum mechanics at some point.  Bad or good, that's 
a possibility, but it's not one about which I want to talk about. 
That's going in an entirely different direction. 
Aharonov:  You will say a few words about what Everett makes the 
reduction of the wave packet? 
Shimony:  Everett simply doesn't.  Everett makes the reduction of the 
wave packet not an ultimate thing.  That is, ultimately the universe 
has one state, and its propagation is governed by the Schrodinger 
equation. What seems like reduction is really only appearance versus 
reality.  Namely, at one of the crucial junctures where reduction 
seems to occur, or appear, one has a branching of the relative state, 
that is, the state having left out part of the universe, in various 
directions.  Now as to that, there are various questions which one can 
ask.  One is, is awareness associated with only one of these, but not 
with all of them? That's certainly a possibility.  Everett's answer 
was no, so maybe we shouldn't even consider that.  He says, no, if 
there is awareness, it is equally associated with every possibility. 
Aharonov:  In that case then, each possibility doesn't know about the 
others, each possibility has no way to know the others.  
Shimony:  That's right, and if this is the case, well, it seems to me 
that the thing to ask is how is a situation as visualized in one of 
the branches to be distinguished operationally, or by any other way, 
from a situation in which you don't suppose that the other branches 
are real, but only suppose that there is one branch 
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where a stochastic jump has occurred.  In other words, what are the 
differences, if any, between one part of it which is enclosed in 
one branch and one part of it which is enclosed in 
another branch? What is the difference from that standpoint between 
his theory of multiple branching, and the theory which has only one 
 
no difference observationally, there is only a difference logically, 
and his claim is that the theory he is proposing is more logical. 
Well, I don't know what this means.  I think that if you have two 
 
ways of talking about the same thing.  One way is more elaborate 
in its terminology than the other.  I think one should invoke Occam's 
 
be multiplied beyond necessity.  And my feeling is that among the 
entities which aren't to be multiplied unnecessarily are histories 
 
Aharonov:  I don't see that you point to any inconsistencies.  The 
question is, are there any inconsistencies? 
Shimony:  I think that my answer is that either there is not a very 
apparent equivalence between his way of talking and a way of talking 
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is one place where it's certainly reasonable to invoke Occam's razor. 
Podolsky:  Dr. Band. 
Shimony:  No, there seems to be a possibility that when this branching 
occurs most of them are dead and one is alive, but he doesn't want to 
say this; he wants to say that in the other branch he made a foolish 
decision or in the other branch he made a wise decision, whatever 
comfort that would be to you.  And in the other branch you were aware of 
your faulty decision. 
Podolsky:  There seems to me to be a possibility that when you have two 
observers simultaneously observing an instrument, that both of them 
produce reduction of a wave packet, but not the same wave packet. In 
other words the wave function may be a sufficiently subjective sort of 
a thing, so each observer produces a wave packet for his 
own consideration. 
Shimony:  Fine, that's one of the possibilities but, then I ask 
what is it in the nature of things that allows intersubjective 
agreement? Is it what Leibniz has called, 'pre-established harmony?' 
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Well, that's a desperate and quite ad hoc answer.  Ordinarily we 
believe in an agreement between us when we make an observation, that 
certain physical conditions for the observation are the same for us.  
That is, there is something there that we are both observing, and there 
is similarity enough to describe it.  
Podolsky:  I see the difficulty. 
Shimony:  If you are leaving that out, it's truly hard to see what 
guarantees the intersubjective agreement, that is, if you make your wave 
function subjective for you, and my wave function subjective for me. 
Kaiser Kunz:  That isn't so bad because if you wanted to find out, 
 
 
 
Podolsky would have his wave function which he would study and I 
Shimony;  I go back now to my original philosophical supposition, 
responsibility of giving an overall picture of the world in which 
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Kunz:  I'm glad you mentioned it because I think it ties in with 
the theory. 
Shimony:  May I give Goedel's answer.  His conclusion is that 
mathematics is not merely a matter of axiomatization. Which means 
 
interpretation of his own proof, of his own results; but, I'm citing 
Goedel. 
Furry:  Physics certainly includes enough mathematics to include 
the postulates of Goedel's theorem. 
Shimony:  For a theory of inscriptions anyway, and these are macroscopic 
problems. 
Furry:  I should think that in the admittedly woefully incomplete state 
of our knowledge we are to accept his conclusions with con- 
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siderably more excuse than the mathematicians could accept it. That 
is they are dealing with something which ought to be under the 
control of their mind, and we're at the mercy of the new experi-
mental facts, so we have more excuse for having a theory which is 
sort of open-ended than they have. 
Shimony:  Well, anyway I don't know how much more there is to say 
here.  I try to do this with each of the interpretations that I 
consistency, just as classical mechanics is consistent as long as one 
doesn't try to push it too far.  I think there is consistency in 
many of these interpretations but, if you ask the question, "Is 
there a consistent extension of them to other than physical reality, 
to reality embracing conscious beings?" I just see many blind 
alleys. 
Perhaps the moral of this is that there is a kind of complementarity 
of Bohr's form 
 
Furry:  May I make a brief comment? 
Podolsky:  Sure. 
Furry:  I hope this will be made available somehow for our perusal. 
Shimony:  Well, I. 
Furry:  If these proceedings are going to be published, 
Shimony:  I have a paper entitled "The Incompleteness of the Philo- 
sophical Framework of Quantum Mechanics," * (see footnote) but, as 
is the physics, 
my paper is incomplete.  (Chuckles in the background) 
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Furry:  I was out of the room when you started your talk, and I 
don't know just what the postulates were, but it sounds as if the 
postulate is, that some human or at least sentient observation is 
the only stage at which...  
Shimony:  No, no, no, no.  
Furry:  At which the wave function is... 
Shimony:  The rules of the game are only two.  The rules of the 
game are, let's take quantum mechanics as it now stands absolutely 
literally—that's one.  The other rule of the game is, don't intro- 
 
that black box.  Those are the only two rules of the game.  Then I 
said I would like to look at all possible interpretations of 
quantum mechanics consistent with these two rules, but I only 
looked at one, the only one which I took up in great detail, namely, 
the one Professor Wigner was sketching, in which the reduction of 
the wave packet occurred in cognition. 
Furry:  Professor Wigner's statement of it sounded, to me, quite 
anthropocentric, and I would certainly be inclined to say that, 
whatever the fields in which there is controversy, the greatest 
importance is attached to questions as to what difference there is 
between a human being or a sentient being, and some other very 
complicated physical-chemical system.  This doesn't seem to me to 
be one of them.  I should say that the essential feature of the 
human observer as the thing that reduces the wave packet is that 
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he is a very complicated system which we are not able to analyze 
in complete detail, and many other things such as a photographic 
plate, geiger counter complete with amplifier and so on, and many, 
in fact, all our large scale pieces of apparatus have this in 
common with human beings, and many, in fact all the usual large 
scale pieces of apparatus have this in common with humans.  
Shimony:  Well, that's essentially Ludwig's answer.  And one of 
the various ones Bohr gave, I think.  I read Bohr at different 
times in different ways but I think this is one of his answers. 
Furry:  Now, the transition would seem to me to be somehow like the 
step from a completely detailed kinetic theory in which one keeps 
track of all the particles and uses detailed description of just 
exactly what goes on in the system, and a statistical mechanical 
or thermodynamical treatment in which one uses fewer parameters. 
Now the difficulty that seems to arise is that we have no sketch, 
as you say, of a theory of just how this change goes but, do we 
have exactly such a sketch of a theory in the case of a change 
from detailed kinetic theory to statistical mechanics? Of course, 
we can show how to get the same answers mathematically, but it 
seems to me we do not have any such an epistemological theory of 
the change from one to the other. 
Shimony:  I think there is an essential difference in the case of 
the relation between statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, but 
we do have some pretty good ideas of why most of the 3n conserved 
quantities are observable, or not observable, on a large or a small 
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scale, whereas, the few in which thermodynamics is 
interested are; this is largely a physical theory, not an 
epistemological theory.  
Furry:  It is a mathematical truth that you will get right 
answers if you use statistical methods.  But, aren't those 
results proof enough that we'll get right answers if we use 
statistical methods here? Maybe, it's a simple method here. 
Aharonov:  After you can use a mixed state and you can 
get the right results.  I mean there is... 
(There is extremely loud explosion outside;  Bang!!!  
followed by fifteen seconds of silence.) 
Aharonov:  Are we all agreeing that there was something, an 
explosion here, or (laughter)...  Is everybody here on this 
same branch (referring to Everett's theory). 
Furry:  Whether it's necessary for such a loud bang to be 
associated with that observation, or whether a smaller one 
would suffice...  
Podolsky:  Dr. Band, you wanted to say something. 
 
a functional, a function of functions.  A mixture is a 
function not of the wave function or maybe a function all of 
the wave function.   (note by Shimony concerning the last paragraph: 
“Perhaps not this. It makes no sense.”) 
Shimony:  So far I haven't written a mixture there, but you used 
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Furry:  It's a bi-linear form and the other is a linear form.  
Band: Just look at one system, a pure state or a mixed state. You know 
less about it, you want to describe this state as a pure or mixed 
state.  If you describe it as a mixed state, you should describe it as 
a functional of the wave function and not as a function. 
Furry:  I don't think I can agree with you, Professor Band, I mean 
after all, there may be theories in which one could establish this 
but, if one accepts the usual, powerful assumptions used in making the 
mathematical theory of quantum mechanics—well, though there have been 
criticisms of these powerful assumptions, no one has ever made the 
theory without them.  Then one proves very definitely that this bi-
linear form in the wave functions here, is the most general statistical 
situation.  
Shimony:  There's the mixture, as I take it, using projection opera- 
relations. 
Podolsky:  But, such a mixture, of course, is not a wave function. 
 
everything's good about it except one thing and that's that a ... 
Furry:  Except that I can't prove it logically. 
Shimony:  No, I think... 
Furry:  It only agrees with all the facts and that's its trouble. 
(Chuckles in the background.) 
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superposition; or you say that it is, but you can't distinguish 
epistomologically between a pure state and the corresponding mix-
ture.  Then you can say, "but it doesn't make any difference; after 
all, I only observe ensembles, I only observe large numbers of 
cases," and that's the strength of such a position.  But I think 
the weakness comes in a theory which does not tell you in principle 
what happens in individual cases.  That is, in principle, the ordinary 
quantum mechanics says that the reduction of the wave packet occurs 
not when you have a great number of identical electrons in the beam, 
but it occurs for each one of them.  
Furry:  Oh, yes. 
Shimony:  Now, your theory would say, well, we don't really care. 
Furry:  No, no, I don't say that.  There can be just one electron. 
If that one electron has been coupled in the measuring manner with 
a photographic plate as a macroscopic system in which there are an 
enormous number of particles—but, I don't even know how many 
particles there are, or its exact detailed structure, or its 
isotopic composition.  That photographic plate is just as good and 
as new a thing as I am for this purpose of calling the state a 
mixed state.  For making predictions about that single particle, of 
course, we won't get much of a pattern on our photographic plate, 
and no experimenter would ever do it.  But, the only differ- 
that quantum mechanics is not literally correct,  that is, when 
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ence between the beam business and the single particle business that can 
ever be distinguished experimentally is checked when one does the 
experiment, which has been done, running at such a low intensity that 
one particle comes through at a time.  You add them up, and one gets as 
a result the statistics that one can predict for a single particle.  
That is, for a single particle, one cannot predict what will happen 
exactly, one cannot say exactly what will happen, one can only give 
probability. What one gets piled up out of this business of sending one 
through at a time, when one has sent through a million, is just the 
accumulation of these.  I don't know about Ludwig's stuff, Ludwig's 
doctrine which I haven't read, but I don't feel what I am saying retreats 
from any experiments done with single particles, except this, that the 
experiment done on large numbers is recommended.  But, you never get 
much of a check of any statistical relation, because you never get much 
of a check of any statistical relation if you only take one case. 
Shimony:  Even a theory regarding only individual cases is checked 
 
Aharonov:  Here is the view crucially as far as cognition, namely, as far 
as the observer, in order to get over your difficulty, right... Anyhow, 
this is how we describe the relation between macroscopic things and 
microscopic things in ordinary statistical mechanics. There you have the 
same thing that you have to give some kind of quantum mechanics. 
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on the formalism of quantum mechanics. 
Furry:  I am asking for something that the formalism doesn't contain, 
finally when you describe a measurement.  Now, classical theory 
doesn't contain any description of measurement.  It doesn't contain 
anywhere near as much theory of measurement as we have here. There is 
a gap in the quantum mechanical theory of measurement. In classical 
theory there is practically no theory of measurement at all, as far 
as I know.  Now, quantum theory does an awful lot more for us than 
classical theory.  And I have a suspicion that this is the point in 
which we should stop making demands on the instruments of classical 
theory, and as Professor Dirac says, "There are other problems too 
hard for us."  They really are the ones we ought to be thinking 
about. 
Podolsky:  There is no way of telling what path we have to take in 
order to get the kind of a theory we want to have.  Possibly by 
examining these difficulties we may get some clues as to what kind of 
a theory. 
Aharonov:  Class one difficulties? 
Podolsky:  Yes, class one difficulties. 
Band:  This thing you wrote up there says something about a mixture 
operator? The result of the operation is a pure state, which is 
another state, that is still a pure state. 
Furry:  Oh, yes, you apply this to a wave function.  You see this 
is not a combination of kets, this is a bra and ket back to back. 
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Band:  Yeh, I know this.  It's a quantum mechanical operator, some 
kind of operator.  I wanted to have the concept whereby you say, as 
far as my knowledge is concerned, I don't know what state it is in, 
but I allow it to be in a mixture of states.  This is his condition 
of my knowledge of the system.  I don't represent that con- 
 
what I mean by a function of the wave function.  It may be something 
that's missing in quantum mechanical descriptions.  It may be the 
conclusions have to be statistical. 
Furry:  Well, it may be that with the restrictions on the postulates. 
Many people, including very distinguished people, have said we really 
ought to make a more general description of what one really means.  
But, no one has ever given it, and if one does use the powerful 
postulates, as many people have used, everyone uses them to derive the 
complete formal theory and in a formal mathematical way uses the 
powerful postulates including that famous one, of 
course, that any Hermitian operator that does not have certain 
pathological characteristics, is an observable, then you prove that 
this 
is the most general theory.  If there could be a more general one, 
somebody somehow or other has to find it. 
Band:  I don't get the connection between the mixture operation and 
the state of the system whose condition is not given. 
Furry:  Oh, this, as I see it, you must realize that this quantum 
argument I gave the other day is, this formal argument I gave the 
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other day,is not usually given.  The usual way to introduce the 
mixed state is the way that I have always done it in a class.  It 
is just to say that you ordinarily do not measure a complete set of 
observables.  "The measurement is ordinarily fragmentary concerning 
the ones you haven't measured, you can only make certain guesses, 
that is probabilistic guesses as to what they might have been, what 
the relative probabilities of different values are, and 
one then puts in these estimated probabilities for the different 
wave functions which the system might have, if the complete 
observation had been made, and had come out different ways.  One 
puts those in, these are to be established by the principle of 
insufficient reason, or by whatever other evidence is available, and 
then one goes ahead. 
Conference:  October 1-5, 1962 
Friday Afternoon - October 5,1962 
CLOSING REMARKS 
Professor Podolsky:  It seems to me that we have exhausted the 
questions that Dr. Schwebel is prepared to answer at the moment. 
Before closing this conference I would like you people 
individually, if you so feel like doing, to express your opinion 
about the desirability of this kind of a conference, a panel 
conference is different from most ordinary conferences. We would 
appreciate expression of opinion. 
Aharonov:  The question is not clear enough, do you mean this type 
of conference from the point of view of topic, or from the point 
of view of the number of people? 
Podolsky:  Prom the point of view of number of people, 
organization and everything else that went into it. Did you like 
the conference?  
Dirac:  I think it's much better to have a small conference like 
this where people can really have time to think about things.  In 
the larger conferences you get a paper every ten minutes.  
Therefore, it's pretty hard to follow after a while. 
Podolsky:  Thank you Dr. Dirac. Well, this is the kind of opinion 
I would like to hear from other people too.  
Carmi speaks: __________________________________________________. 
Podolsky:  Thank you, Dr. Carmi. Anybody else want to say 
something about it?  
Band: At this conference, I really learned something, whereas, at 
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other conferences I really don't learn much. Here you have plenty of 
opportunities to ask questions and get into discussions.  It's good to 
be able to sleep on it over night, and come back and talk about it the 
next day. 
Aharonov:  And we are certainly grateful to Mr. Hart for his help he 
gave to all of us in everything we have to do.  (hearty applause) 
Podolsky:  Thank you, gentlemen.  I do believe that Mr. Hart was more 
responsible for this conference than anybody else.  
Aharonov:  I think we should also mention the other people that were 
all the time around here to help us. 
Podolsky:  Oh yes, we had plenty of help from these other people. Would 
you like, Mr. Hart, to mention the names of all the people that helped 
you, just for the record? 
Hart: Well, for the record I would like to mention the immediate 
people in the room, first of all, starting with Dr. Podolsky. This 
could not have been done without his great help contacting Professor 
Dirac, Professor Wigner and Professor Aharonov.  I would like to thank 
Dr. Werner for his tremendous enthusiasm for this type of conference, 
and for helping to sustain me in some of the effort that we had to go 
through to bring this about.  I would also like to mention in our 
immediate group at this University, Mr. Fisher. I appreciate all the 
work that he has done recording these sessions and I particularly hope 
that he was able to record Professor Dirac's comments as well as Dr. 
Aharonov's, in their mentioning of the fruitfulness of this type of 
conference.  I would like to thank 
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Mr. Towle for help in handling the cameras, and Mr. Robert Podolsky, who 
is not here at the present time, for helping to record some of the 
material put on the blackboard and taking notes also.  There have been a 
lot of people who may be considered, as Dr. Furry mentioned at one time, 
I believe, our part of the hidden variables of this conference. We have 
Mr. Weber in our development office, who went to a considerable amount 
of trouble in trying to secure and actually obtaining the necessary 
funds for the conference, and also our Public Relations Department, Mr. 
Vonderhaar and Mr. Bocklage.  I know that there are others, and it's 
dangerous to list people by name because, I almost of necessity will 
have forgotten to name people explicitly.  I would like to offer my 
tremendous thanks to the main participants who honored us with their 
presence at this conference.  There is no doubt about it, that without 
them it could not have been put on and would not have been a success at 
all, and without the tremendous enthusiasm that all these people 
manifested during the past week. Wow last but not least, I think we 
should be tremendously appreciative of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, the Office of Naval Research, and also The Judge 
Robert Marx Foundation for contributing the necessary funds to make this 
possible.  Now I would like to mention, although he is not here now. Dr. 
Jack Soules, of the Office of Naval Research. He was the first man in any 
government agency who, without qualification or hesitation just took it 
upon himself to say,  "This looks like such a good conference, yes, you 
will get the money." He was 
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among us here for a time.  He just left last night. Well, I think at 
the present time this is all that I have to say? I do hope that 
perhaps within the next couple of years or so, if you are willing 
and the agencies are willing, we might possibly duplicate this and 
make it much better, because I have learned from mistakes I have made 
this time.  Thank you very much. 
Podolsky:  Anything else anyone wishes to say before we close the 
conference? 
Werner:  I just want to say on behalf of the students of the 
University, and also some of the people of the community, who for a 
while were students at the University here, who came to the lectures, 
that they certainly have indicated a great deal of appreciation for 
the stimulation that has been given here.  All of those who came, 
who came and helped to have this conference go on, the students both 
regularly enrolled and ones who came especially to the conference, 
express their deep appreciation to you who gave so much inspiration.  
I think your work here will continue in ways that perhaps go beyond 
where you may ever see fully in detail how much you have given. 
Podolsky:  Thank you, Dr. Werner.  I now declare this conference 
closed. 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
QUANTUM MECHANICS  
A conference report by F. G. Werner 
What are the leading problems of quantum physics 
today? Where does reduction of the wave-packet 
occur? Why single -valued wave functions? To what 
extent have relativity theory and quantum theory 
really been united consistently? Does it make sense 
to speak of "quantum mechanical action at a dis-
tance"? What is the significance of electromagnetic 
potentials in the quantum domain? What does a 
leading quantum physicist have to say about the 
physicist's picture of nature? 
Yakir Aharonov, P. A. M. Dirac, Wendell Furry, 
Boris Podolsky, Nathan Rosen, and Eugene Wigner 
engaged in vigorous discussions of these questions 
at a special five-day conference called by Professor 
Podolsky at Xavier University in Cincinnati. The 
Conference on the Foundations of Quantum Me-
chanics was sponsored jointly by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Office 
of Naval Research, and the Judge Robert S. Marx 
Foundation. Although the meeting took place during 
the week of October 1-5, 1962, the writing of this 
report had to wait until the entire conference 
proceedings could be transcribed and submitted to 
the participants for approval. 
Years ago, when the number of physicists at a 
meeting was so small that all could fit easily into a 
single room, the spirit of free discussion so vital for 
the progress of physics was characteristic of most 
conferences. Today, with the large meetings 
attended by hundreds of people and with many 
sessions going on simultaneously, it is difficult to 
create an atmosphere conducive to free and thor-
ough discussion. The prime purpose of the Xavier 
conference was to recapture some of that earlier 
spirit of intensity and depth in the exchange of 
ideas. 
The heart of the conference was a series of lim-
ited-attendance sessions designed to provide ample 
opportunity for the six participants to discuss 
among themselves questions concerning the foun-
dations of quantum mechanics, and to do so at 
F. G. Werner, the author of this account of th e proceedings of 
the five-day conference on the foundations of quantum 
mechanics, is associate professor of physics at Xavier Univer-
sity in Cincinnati, where the meeting was held.  
sufficient length to establish clearly which issues 
are most in need of further clarification. In order 
that each main participant might feel free to ex-
press himself spontaneously in the spirit of the 
limited portion of the conference, Chairman Podol-
sky adopted the policy that references to remarks 
made by the participants dur ing the conference 
were to be checked with the persons who said them 
for approval prior to publication. These 
limited-attendance sessions were also attended by 
about twenty observers, who were expected to speak 
only when called upon by the chairman. 
While at Xavier for the conference, four of the 
participants delivered lectures which were open to 
the public. Aharonov spoke on the significance of 
potentials in the quantum domain. Furry lectured 
on the quantum-mechanical description of states 
and measurements. Wigner discussed the concept 
of observation in quantum mechanics. Dirac ad-
dressed visiting physicists and students on evolution 
of the physicist's picture of nature. 
Aharonov, in the first part of his public talk, 
summarized some previously treated effects of 
potentials in the quantum domain connected with 
interference and energy shift caused by potentials 
in field-free regions. Here he emphasized three gen-
eral points: (a) the effects of potentials are all 
peculiar to quantum theory in that they all dis-
appear in the classical limits; (b) they all make 
themselves evident only in nonsimply connected 
regions, in which freedom from finite field values 
does not ensure that potentials may be gauged to 
zero; (c) all these effects of potentials in quantum 
theory depend on the gauge-invariant line integral 
of the four-vector potentials around a closed loop 
in space-time in a manner not affected by the addition 
of integer multiples of ch/e. Aharonov suggested 
that these results peculiar to quantum theory be taken 
as a hint that we do not yet fully understand all the 
most characteristic consequences of quantization of 
the electromagnetic field theory.  
In the. second part of his "talk, Aharonov ques-
tioned whether there might not be some residual 
quantum effects of potentials in simply connected 
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regions. Although classically defined vector 
potentionals may always be gauged away in any 
field-free simply connected region, this may not 
necessarily be the case for q-number potentials. To 
see the difference between the quantum and the 
classical case, said Aharonov, "Remember that both 
theories distinguish between canonical and 
kinematical momentum. Nevertheless, it is only in 
quantum theory that canonical momentum acquires 
an independent significance, in particular through 
uncertainty relations and the demands of 
single-valued-ness of the wave function. Thus in 
the quantum theory we might have a situation in 
which both canonical momentum and vector 
potential are uncertain in such a way that their 
difference, which depends on the kinematical 
velocity, is still certain." He illustrated the 
possibility of observable consequences of this 
distinction in "a possible residual correlation 
between electrons moving in a simply connected 
region with a well-defined velocity and the 
quantum-mechanical source of uncertain vector 
potential"; the attempt to remove such vector 
potentials in a simply connected region through a 
(q-number gauge-transformation, he pointed out, 
would not leave this correlation invariant and 
therefore this will have an observable consequence. 
Aharonov went on to discuss the importance of 
this aspect of potentials and of its relationship to 
quantization of magnetic flux in superconductors 
verified in recent experiments. He also discussed the 
state of experimental verification and experimental 
work in progress. 
Furry, in his public talk in the afternoon, de-
scribed the regular formulation of the theory of 
measurement in standard quantum mechanics in 
order to provide a background for various further 
discussions. He discussed the generality of the Gibbs 
ensemble and the "realistic interpretation" where 
"we could think of many systems, some prepared 
one way, some prepared another way, and the ex-
periment consists of measuring on a system drawn 
from this ensemble". He emphasized that a mixed 
state, which is the outcome of a measurement, does 
not mean a state which has a wave function formed 
from a linear combination of some other wave func-
tions. "It has no definite wave function at all," 
Furry stated. "It has instead a list of probabilities 
for different wave functions. In applying it, one 
appeals to the principle of insufficient reason in 
precisely the same way that one does in classical 
probability theory. But there is another source of 
dispersion in quantum mechanics—and it has no 
classical analog. It is something entirely different 
from the Gibbs ensemble and has nothing whatever 
to do with the Gibbs ensemble. But it is true that 
if you work in the most general possible way, you 
can build the Gibbs ensemble situation on top of 
the quantum-mechanical situation, which is quite 
important for some purposes. Within the context of 
quantum mechanics it is not possible to ascribe 
this second form of dispersion to hidden parame-
ters." 
In discussing the description of measurement, 
Furry showed that the orthodox theory of 
quantum-mechanical measuring processes assumes 
choosing the interaction between the microsystem 
and the apparatus so cleverly that after their 
interaction, the system (apparatus plus microsystem) 
has a wave function of the form, 
)()()(),,( qxTcTxq nnnn fmy å= .  
Here, )(qnf is an eigenfunction of the dynamical 
variable being measured, )(xnm is an eigenfunction 
of the apparatus -pointer position, and 
2
)(Tcn is 
the probability of obtaining the result numbered 
by n. Thus, by observing the state of the apparatus 
)(xnm , the state of the microsystem can be inferred. 
Furry remarked that in both classical and quantum 
theory we don't say what we do when we make a 
measurement. 
"In the so-called Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen para-
dox," said Furry, "we have a situation which 
theorists cannot ignore, and where the realistic 
interpretation fails completely. It is just not avail-
able. The property of wholeness of the quantum 
state can apply to systems in which the parts be-
come widely separated and in which one deals with 
only one part." This is analogous to the wholeness 
of the quantum state which London has empha-
sized in the theory of superconductivity and super-
fluidity. Furry pointed out that for macroscopic 
systems covering macroscopic distances—and in that 
case with a great many particles in them—one has 
the essential wholeness of the quantum state giving 
special properties to the macroscopic system. 
In his public talk, Wigner began by declaring 
most emphatically (three times) that "there is no 
logical flaw in the structure of orthodox quantum 
theory". But in quantum experiments "the instru-
ment may even be in a state having no classical 
analog. . . . How we eventually get the information 
is not described and cannot be described clearly by 
quantum mechanics." He noted that on entering 
science we are filled with idealism concerning the 
wonderful nature of science and how much it will 
accomplish for us; but in quantum mechanics only 
the probability connections between subsequent ob-
servations are meaningful. Questions about the 
process of observation, he said, presently lead to 
answers such as "We learned that as children," 
which brings home the fact that "we cannot make  
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science without being unscientific. . . . This teaches 
us a little humility in our science." 
In discussing the implications of relativistic 
in-variance in quantum field theory, Wigner 
questioned how realistic the theory is, since 
measurements of field strength at points accurate 
enough to detect quantum effects have not been 
accomplished because of "very grave difficulties". He 
also wondered why we almost exclusively measure 
positions, when the theory says that every 
self-adjoint operator can be measured. "Nobody 
really believes that everything is measurable. It is 
absurd to think of it. . . .  [But] I feel terribly 
uneasy about it. . . .  A really phenomenological 
theory would not only say that there is a 
measurement but would tell how it should be 
carried out." Wigner said that one way to do this 
would be to reduce every physical problem to one of 
collision, and to perform calculations using the 
collision matrix, but, he added, "there are, in this 
world, other things of interest in addition to 
collisions." 
In concluding his talk, Wigner returned to the 
question of how knowledge and understanding are 
acquired. Although this question is crucial to phys ics, 
he indicated that we must also look elsewhere for 
the beginnings of an answer. "Science," he said, "has 
taught us that in order to understand some thing we 
must devote a great deal of careful and detailed 
thinking to the subject in question." He noted that 
physics has little to say regarding the acquiring of 
knowledge, which "teaches us a great deal of 
humility as to the power of physics itself. It also 
gives us a good deal of interest in the other 
sciences. . . .  I think that an integration [including] 
more than physics will be needed before we can 
arrive at a balanced and more encompassing view 
of the world, rather than one which we derive from 
the ephemeral necessities of present-day physics." 
Rosen took charge of a panel discussion for an 
entire afternoon. The group, which also included 
Wigner, Podolsky, Furry, and Aharonov, discussed 
questions developed that morning at a question 
workshop, to which the public had been invited, 
conducted by William Wright, Dieter Brill, and 
Frederick Werner. The workshop offered those in 
attendance an opportunity to receive technical help 
in formulating their questions. The individuals 
who did so were invited to stay for lunch and to 
join the other observers in the afternoon to hear 
their questions discussed by the panel members. 
The first such query asked, "What is meant by 
the statement that an operator is observable? How 
does one distinguish which are observable?" The 
ensuing discussion by the panel participants might 
be paraphrased as follows: 
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Furry: "As Professor Wigner and I remarked, it's 
nice to have powerful mathematical weapons if you 
are making a mathematical theory. If you're inter-
ested in powerful mathematical assumptions to 
make various deductions easy, you make the assertion 
that every Hermitian operator has a spectrum that 
can be measured. On the other hand, very eminent 
physicists have held strongly to the position that 
one should regard as measurable only things for 
which we can describe, at least in principle, an 
actual physical arrangement for making the 
measurement. And such one finds in the de-
scriptions that Pauli worked out in the early part of 
his Handbook article. (This adds a little bonus, I 
might say, for the old custom of learning to read 
German, which was universal among graduate stu-
dents when I was one, and is not so universal 
today.) These measurable quantities include, of 
course, position within certain limits, and momen-
tum, energy, and angular momentum. As Professor 
Wigner said, that is just about the end of the list. 
Time, of course, is not an operator in nonrelativistic 
quantum mechanics. Time measurement is just a 
procedure for tagging things with a parame ter. 
Now if you arm yourself only with positions, it is 
much more difficult to prove all the theorems." 
Wigner: "How can you measure position?" Furry: 
"Well, with Heisenberg's gamma-ray microscope." 
Wigner: "You don't measure position with that! At 
what time do you measure position?" (meaning: 
the measurement took place at what definite time, if 
any?) 
Aharonov: "What about separating shutters?" Furry:  
"Yes,  that  is  the  method  Bohr ordinarily used.   
One  can   plan   ahead   but   the  experiment might 
fail." 
Aharonov: (referring to the statement above that 
in practice only positions can be measured) "One 
can measure energy jumps and thus—if the energy 
is a sufficiently quantitatively detailed function of 
momentum and position—from the spectrum find 
the value of operators which are, in general, com-
plicated functions of momentum and position. So 
life is not so bad after all." 
Furry: "That's right, a single measurement of en-
ergy will get you quite a lot of different operators 
associated with it." 
Gideon Carmi, a conference observer, asked: 
"What is a measuring apparatus, and what is the 
relationship between observables and dynamical 
invariants of the system? Some people feel that 
there is much more to this relationship than ap-
pears on the surface." Wigner: "I'm afraid I am one 
of those people. I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
think that  i t  is  a  very useful  thing to analyze in 
detail what you really measure with a gamma -ray  
microscope.  But  Dr.  Furry withdrew from the 
gamma -ray microscope, with good reason. Then he 
said, 'Let us erect barriers separating the space into 
many regions, and then we can leisurely investigate 
in which one the system is found, converting posi-
t ion  in to  a  s ta t ionary  s ta te . '  What  i s  measured  a t  
al l  with ease are stat ionary properties.  Arake and 
Yanase found that  only those operators  can be 
measured without approximation which commute 
with all conserved quantities. Now one of the 
con -served  addit ive  quant i t ies  is  energy,  so that  
they must be already then stationary quantities. It is 
also evident  that  in  the relat ivist ic  theory,  i f  i t  
commutes  wi th  the  ene rgy ,  i t  w i l l  have  a  ve ry  
ha rd  time unless it  commutes with momentum also. 
Furthermore,  the measurement of posit ion,  which 
Dr.  Furry mentioned,  destroyed the invariance of  
the system by erect ing the barr iers . I t  isn ' t  a  bona 
f ide  measurement  because  i t  does  not  leave  the  
system alone. It changes the wave function very 
considerably. It is very difficult to measure some -
thing that is really easily measurable that is not 
stationary. It follows from general theory  of obser-
vat ion that  unless the measured quanti ty is  s ta -
t ionary,  no such measurement is  possible.  The 
interaction between instrument and object must be 
consistent with the principles of invariance." (Note: 
Further discussions are taking place between Wig -
ner and Aharonov, who has a different interpreta -
t ion  of  th i s  po in t . )  
The queries  from the quest ion workshop con -
t inued:  " Is  i t  jus t i f ied  to  make a  theory  ignor ing  a t  
the  outset  quest ions  of  the  measur ing process ,  and 
then expect  to  obtain,  by means of  that theory, a  
description of the measuring process?" Aharonov: 
"The point of view that measurement theory is 
something very special seems to me a very subjective 
one. There are only special kinds of interaction 
taking place in nature anyhow, and interactions  
with human beings are no more spe c i a l  t h a n  a n y  
o t h e r .  W e  d o n ' t  h a v e  t o  p u t  i n  a  foreign interaction 
for the measuring process. We believe the theory 
should be valid also for con siderations of measuring 
processes." Podolsky: "That assumes, however, that  
the meas urement process involves nothing but 
interaction. But actually,  i t  involves a good deal 
more. It in volves the question of reduction of a wave 
packet. You say at a certain point you read a pointer 
or something l ike that.  You have the object on wh ich 
the measurement is performed. You have the meas -
ur ing  ins t rument .  You es tab l i sh  a  cor re la t ion  
t h rough  t he  i n t e r ac t i on  a t  t he  app rop r i a t e  t ime . 
Then  we  say  we  r ead  these  measuremen t s  and  
ignore the others. As you pointed out, Professor 
Wigner,  we cannot separate the measuring instru -
ment from all the other objects. In order to meas ure  
someth ing  abou t  t he  e l ec t ron ,  we  have  to  measure 
something about  this  measuring instru ment.  How 
do we do it? We've got to have another measuring 
instrument,  unless we ca n  somewhere  say, 'Well 
now, I know what this measuring instru ment is 
doing. '  And that  is  an addit ional assump t ion  in  the  
theory."  
Aharonov: "I think it is inconsistent to say that it  
should  col lapse  suddenly ,  only  when we human 
beings  are  coming and looking a t  the  thing.  Suppose 
we consider such a large system independently of the 
fact that we call it a measuring process, but cons ider  
s imply  tha t  th i s  k ind  of  in te rac t ion  i s  going on. 
There the collapse should happen independent ly  of  
whether we call  i t  a  measurement  process or not, or 
whether we prepare it as a meas urement process. If 
the theory is consistent, independent  of  quest ions  of  
measurement  theory,  i t  shou ld  a l so  answer  
p rob lems  o f  measu remen t  theory, because 
measurement theory serves only to point to some 
special difficulties of the theory. But these are 
independent of the question of measure ment."  
Podolsky: "I disagree."  
Wigner:  "There are perhaps two points of view on 
this subject. Ludwig, who made use of exactly the 
point of view of Dr. Aha ronov, said that quantum 
mechanics is not suited to describe macroscopic ob-
jects ,  because there the contract ion of  the wave 
packet takes place under all  conditions.  The other 
point  of  view is  that  quantum mechanics  appl ies  
even to macroscopic objects, and  the collapse of the 
wave packet takes place only through the act of 
cognit ion.  This  is  ent i rely tenable.  I t  says that  
quantum mechanics gives us only probability con -
nections between subsequent observations or cog -
nitions. I never succeeded in finding out  what Dr. 
Dirac thinks about it,  because he dodges the issue. 
But  there  are  two points  of  v iew and I  th ink we 
must admit we don't  know, with absolute certainty, 
the answer.  I  agree with Dr.  Podolsky 's  opinion."  
This  in te rchange  i s  ind ica t ive  of  the  na ture  o f  
the debate between the main participants which 
continued throughout the afternoon. It  is clear that 
no complete agreement among the panelists was 
reached as far as the first questions were concerned. 
The  next  ques t ion  f rom the  workshop  was :  
"Today,  what  would  you cons ider  to  be  the  bes t  
reply to the arguments of Einstein, Podolsky, and 
Rosen?" After  much discussion,  the panel  agreed 
tha t  the  top ic  i s  s t i l l  a s  cha l l eng ing  as  ever ,  and  
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that, although the mathematical formalism of 
quantum theory is perfectly consistent, it is still 
very difficult to find a way to picture, by a model, 
some of its subtle consequence, such as the so-called 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. Some went so far 
as to say that perhaps this is an indication that at 
some point a modification may be necessary in the 
formalism to overcome these difficulties. 
Another interesting problem, raised by Carmi 
and discussed by Wigner and Aharonov, was the 
question "What would be, from the point of view 
of quantum theory, the best way to define a classical 
object?" They concluded that this is another 
difficulty: macroscopic measuring devices cannot be 
treated fully by quantum theory. Since any such 
macroscopic object is built from single ele ctrons 
and other elementary particles, it seems reasonable 
to assume that this difficulty may be reflected even 
in the treatment of single particles. 
The last main question considered at the after-
noon panel discussion concerned the question of 
potentials and gauges in quantized theory. Aharo-
nov replied with a further discussion of quantum 
gauges, which he put forward in his public talk.  
The lively spirit of the extended discussions on 
problems of quantum mechanics, so evident in the 
panel discussion, carried through to the 
limited-attendance sessions. Hugh Everett flew to 
Cincinnati from Washington to present his 
relative-state formalism. Some of the observers also 
offered interesting comments concerning various 
related problems. Merzbacher discussed the 
important question of the single-valued character of 
the wave function, its necessity, and its consequences. 
Guth discussed, among other things, a formulation 
of a nonrela -tivistic Schrödinger equation for a 
particle moving in an electromagnetic field, and 
showed that one can transform it to an equivalent 
equation dealing only with local gauge-invariant 
quantities. Nevertheless, one could show that the 
Aharonov-Bohm effect can be incorporated in 
such a theory. Schwebel reported on a 
reformulation of quantum electrodynamics without 
photons (published elsewhere), and Rivers spoke on 
an interpretation of metric which he was preparing 
for publication. Shimony discussed the general state 
of affairs in measurement theory, giving some 
challenging thoughts of his own. 
The high point of the conference was P. A. M. 
Dirac's talk on "The Evolution of the Physicist's 
Picture of Nature" (which was subsequently pub-
lished in the Scientific American, May 1963). In 
keeping with the idea that the development of 
general physical theory is a continuing process of 
evolution, he gave a brief account of some past 
achievements and discussed, in more detail, present 
difficulties and a few of his ideas on possible future 
developments. 
Dirac emphasized that progress in theoretical 
physics sometimes crucially depends on having 
beauty, based on sound mathematical insight, in 
one's equations, rather than only having them agree 
with experiments. Present difficulties suggest that 
we are in a transitional stage, and present theories 
are stepping stones to better stages in the future. 
"The hostility some people have to [the giving 
up of the deterministic picture of nature] can be 
centered on a much-discussed paper by Einstein, 
Podolsky, and Rosen," Dirac noted. He left this as 
essentially a problem of describing quantum uncer-
tainty and indeterminacy in a way satisfying to our 
philosophical ideas. But, since evolution goes for-
ward, "of course there will not be a return to the 
determinism of classical physical theory." Physicists, 
he said, are most concerned with difficulties stem-
ming from the fact that present quantum mechanics 
is not always adequate to give any results. 
Dirac indicated his belief that separate, unex-
pected ideas will be needed for each difficulty, even 
though most physicists "are inclined to think one 
master idea will be discovered that will solve all 
these problems together." After mentioning several 
examples of these problems, he presented some 
ideas that he has been developing recently: intro-
ducing "something corresponding to the 
luminiferous ether" of the 19th century which 
would be subject to the quantum uncertainty 
relations, discrete Faraday lines of force, and a 
finite-sized electron. Also, since the description of 
nature sometimes gets simplified when one departs 
from four-dimensional symmetry, Dirac expressed 
doubts as to its overriding importance in future 
theories. He said "The physics of the future cannot 
have h, e, and e all as fundamental quantities." If e 
and c are fundamental (as he suggested) then h will 
be derived, and "one can make a safe guess that 
uncertainty relations in their present form will 
not survive." 
In conclusion, Dirac said he thinks ideas more 
drastic than his may be needed to make any real 
fundamental progress. To describe the laws of na-
ture, we need "a mathematical theory of great 
beauty and power. One could perhaps describe the 
situation by saying God is a mathematician of a 
very high order, and He used very advanced mathe-
matics in constructing the universe. Our feeble 
attempts at mathematics enable us to understand 
a bit of the universe, and as we proceed to develop 
higher and higher mathematics we can hope to 
understand the universe rather better." 
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